shahrezad's profileShahrezad's hjerterumPhotosBlogListsMore  |  Tools Help |
Integration Muslims and Integration in Europe
Zafer Şenocak
is one of the most prominent and versatile German Turkish writer today. A prize-winning poet, translator, editor, political and philosophical essayist, and fiction writer, Şenocak is the most challenging voice of the Turkish population in Germany. His stylish and provocative essays explore taboo and repressed aspects of relations between Occident and Orient, Europe and Islam. His fiction has won him international acclaim. Abdelkader Benali was born in Ighazzazen, Morocco in 1975 and moved to Rotterdam when he was four years old to join his father who was working there. He spoke Berber but soon started to write successfully in Dutch, winning several literary competitions. Acclaim for Benali's work followed rapidly, with translations of the novel, Wedding by the sea, appearing in many countries including England, the US, France and Germany.
In their correspondence, Zafer Senocak (one of the most prominent and versatile German Turkish writer) and Abdelkader Benali (a brilliant Dutch-Moroccan novelist and author) discuss their experiences in two different cultures and the integration problems Muslims are facing today. Berlin, 30 March 2006 Dear Abdelkader, Zafer Senocak | I grew up in a family in which religion played a major role. During the fifties and sixties, my father was the publisher of one of the most influential Muslim magazines in Turkey. The magazine, which was simply called "Islam" was an intellectual platform for a conservative variety of Islam which tended towards theology, mysticism and philosophy. His kind of Islam was at the same time not directed towards politics: that approach to Islam had been largely banished from public life since the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. My mother, on the other hand, was a primary school teacher who came from a family of secularised civil servants. Her father was a judge – one of the first generation of lawyers in the Turkish republic. Her family viewed Islam as something for the lower classes, symbolised by the headscarf of the peasant women and domestic servants. For them, Islam was the main reason for the country's backwardness. For centuries, hadn't Hodjas prevented progress with their dubious legal judgements? They had even prohibited the introduction of the printing press, for fear that such a machine might be used to duplicate the Holy Koran. On the other side, Atatürk had liberated women from their social imprisonment, set the truths of science and research above those of religion and initiated a process of Enlightenment. In such an environment, my father was an outsider with his views and religious convictions. But his position as an outsider always fascinated me. He was an artistic man, and much more open than the strict Kemalists when it came to matters of art and social conventions. What was he really fighting for? For his role as a man, for his faith, for his dignity, for democracy and human rights? At least in my case, the so-called "clash of civilisations" was fought out within my own family. I always regard tension as something from which creative energy can emerge, and so I found myself quite happy in the role of an observer of these different worlds and values, even though I was repeatedly made aware that a dialogue on matters of faith is only possible in a very limited way. All the same, those committed to the enlightenment, who believe in the responsibility of the individual, and those who are committed to faith, who see themselves as God's creatures, are dependent on each other. The former reminds people of their creative potential, the latter of their limitations. One without the other leads to slavery. The Turkey of the sixties no longer exists. The headscarf is no longer a symbol of the lower class; it's now a symbol of the women who want to study but are prohibited from doing so because they wear it. Even the prime minister's wife wears one. For that reason she is not permitted to attend official receptions of the Turkish state. It's a paradox that the regime which wanted to liberate women from their isolation now prevents them from appearing in public. Muslim women are justified in seeing this as discrimination. But what kind of religion is it which tells you what clothes you should wear? What has God to do with sex? Why does the man have to be protected from the attractions of women? Wouldn't life be more beautiful if we (we men?) were allowed to observe these attractions in all their splendour? What is the advantage for women of these restrictions? For a long time, people thought the issue of religion had been dealt with – at least ever since the time of sexual liberation. But sexual liberation never arrived in Muslim societies, mainly because it's a very Western-Christian phenomenon. In Muslim culture, sex doesn't need to be liberated from its connection with smuttiness – it's simply there: a natural phenomenon. But it has to be regulated, just like everything else has to be regulated. And it quickly becomes an issue of honour, always seen from the male perspective. It is scarcely possible to imagine a greater tendency towards structure and discipline than in Muslim society. In fact, in that way, it's very German, even though since Hitler the need for structure and discipline in Germany is not celebrated quite so excessively. I saw an extract from a film recently. In it, the Netherlands presents itself to potential immigrants. There was a woman in the film, topless. At least that is honest. That is more or less how people in Muslim countries imagine the West: as a powerful machine for business and sex. But is that the way the West really wants to be seen? Can one, should one separate the human body from sexual desire, and does that bring about a more liberated relationship with oneself? In Germany, there is a lively debate on the issues of the low birth rate and the decline of the family and plenty of discussion about values. It was only ten years ago when people in Germany were talking about the Fun Society. Everyone was supposed to be partying. It shows how quickly times change. Nowadays time is divided into tiny splinters. Perhaps that is one cause of the general feeling that people do not know where they are going or what they should do. The late pope worked his way to pop star status with slogans like "no contraception" and "no sex before marriage." That too is the West. Sometimes I have the feeling that people here envy Muslims for their large "intact" families and for their general sense of community. This furtive envy is scarcely a satisfactory precondition for promoting individualism. Does the West want to make its open society more attractive for Muslim immigrants, does it demand from them more respect and loyalty? The thought that the entire immigration process has an erotic element seems convincing to me. The two sides can only unite so long as there is a mutual attraction between them. Zafer *** Amsterdam, 4 April 2006 Dear Zafer, Abdelkader Benali | I am astonished by how globalised we have become during the last ten years, due to the Internet, cheap plane tickets and the mutual attraction between cultures. We can see this globalisation from events like 9/11 and the war in Iraq and now I, Abdelkader Benali, who was born in the poor north of Morocco of semi-illiterate parents and whose father moved to Europe in the sixties and worked as a Gastarbeiter before establishing himself as a butcher in Rotterdam, am writing in proper English to a German-Turkish author, discussing interesting topics like the headscarf, secularism vs. religion and the best way to avoid misinterpretation. We have met in Maastricht, the city where the famous treatise was signed that opened the way to a unified monetary Europe. At that time this idea of Europe (as de Gaulle would have said) was seen by many hard-toiling people as a cheat. Nothing good would come of it. Abdelkader Benali was born in Ighazzazen, Morocco in 1975 and moved to Rotterdam when he was four years old to join his father who was working there. He spoke Berber but soon started to write successfully in Dutch, winning several literary competitions. Acclaim for Benali's work followed rapidly, with translations of the novel, Wedding by the sea, appearing in many countries including England, the US, France and Germany. Since then a lot of complaints have been raised about the big world we are living in; our leaders have been scorned and it serves them right; but it looks as if even the staunchest opponent of this Europe has turned mild or in the least has tuned down his earlier criticism. Nowadays the number one topic is Islam in Europe and the question if the laws, morals and social standards of Muslims are compatible with the prevailing secular society. I sense confusion in this discussion and – after what happened in Amsterdam with Theo van Gogh and the rise of a right wing government that has launched a political program of Muslim containment – fear. Among the common people there's the idea that nothing good can come out of Muslims. Their behaviour is backward; and as arguments to justify their view they point to the headscarf that covers the head but suppresses the woman, or the way Muslims slaughter their lambs on the Feast of Sacrifice, or their anti-Western rhetoric when it comes to issues like globalisation and separation of State and Church. The first time I saw Muslim immigrants represented as a group was in a German movie I watched as a child. The story dealt with a group of Turkish immigrants who had come in a van from Anatolia to work as Gastarbeiter in Germany. They sleep in the van, pray and barely talk to each other. In Berlin, City of Sin, they end up in a sex show. They see a couple copulate naked on the stage. People have paid to see this and they applaud when the man has ejaculated. People never applaud for a woman reaching her orgasm. My parents would never allow me to watch that very explicit part of the movie, but somehow I saw it. I never forgot it. Muslim immigrants abhor cheap sex. And suddenly I am looked on as an author with a Muslim background who can tell society and its well-wishers how to deal with this homogeneous part of the population. When people ask me what I think, I always know how to tease them. I think a writer should tease. Especially now with so much hullabaloo going on. "How are we going to solve the Muslim problem," people ask me. "I don't see a problem," I respond. "What do you mean, you don't see a problem?" "What do you mean by problem?" "Well, don't you see that the second generation of Moroccans looks down on Western culture, they are anti-Semitic to the core, they import their woman from their country of origin, try to emulate the traditional life of their parents and they still eat with their hands." "What is the problem with eating with your hands?" "You know what I mean." I just have to smile before I answer. "Did you read this inquiry that has just come out in the Netherlands?" I respond. "Forum, an institute that follows trends in multicultural society has asked young Muslims about their religious behaviour, their points of view on life issues and so on. And what has come out of it, among the facts, is that scarcely any of them attends mosque. They care more about the right model of Prada's than the right position for praying in the direction of Mecca. They are young and like all the young they are extreme. So they feel extreme emotions, dress extreme and talk extreme. Look at the generation of '68 that put flowers in their hair and listened to very strange music and called for world revolution. How many of them really pursued their goals?" The discussion has not ended yet. Intelligent people who have found a Moroccan-Dutch writer who is open to discussing everything from Islam in the Valley of the Palms in Southern Morocco to Mahler's Fifth can be very, very persistent. "But calling for love and peace is different from calling for jihad and death to the infidel. This generation has no respect whatsoever." "Maybe they resemble the general attitude of our times. To have no respect for authority, to be critical of Bush, Blair, to say it like it is, to raise issues concerning discrimination and social injustice and to ask again what it means to be religious in secular times – that's not only confined to young Muslims. Everybody talks about such things, the game is open." "So you say they are not different?" "I call a spade a spade and to me all the spades look alike." "Even when they wear a headscarf?" "You know: I see girls with headscarves who wear make-up and smoke cigarettes. That looks like a contradiction but one day I saw a Turkish girl with a headscarf (Turkish girls wear their headscarves totally differently from Moroccan girls) holding a dog on a leash. That is a contradiction in terms at its most sublime extreme." "So you don't see the threat?" "I see a lot of dogs on a leash." "Some of these dogs can bite." "Some of these dogs are totally harmless." "Some headscarves want more headscarves and are controlled by a man with a beard." "Some headscarves enjoy great sex, even if they don't talk about it, even if they keep it secret to society. Do we need a ScarfStock, like the generation of the sixties needed a Woodstock to confirm its total liberation from everything, so that it could say it had solved the existential riddle that haunted society after the Second World War?" "So you don't see the threat?" "I am a realist. I think we should have strong security services to undermine attacks on our civil society. But I think personal freedom is more under attack now than the so-called civil society is." "I wish you were right." "And I wish arguments could turn even the most fearsomely intelligent person into somebody who trusts the future and is willing to fight for it." "So you want to bring down the threat?!" "Maybe." "You can't win." "Why not?" "Because the threat doesn't play games." "We will see about that." Abdelkader *** Berlin, 11 April 2006 Dear Abdelkader, | You write about the globalised world in which we live. This world is a real challenge especially for us writers, since we need a certain slowness in order to work. After all, writing is nothing if it is not slowing down the flow of speech so that we can win something meaningful from it. But the globalised world also opens up new fields of activity and spaces for communication. Is it merely chance, for example, that we are now communicating in a medium which specifically belongs to the globalised world? When people talk about the failure of multicultural societies they are, in my view, only expressing their failure in the face of the challenges of the globalised world. And the key element in this failure is "fear" – fear of the loss of the well-worn paths one has taken, of the ways of expression one has used, of the currencies with which one is used to paying. Every moment, the known can turn into the unknown, into something new. These permanent transformations are not seen as something exciting and enriching, but as a threat – especially since they are often linked with the loss of economic and political power. When the "guest workers" were first brought to Europe a half-century ago, nobody thought of the danger of Islam. Nowadays, people write books in which they prophecy a world controlled by Muslims. Muslim fascism threatens the "free" West, they write. But such scenarios only distract attention from the real problems. I recently saw a statistic which showed that in recent years it has become very difficult for young people of Turkish origin to get a vocational training place. The number of those who have such places has gone down by almost a third, while the number of Germans has at least remained the same, and in some parts of the country even improved. What will happen to those young men and women? What kind of future do they have? Is it possible to integrate people into society if they do not even have the basic necessities for living? Our society is an assembly line for outcasts. Many of these young people have nothing to do with religion. It's all the same to them whether the muezzin calls them to prayer or the church bells ring. But in public they are the Muslims: impossible to integrate, potential terrorists, misogynist, homophobic etc. It's true: we are seeing a brutalisation of behaviour, and to a certain extent there is also a radicalisation of opinion. Many of the young men grow up in a very traditional environment whose values and norms readily find themselves in conflict with those of a free, pluralistic society. But to see this social phenomenon in theological terms doesn't bring us a step further. There are some 120,000 Iranians living in Germany and most of them ascribe to the Muslim faith. But we never hear about them when people are talking about the "dangers" of Islam. That's because most of them come from the middle class, some of them even from the upper class. The Turks, on the other hand, were let into the country in their hundreds of thousands in the sixties to take up the dirty work in the coal mines and underground tunnels, and they have turned into a millions-strong lower class with small chances of upward social mobility. The jobs they used to do simply do not exist any more and the people who did them are simply no longer needed. Most of them are poorly trained, if at all, and their children are failures at school. Anyone who manages to crawl out of this hole – and quite a few do – has truly accomplished something. That's the real scandal we should be talking about. The intellectual discussion about Islam is a pointless debate. It doesn't reach the people it's talking about. It's a matter for the cultural pages of the newspapers. Let's return to the phenomenon of fear. I've got into the habit of sometimes changing my point of view when I write about this phenomenon. I stop being the one of whom others are afraid, and I become someone who is afraid of me. I imagine I'm one of those Germans who have been living in the same part of Berlin for decades. I work for a small company which is threatened with closure. I'm coming up to fifty, and the chances of finding another job are poor. And now they want to build a mosque in my part of town. People who look foreign, who always go around in groups, will gather there and say their prayers. I've found out from the media that they don't just say their prayers there. And anyway, their foreign looks, their strange clothes, their broken German all irritate me. I want to live in Germany with people like me. It's my country after all. What are these foreigners doing here anyway? My neighbour told me that most of them live off social welfare at our expense. He also says that we're dying out and that these "wogs" will inherit everything that we have built up with so much effort over the years. They have children like rabbits. No, when I'm taking part in a panel discussion or at the readings I give, I don't hear such arguments. Then I hear that the Turks don't want to integrate. And that there are simply too many of them here. Zafer *** Amsterdam, 26 April 2006 Dear Zafer, | The present discourse about multiculturalism, globalisation and reaching out to each other to answer the challenges of globalism is taking on more and more of the traits of an unpleasant drama. We love to talk about the good, the bad and the ugly that are stored up in humankind, but when in the meanwhile nations, regimes, democratically chosen leaders and not so democratically chosen leaders are preparing for war, are unwilling to give up their plans to enrich uranium, or continue to bombard innocent countries, everything positive that could be said begins to sound a little bit hollow. Poetry changes nothing, and I also would add, nor do novels and short stories and the occasional essay. I totally agree with you that writers should be hesitant where society becomes hasty and demands immediate solutions to erstwhile neglected problems. I love to write slowly and I love to be patient although I also think that when urgency prompts you to speak out loud, to put emphasis on the Zeitgeist, and you see things clearly where others just observe a blurred picture, you should do so. But nowadays I have grown weary. I think it is a mistake to ask writers, especially us, endowed with this incredible experience of two cultures, to lay down the fundaments of the future. The future is unknowable. Of course: I believe in the happy couple, I believe in making plans and I believe in the groundwork of common sense that will bring people together and unite them in their struggle against social injustice. But like in every good marriage unforeseeable things can happen along the way. The husband can fall in love with his mistress and the whole affair tumbles until it resembles the agonising Scenes of a Marriage by Ingmar Bergman. But let me give you a brief outline of the mistakes made by our present governments: the mistake of not reaching out to the underclasses to improve their backward situation but instead attributing their social problems to religion. This is a mistake for which the French are paying, as we have seen in the banlieus. Another prize is that Europe is still very much a confederation of states, in other words: every country is deeply nationalistic. The history of Europe has always been one of emphasising the differences between the states, so France is different from Germany and for that reason we can go to war, England is different from the Netherlands and for that reason we want to stay out of war. Europe was always basing its identity on the fact that it was different from the other. The deaths of the First and Second World War were of soldiers who were defending this absurd but workable notion of difference. That is also the reason why the idea of Europe does not appeal to people nowadays. There is nothing to fight for, because Europe was created on an idea of peace and that idea has an economic foundation of mutual self-interest. It's a fine balance and still maintained. You can understand why Europe has many problems accepting the immigrant as his equal: because it means contradicting this prevailing idea of maintaining the difference that ruled Europe for hundreds of years. The immigrant should, in order not to break the nationalistic dream, stay different. The moment the immigrant starts asking for equality, it is given on the basis of the ideals of the French Revolution, but that sits uncomfortably with the idea of nationalism. The "scum" of the earth found refuge in the twentieth century in socialism. Its universalism and redemption of the damned appealed and worked, but socialism was dealt a blow with the fall of the Wall. Socialism was death and the parties directed their attention to the new middle class that came out of the old lower class. But nowadays we have a new form of lower class: all those people of different origins that neither fit in to the idea of Europe nor find their way in the socialism of the third way. They are the new orphans. To be an orphan is to be independent out of necessity. You cannot not be independent, because nobody is taking care of you. This idea, this challenge, creates, as you said, great individuals, but it leaves the group disoriented. The new form of Islam appeals to a lot of these orphans. I understand why. They don't want to go through a scenario out of Scenes of a Marriage – they want an identity (although it may be cheap) and a stability that can protect the orphan that is within them. It says: you can be saved too, and resounds with all the clichés of the so-called dynamic religion. Whether you abhor it or have sympathy for it: it creates a new reality and it is up to the global society to deal with it. Let me come back to the idea of globalisation; I agree with you: failure to deal with globalism leads to fear and reactions that have their root in provincial nationalism. Europe is caught in its desire to be a Jack-of-All-Trades; it does this perfectly well but it leaves its citizens without a soul. I will elaborate deeper on this next time. Kind regards, Abdelkader Benali **** Berlin, 8 May 2006 Dear Abdelkader, | You write that Europe's core problem is the way it relates to the Other, and that culture, as it is developed in nation states and nurtured to underpin an identity, is seen as the realm of the immigration police. In reality, I believe that without overcoming this exclusivist and essentially deeply racist way of thinking, there will be no possibility of achieving a united Europe. At the most we will have a community of independent states which have got together over common economic and strategic interests. Perhaps that in itself is a success, when one thinks of the history of Europe, branded by wars and mutual slaughter. The continent of civil wars has been fairly successful in ensuring peace over the last sixty years. But this peace will be under threat as long as people do not realise that migration into Europe is creating new tensions. It's precisely because the tensions between the states have diminished that Europe's aggressive potential is now looking for a new and at the same time familiar battlefield: the relationship to people of other religions and other skin colours. I see Islamism as merely an "oriental" version of European nationalism. The xenophobic element, the culturalism, the entrapment of people in their group, their clan, their nation and their culture are thereby the elements they have in common. Islamism in this sense is not an archaic religious conviction, but a thoroughly modern tendency. Some commentators speak of a third totalitarian ideology after fascism and communism against which the free world must defend itself. But I agree with you: this struggle, which is often interpreted as a cultural phenomenon, is in the first instance a dispute over material resources, over opportunities for the future, social status and justice. That last term is a term which is often used, but remains foreign to the history of humankind. I have increasingly the feeling that the escape into culturalism – by which culture is seen as the framework which explains all problems – is strengthened by this development, so that the solution of social problems is pushed back ever further into the future. What chances does the child of a migrant family have nowadays in European society if it ends up without any qualification from school? And in Germany it's not just a few children who are in this position. Of course, society isn't to blame for everything. There's also plenty of lethargy and lack of interest among the migrants themselves. But the "orphans," as you fittingly call them, are addressed far too infrequently. In recent decades, money has been cut from training and free-time provision, in order to save money. But this is a false economy which will prove expensive for society: you can see that already, without having to be a prophet. It's true: we writers are not social workers. We are also not prophets. But we still have some kind of connection to these roles. We describe human conditions and feelings which often remain hidden in the so-called public discourse. The way the "orphans" look for self-sufficiency has a strong aesthetic dimension – there can be little doubt about that. This aesthetic dimension is served today, in my view, by the affirmative ideology of Islamism. The poses Islamists adopt, the video messages of suicide bombers, the intensive use of the internet, the media presence of the terror princes – as if they were pop stars – these are all a kind of replacement for art, a kind of bad poetry. To confront that with a demanding and innovative aesthetic programme is a real challenge. It's not a matter of changing the world with books; it is rather a matter of being part of the world so that one can see it from a new perspective. That can partly be achieved by finding a language for the sense of loss which many feel, without ties to a state, a country or a tradition. There are other options beyond the leisure industry and the Al Qaeda training camp. I'm a few years older than you. And this sense you write about that you've had enough of being someone guarding the bridges between the cultures is one I recognise all too well. The fact that we have to live with this role that has been ascribed to us gives us the chance of making something of it. Aren't you grateful for the many wonderful stories to which we have access because we've grown up in more than one culture? I see this by now as an aesthetic challenge, just as I see Islam as an aesthetic challenge. There's no other way of moving towards self-sufficiency. With very best wishes, Zafer *** Amsterdam, 15 May 2006 Dear Zafer, | Our bodies don't belong to us any more. They are being invaded, torn up, eaten, occupied, bombarded, discussed, enlightened, cut up and scrutinized by new ideas, influences, traditions, songs, medleys, movies, political circumstances and radical thought. We try to protect our body, keeping it a bridge between the rational and subconscious, by wearing beautiful clothes, by swimming, by building houses that surround us and our shallow ideas, we defend this our mortal flesh against the arrows that besiege it by hiding away, by not responding to the sharp questions of modernity. The East and the West, they both claim our body, they say: show it to world, or blow it up, or make it strong, or let it be a pious thing, cover your jewellery! And so the body becomes the new battlefield of the so-called struggle for dominion. The only way for the thinking person to claim sovereignty over their body is by thinking, reflecting, writing and using their anger to mould a new form of resistance, or existence, in the great tradition of Abu Nawas, Voltaire, James Joyce, Albert Camus, Edward Said and his brothers and sisters. Right now we are doing this, or trying to do this. The metaphor of Sisyphus ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of a mountain comes to mind. I live with this image that is very dear to me, and it comes to mind every time I engage in a discussion about Islam, the plight of feminism, terrorism, social injustice – the discussions seem to never change, the topics are well known, not many people are willing to let their stern point of view alter in the face of the changing realities and I see myself as Sisyphus going up that mountain again, using this stone as a weapon – or style – to make myself understood and clear. The body of Sisyphus is also vulnerable so one day death will come and take him away and the stone will stay behind, ready for a young new Sisyphus to push it up the mountain. The challenge for writers is to define the sharpness of that stone and the immediacy of the moment. I travel, use my eyes and bring back my experiences. Just like you, I feel connected to my roots and I look with excitement into the future. This may be bleak, but let us learn to love bleakness! One thing is for sure: writers and thinkers can change attitudes by opening windows on a new world. But there are many ugly truths to be told, and the best way to tell them is gently and with patience. Sisyphus has to be patient. And we have to listen better and be aware of the fact that sometimes the highest form of responsibility is to not be responsible at all. We have to be blunt, a little bit foolish, like Erasmus in his masterwork, In Praise of Folly, to bring into light this absurd and, for that reason, unfair situation that we human beings live in. We have to say no to oppression in all forms, everywhere, only via that way we truly can become universalists. All too often do the so-called "great thinkers" of our times shun away from making public their critique of religion and state institutions. All too often the so-called objective critics of modern society and its enemies turn a blind eye. But this has its consequences: more and more people understand that it is impossible to condemn injustice of a culture that one does not belong to and at the same time say nothing of the injustice that is thriving in one's own community. It's not fair. Sisyphus cannot play that game. This correspondence is a beginning, and it should not stop here. In a way I changed during this dialogue. I started rethinking some of my positions and I had to give up some of my former arguments. Dialogue is the only way to a kind of agreement. It's the only weapon in the long-term fight against fanaticism. The problem of our times is not that there is a conflict going on between equals. The world is a place that feeds on inequality. The problem is that every conflict is an unequal affair. It's always the stronger against the weaker, always the richer against the poorer, the more villainous against the less evil. The reason that we have to reasonable is because it's the only way we can analyse this disturbing state of inequality and its distorting images. Maybe that is the reason why I love the myth of Sisyphus so much: the weak man pushes the heavy stone. The stone will always defy the man's intent – but it lacks the one thing that the man has: reason. Kind regards, Abdelkader Benali http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-627/_nr-13/_p-1/i.html Om Bahaii religionen Bahai - en fleksibel verdensreligion
Læs også:
Hanged for teaching “Sunday school”
A Campaign of Cultural Cleansing
og mere samme sted:
Bahá’ís killed since 1978http://question.bahai.org/007_1.phpVerden er kun ét land og menneskeheden dets indbyggere, mener tilhængerne af religionsstifteren Bahaullah
Af Helle Merete Brix Lise Raben – livet er forskelligt til forskellige tider, og love bør ændres tilsvarende
Foto: Sappho Det danske bahai-samfunds sekretær Lise Raben undrer sig: Hvorfor skriver dansk presse ikke om forfølgelserne af bahaier Egypten og i Iran?
På www.bahai.org kan man læse om, hvordan bahaier, efter en periode med lettere adgang til de offentlige uddannelser, i stigende grad smides ud fra iranske universiteter. Og i Egypten kan bahaier nu ikke få det officielle og livsvigtige identitetskort, som skal bruges i forbindelse med uddannelse, lægehjælp med mere. Det er heller ikke ofte, pressen skriver om de danske bahaier. Det tager Raben roligt, men siger samtidig: ”Vi er nok for normale.” Det kan der være noget om. I en tid, hvor danskerne på fuldt tryk diskuterer religion i det offentlige rum, om lovgivningen skal tilpasses de religiøse minoritetssamfund og meget mere, koncentrerer dansk bahai sig om at udbrede grundlæggeren Bahaullahs budskab om harmoni og enhed, Guds enhed, religionernes enhed og menneskehedens enhed. Relative sandheder Bahai, der opstod i Persien i sidste halvdel af 1800-tallet, er af den opfattelse, at alle de store religioner, islam, jødedom, kristendom, hinduisme og buddhisme er guddommelige i deres oprindelse. Men samtidig mener man, at de forskellige religioner blev åbenbaret for en bestemt tid, og at, som det udtrykkes i en brochure fra trossamfundet, ”religiøs sandhed ikke er absolut, men relativ, at guddommelig åbenbaring er en stadig, fremadskridende proces.” Lise Raben giver som eksempel, at det ikke er hensigtsmæssigt at anvende jødisk lov i nutiden eller indrette sig med et væld af regler. Livet er forskelligt til forskellige tider, og love bør ændres tilsvarende. Som bahai pålægges man at bede dagligt, men det skal ikke være på et bestemt tidspunkt, blot som det passer bedst for den enkelte. Derudover er der påbud om en årlig fasteperiode, monogami og afholdenhed fra alkohol og narkotika. Ægteskab kræver ikke blot parternes, men også forældrenes tilladelse. Skilsmisse frarådes, men er muligt. Bahai blev for alvor kendt i Danmark i forbindelse med den islamiske revolution i Iran i 1979. Ayatollah Khomeinis styre dræbte og forfulgte trossamfundets medlemmer og sendte mange på flugt. Nogle af dem havnede i Danmark, men der har været bahaier i landet længe før. Kvinders rettigheder Johanne Høeg, Danmarks første bahai, udvekslede breve med Bahaullahs dattersøn Shoghi Effendi allerede i 1920erne og diskuterede bl.a. spørgsmål i forbindelse med oversættelsen af Bahaullahs skrifter. De består af mere end 100 værker. Som så mange andre enlige bahai-kvinder i 1920erne og 30erne havde Høeg ikke rigtigt succes med den undervisning, som bahai lægger stor vægt på. Men hun kan ses som et eksempel på, at kvinder har spillet en rolle i religionens historie. Bahai lægger vægt på mænd og kvinders ligeværd. Kvinder skal kunne bestride enhver post i samfundslivet. En af de kvinder, der nævnes i Dansk Bahai forlags lille skrift om ligestilling, er Tahirih, en af de første forkæmpere for ligestilling i Iran. Tahirih havde også forbindelse med babi-troen, der er forløberen for bahai. I 1848 smed hun sløret i en forsamling af mænd og blev henrettet. En enkelt begrænsning er der dog for kvinder inden for bahai-samfundet. Siden Shoghi Effendis død i 1957 har Det Universelle Retfærdighedens Hus, det øverste bahai-råd, fungeret som den øverste institution i bahai-verdenen. I dette råd kan ingen kvinder vælges ind. Men de kan indvælges i et lokalt åndeligt råd, der oprettes, hvis der er mindst ni bahaier i et område. Og de kan indvælges i de nationale åndelige råd, der vælges en gang om året af forud valgte delegater, som samles til et konvent. Der er 183 sådanne nationale råd i verden. Hvert femte år samles også de til et konvent, der vælger Det Universelle Retfærdighedens Hus. Der er ingen forudgående valgkampagner eller opstilling af kandidater. I de forskellige råd sidder altid ni personer, ligesom de særegne bahai helligdomme, der findes i bl.a. USA, Indien, Panama og Tyskland, altid konstrueres med ni sider og ni indgange. Ni er et særligt tal for bahai, fordi det, som Raben forklarer, er ”det mest fuldkomne tal”, der indeholder alle andre tal. Ligesom det hedder i bahai-skrifterne, at ”verden er kun ét land og menneskeheden dets indbyggere”. I de forskellige andagtshuse læses der op fra alle religioners skrifter. Der er ikke noget præsteskab. Det er ikke tilladt bahaier at deltage i partipolitik eller have en politisk post. Som vigtige mærkesager har bahai til gengæld undervisning og internationalt arbejde. Det internationale bahai-samfund er bl.a. akkrediteret FNs økonomiske og sociale råd og FNs børnefond, ligesom man her arbejder med bl.a. menneskerettighedsspørgsmål og kvindernes status. Raben selv har hele sit liv været engageret i organisatorisk arbejde. Således mindes hun, hvordan 15 mennesker arbejdede i døgndrift op til det sociale topmøde i 1995 i København. Og gennem fem måneder ledte hun store grupper af unge NGOer i Istanbul i forbindelse med Habitatmødet året efter. I dag varetager hun forlagets udgivelser, ligesom hun leder to bahai-studiegrupper, der samler både medlemmer af trossamfundet og ikke-bahaier. Her undervises der i bl.a. glæden ved at undervise, undervisning af børn, religionens historie, sjælens liv og livet efter døden, sådan som bahai opfatter disse spørgsmål. "Vi tror på et åndeligt liv efter døden, en sjæl, en abstrakt tankegang. Meningen med livet er at udvikle sin sjæl, at tilegne sig gode egenskaber. Der er ingen slutning, målet er at nå frem til Gud, men det gør man aldrig. Der er ingen himmel eller helvede, det er tilstande, de kan være her, som på den anden side." Billedforbud Det var amerikanske bahai-pionerer, der i 1947 kom til Danmark og banede vejen for, at det første lokale åndelige råd i København blev grundlagt to år senere. I 1962 etablerede man det første nationale åndelige råd i Danmark. Allerede i 1955 havde medlemmer af trossamfundet dog købt den hvide villa på Sofievej i Hellerups ambassadekvarter, hvor man stadig holder til. Den er enkelt indrettet. I stuerne er der blå sofaer og pastelfarvede vægge, få billeder, lys og luft. Et af billederne forestiller Abdul Baha, religionsgrundlæggerens søn. Men her er intet billede af Bahaullah. Som Raben forklarer det, mener man som bahai ikke, at man skal se på billeder af ”dette hellige menneske”. Så hvad ville bahaier have gjort, i tilfælde af ikke Muhammed-tegninger, men af Bahaullah-tegninger? Faktisk har man engang, fortæller Raben, haft en sag i Skotland, hvor nogle kristne præster havde skrevet meget kritisk imod religionen. Her inviterede man præsterne til et møde og diskuterede sagen. Og sådan ville man nok reagere i dag i en tilsvarende sag, mener Raben, ved at give ”korrekt oplysning, og uden drama”. I den israelske havneby Haifa, der rummer troens åndelige og administrative verdenscenter, findes dog et billede af Bahaullah. Det er der mulighed for at få lov at se, for eksempel når medlemmer af de forskellige landes konventer hvert femte år tager til Haifa for at vælge den øverste ledelse. Det sker næste gang i 2008. Ved denne lejlighed opfordres de enkelte bahaier til at komme i deres lands nationaldragt. Raben siger, at det har hun nu aldrig gjort, men hun har mødt konventdeltagere fra bl.a. Mongoliet, Borneo og Grønland i abeskind, med høje, eksotiske hatte og i nationaldragter så varme, at de måttes tages af. Varmen i Israel var for stærk. Raben selv er født i Hong Kong i en bahai-familie. Hendes mor mødte bahai gennem en veninde. Det danske bahai-samfund, der tæller 350 medlemmer, består af blandt andet læger, sygeplejersker, lærere, pensionister og forretningsfolk. Raben er uddannet laborant og har suppleret med en videreuddannelse i engelsk oversættelse fra universitetet. Selvom det er et lille trossamfund, er der tale om et ”stabilt flow”, siger Raben. De, der melder sig ind, bliver. Som bahai skal man bekende sin tro. For børn, født ind i bahai, sker det, når de fylder 15. Kongen af Samoa I dag findes der bahai-samfund i 238 lande og territorier. Den nyligt afdøde konge af Samoa var for eksempel bahai. Der er forholdsmæssigt mange bahaier på Island, og i Bolivia er der så mange som 300.000 ud af en befolkning på 8 millioner. Den etniske profil afviger fra land til land. I Storbritannien er der masser af iranere indenfor trossamfundet. I Danmark har kun en tredjedel af trossamfundets medlemmer iransk baggrund, mens resten er etniske danskere. Men derudover kommer der også for eksempel mennesker med tyrkisk baggrund i det danske center. Hver onsdag aften er der åbent hus i villaen. Ved visse arrangementer kommer der flere ikke-medlemmer end medlemmer, som det var tilfældet for nylig, da professor i religionssociologi Margit Warburg holdt foredrag. Warburg har igennem 27 år beskæftiget sig med de danske bahaier. I 1985 udgav hun tillige bogen Iranske dokumenter om den forfølgelse, som bahaier i Iran blev udsat for. Warburgs studier af bahai blev til en doktorafhandling, Citizens of the World, som hun forsvarede i januar i år, og som er udkommet på et hollandsk forlag. http://www.sappho.dk/Nr.%206%20maj%202007/bahai.html Læse Også:
Islam and Human Rights
Islam and Human Rights
About the Author Farhang Jahanpour is a British national of Iranian origin. He received his Ph.D. Degree in Oriental Studies from the University of Cambridge and is a former professor and dean of the Faculty of Languages at the University of Isfahan. He has taught at the universities of Cambridge and Oxford, as well as teaching online courses for Oxford, Yale and Stanford. He spent a year as a Senior Fulbright Research Scholar at Harvard. Dr Jahanpour also spent many years as Editor for Middle East and North Africa at the BBC Monitoring Service. For the past 20 years he has been a part-time tutor at the Department of Continuing Education at the University of Oxford. He is the author of three books and numerous articles in academic journals. By Farhang Jahanpour, University of Oxford http://www.payvand.com/news/07/apr/1173.html Abstract The paper examines whether human rights concepts are applicable to Islam or not. It provides a comparative study of the popular perceptions of Islam versus the West, and argues that with a correct understanding of the Koran and Islamic teachings it is possible to defend human rights concepts from inside the Islamic texts. It also argues that most Western views of Islam are due to insufficient understanding of Islam and often based on political considerations, rather than on what Islam stands for. The long history of Islam's peaceful coexistence and interaction with other cultures and civilisations proves that the theory of a 'clash of civilisations' is wrong, and it is possible to establish real dialogue and understanding with Muslims.
War is the greatest scourge of our time. In many ways, the twentieth century was the worst century in human history in terms of people who were killed as the result of local, regional and international wars, most of them fought in the name of good causes, such as freedom, democracy, socialism, etc. Yet it was the age of mass killing on an unprecedented scale. It was the century of technological barbarism and mechanised butchery. It is estimated that between 150-170 million people were slaughtered in various wars during that century. A great American peace activist, Phil Berrigan, who spent 11 of his 79 years in prison for his non-violent protests against war, ended his review of Sr. Rosalie Bertell's book, Planet Earth: The Latest Weapon of War, with these words: "The military as an instrument of mass killing is a waste institution - humans, energy, oil, metals, scientific and technical skills, money - it consumes all and restores nothing to the resources of the planet. Any faithful or sane scrutiny would conclude that it must be dismantled. It kills, threatens and wastes - it is the BIG LIE institutionalized. Its veneer and untouchability gives new meaning to the demonic. Is anybody out there listening?"1 At a time when a number of neocons are once again inciting war and violence, this time against Iran, on equally dubious grounds that led to the invasion of Iraq, the time has come for all the people of goodwill to raise their voices louder against this insane venture. Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, some people who are not able to live without a real or imaginable enemy have put forward the dangerous philosophy of a clash of civilisations. The whole history of 800 years of coexistence between Islam and Hinduism and Buddhism in India; the coexistence of Muslims, Christians and Jews in Spain; the coexistence of Muslims and followers of other faiths in Iran, Turkey, Egypt, etc show that it is possible for the people from different religions or civilisations to live peacefully together. Since the dreadful events of 9/11 this drive to divide the world between 'those who are with us' and 'those who are against us' has intensified and has produced many unfortunate consequences. The world has been divided as never before and a climate of fear and suspicion has enveloped the world. If those who wish to prevent the realisation of that nightmare do not oppose that pernicious philosophy, it may become a self-fulfilled prophecy with all that it might entail. While up to less than two decades ago there was a serious clash between the West and the communist bloc, since the collapse of the Soviet Union Islam or Islamic fundamentalism has been portrayed as the enemy that has to be defeated. This is the undeclared focus of the 'war on terror', not realising that terror is a tactic not an enemy. Although communism posed a deadly threat to the West, it was an economic or at best a political ideology, without deep roots in people's souls and consciousness. Islam, like Christianity, Hinduism or Buddhism is a religion that has profound roots in the consciousness of hundreds of millions of adherents. Unlike secular ideologies, religions tend to get stronger as the result of persecution. The best way to deal with religious fundamentalism is not to wage a war against it, but to remove or moderate its influence through rational arguments, preferably borrowed from the same religious discourse from which they emerge. This is what happened in the West during the Reformation and the Age of Enlightenment, and this is what needs to be done in Islam, by Muslims themselves. The concepts of democracy and human rights are said to constitute part of the Western crusade against the so-called 'Islamo-fascism'. It is argued that these concepts are incompatible with Islam and, therefore, logically it follows that their success requires the defeat or the elimination of Islam. Not only is such an argument dangerous and provocative, it is essentially wrong. In this paper I intend to discuss some Islamic concepts that provide a fertile ground for the development of human rights among Muslims. In order to discuss the universal definition of human rights, it may be useful to start by saying that like terrorism, the definition of human rights is not as easy as it looks. After the terrible events of 9/11, the United Nations spent a lot of time trying to figure out what terrorism is and they didn't reach any conclusion. Then there was a meeting of the Islamic countries and they tried to come to an agreement, and they didn't come up with anything. It cannot be easily defined, because one country’s terrorist is another country’s freedom fighter. Look at Israel. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians describe the activities of the other side as terrorism. Hopefully, the situation may be a little easier in the case of human rights. In describing the relationship between Islam and the West, let me start with what are the popular perceptions of Islam in the West, and by that I do not mean among the readers of tabloids but among the educated and on the whole tolerant people. In recent years, I have been teaching an online course on Islam and the West for the universities of Oxford, Yale and Stanford. In one of the sessions of the course, I asked the students to list what they see as differences between Islam and the West. One of the students provided the following list, which may act as a good basis for appreciating Western views about Islam. Here I quote the entire list as was written by my student: 1. Islam is Theocratic, the West is Secular. 2. Islam wants religion to have a major role in governance and in society, whereas the West wants it excluded. 3. Islam wants to dominate the world, the West believes in coexistence. 4. Islam encourages war in defence of the Islamic Faith (the so-called ‘lesser Jihad’); the West encourages a ‘live and let live’ approach to matters of faith [Clearly there have been no religious wars in the West]. 5. Morality is absolute in Islam; it is often situational and relative in the West. 6. Islam is idealistic; the West is pragmatic. (In the West, if it works, do it; in Islam, if the Koran permits it, do it). 7. Islam cherishes the rule of God as made known in the Koran; the West cherishes the rule of man by the exercise of his reason, and changes the rule as and when reason dictates. 8. Islam is Puritanical, the West is Hedonistic. ("If it feels good, do it" in the West, versus "If it feels good, don’t do it" in Islam). 9. In Islam ‘Progress’ is a return to a Golden Age (the time of the Prophet). In the West ‘Progress’ is out there somewhere in the unknown future to be achieved with the advancement of science. 10. Islam honours tradition, the West honours innovation. 11. Islam honours the community; the West honours the individual. 12. Islamic economics rejects the paying and collecting of interest. In the West interest is one of the two pillars that finance economic development. Think bonds, mortgages, deficit financing, and bank loans. (The other pillar in the West is equity participation in financial ventures, which is also permitted in Islam.) 13. The family structure in Islam is extended and patriarchal; in the West it is nuclear and parental. I have quoted the above list in full because it provides a good example of public perceptions in the West about the differences that separates Islam from the West. These ideas are deeply ingrained, and it is not possible to dispel them easily. What surprised me, however, was not the list itself. I would have expected such a list from a secular Western observer who is indifferent or even hostile to religion as a whole and Islam in particular. What surprised me was that it was prepared by an ordained clergyman who, one can assume, is religious and makes a distinction between secular or even hedonistic aspects of contemporary Western culture, and its Christian roots that still permeate the society and provide it with its spiritual and moral underpinnings. From the above list, one can see that the student is not comparing Islam with the 'West', but is providing a list of differences between a religious and a materialistic or secular point of view. If we look at the list and simply replace the word Islam with Christianity, we will see that nearly all the differences are still valid. Like Islam, Christianity is theocratic, not secular; it believes that religion must play a major role in one's life; it believes that morality is absolute and its rules are laid out in the Bible; it is idealistic, not pragmatic; it believes in divine law rather than human law; it honours tradition, supports family life, cherishes community and is not hedonistic. Christ preaches that his kingdom is not of this world, and prepared his followers for admission to the Kingdom of God. As for wishing to dominate the world, neither Christianity nor Islam wants to dominate the world, although both of them would like to teach their faith to the whole world. So, people seem to be confusing religious versus secular worldviews with Islam versus the West. They are juxtaposing Islam, a diverse and varied religion with followers spread from Indonesia to Tunisia, with the West, which is a geographical or cultural or political concept. In the same way, that it was possible for Christians to move towards the establishment of democracy and the institutionalisation of human rights, there is no reason why the same cannot take place among Muslims. The approaches to the application of human rights to the Middle East and other developing countries are threefold: The first approach was that of the colonialist period that saw the Western way of life as intrinsically superior and universal and looked down upon all other cultures and civilisations. It believed in the necessity of civilising the natives, i.e. forcing them to wear Western dress and follow a Western way of life, to adopt Western laws and to relinquish their own religious beliefs. The second approach was exclusively selective and non-universalist. It was concerned with the fate of Christians and citizens of Christian states in the Muslim world, as was the case in Lebanon where the Christian minority was given power over the Muslim majority. This approach has now been extended to the support of the Jewish state, where the activities of the Israeli forces and the killing and maiming of thousands of Palestinians and the destruction of homes and orchards are often described as acts of self-defence, while any form of Palestinian resistance is described as terrorism. Israel has become part of the West and its ideology is part of the 'Judeo-Christian' civilisation, while Islam which is also a continuation of Judaism and Christianity and furthermore accepts and reveres the mission of Christ is regarded to be outside that exclusive club. The third approach that has been given the clumsy term "hegemonic abstentionism" basically tries to limit the application of universal concepts of human rights, sometimes with good motives. Numerous other terms are used to describe this approach, namely communitarian, relativist, tradition-based, post-modernist, realist, etc.2 According to this approach, concepts of democracy and human rights are limited and applicable entirely or to a large measure to the West, while other societies must live by different set of rules that suits them best. This approach suits those in the West who wish to downplay the issue of human rights, democracy and justice in the Middle East. It also suits the Middle East despots who, in the name of regional authenticity or Islam or whatever else, violate norms of human rights. The fundamentalists in some Islamic countries use this tactic in order to fend off the criticism of their denial of human rights to their citizens or those who are under their occupation, by claiming that their behaviour is sanctioned by Islam. When the Iranian President Mohammad Khatami started his presidential campaign in 1997, he introduced a number of very interesting slogans. Two of the most important slogans of Khatami were civil society and the rule of law. Of course, these terms do not evoke a great deal of interest or controversy in the West, but in a conservative Islamic society such as that of Iran under the mullahs the slogans were revolutionary, especially as the Persian terms signify a meaning that is not conveyed by their English translations. Jame’e-ye madani (civil society) stands opposed to jame’e-ye dini (religious society), and hokumat-e qanun (the rule of law) stands opposed to the rule of the Shari’a or religious law. In the same way, at the beginning of the 20th century when some people were calling for a constitutional government (hokumat-e mashruteh), the leading clerics of the time, Sheykh Fadlollah Nuri, called for "hokumat-e mashru’eh" or a government based on the Shari’a. These words made alarm bells ring among the conservative clergy. Therefore, shortly after becoming president, Khatami decided to soften the blow by saying that he advocated an "Islamic civil society" (which actually sounded like a contradiction in terms in Persian, the same as Islamic democracy. There is no Islamic, Jewish, Hindu or Christian democracy. Democracy is democracy, period). In a speech he gave to the Islamic Conference Organisation in Tehran, in which more than 50 heads of Islamic countries were assembled, Khatami said: "The kind of civil society that we wish to establish and develop in our country, and which we also recommend to other Islamic countries, is qualitatively different in its historical origins and its fundamentals from the kind of civil society which is based upon Greek philosophy and Roman political legacy. The two, however, are not necessarily in conflict and contradiction in all their manifestations and consequences. This is exactly why we should never be oblivious to judicious acquisition of the positive accomplishments of Western civil society. From a historical point of view, the Western civil society is derived from the Greek city states and its theoretical foundations are based on the Roman [and European] political system; while the civil society which we have in mind, is ideologically rooted in the Koran and historically based on the City of the Prophet." 3 When Muslim philosophers refer to Madinat al-Nabi, or the "City of the Prophet", by that they do not mean only what was going on in Medina at the time of the Prophet; but as the Prophet also acted as the head of the state, Muslims believe that his government there represented the most perfect form of government and acted as a model for subsequent governments. The main difference between Prophet Muhammad and Jesus and Moses and other prophets is that while those prophets were only spiritual leaders and not the head of the state, Muhammad managed to form a government in Medina and later in the whole of Arabia. Therefore, the concept of the City of the Prophet also conveys a philosophical idea; namely a city modelled on the one established by Muhammad in Medina. Shortly after this speech by Khatami, a leading religious cleric in Iran, Hojjat ol-Eslam Sadeq Larijani, wrote an article in an Iranian magazine, pointing out the logical incoherence in Khatami’s statement.4 He pointed out that "civil society" has an accepted, historical meaning. He asked why one should use that term if one has a different meaning in mind and when one is only referring to the City of the Prophet. He wrote: "If we are trying to establish a society which is inspired by the City of the Prophet and the values that govern that concept, namely Islamic values and culture, is it not more appropriate to speak of ‘Islamic society’, so that we can avoid unnecessary confusion of terms with their different philosophical connotations?" He then questions the value systems that are implied in that term. In Western usage, the term civil society refers to a different value system from the one that is behind the concept of the City of the Prophet. He continues with firstly providing a brief account of the historical development of the term. Secondly, he defines the concept of civil society as it is understood in the West, which is a society based on a form of contractual definition provided by the people and is free from religious restrictions. Thirdly, he discusses the principles of an Islamic society or the City of the Prophet. He speaks of the close relationship between civil society and Western liberal democracy. He points out that the powers of the government are purely "borrowed" rights, derived from the people, and the government represents the wishes of the people. "The role of the government is to allow the individuals to enjoy the greatest freedom, so that they can pursue their rights and interests in the way that they see fit. The role of the government is not to impose its own values, goals and principles upon the citizens, and it should in no way interfere in such issues… The role of the government is to provide a suitable environment that would allow the individuals to make their own choices in the society." As John Locke said: "Where law ends dictatorship begins." Larijani goes on to say: "There is no doubt that the existence of laws, the rule of law, the equality of individuals before the law, and the just implementation of the law are among the principles that are supported by an Islamic society and in any other society that wishes to live in a rational and reasonable way." However, he points out that laws have a different meaning in civil societies and in Islamic societies. In Western civil societies the government is neutral and must implement the laws promulgated by the legislature. The task of the government is only to provide and ensure individual freedom. In other words, civil society and liberalism are like twins. This is a thinking that is not in keeping with Islamic laws, according to him. The Islamic society is not based on the laws made by men, but on the general principles set out in the Koran. Sadeq Larijani wrote: "We support a society which is based on the spirit of Islam and religious faith, in which Islamic and religious values are propagated, in which every Koranic injunction and the teachings of the Prophet of Islam and the Imams are implemented. It will be a society in which the feeling of servitude to God Almighty will be manifest everywhere, and in which people will not demand their rights from God but are conscious of their obligations to God." In other words, it has less to do with individual rights, than with religious obligations. It looks for a political environment that allows the people to perform their religious obligations. It is less interested in individual freedom and more concerned with social responsibilities. He criticises the views of people, such as Abdol-Karim Soroush, who say that there is no such thing as an Islamic society or an Islamic civilisation, but the society of Muslims or the civilisation created by Muslims. Soroush maintained that Muslim radicals were trying to use Islam as an ideology, while Islam is a spiritual and individual way of life. This debate is not limited to Iran, but is the common preoccupation of many Muslims or Islamists throughout the Islamic world. Sa'id Hawwa, a Syrian theologian, wrote: "Democracy is a Greek term, which signifies sovereignty of the people, the people being the source of legitimacy; it is the people who legislate and rule. As for the shura, it denotes consultation [by the ruler] with a person or persons with regard to the interpretation of a certain point of Islamic law. In Islam the people do not govern themselves by laws they make on their own, as in a democracy; rather, the people are "governed by a regime and a set of laws imposed by God, which they cannot change or modify in any case." The concept of majority rule is rejected by Islam "because Islam would not concur that the majority is sovereign, whatever its mistakes and errors." Across the border in Tripoli, Dannawi summed it all up in a simple formula: "The state in Islam obeys Divine Law, not the people; liberating the state from subservience to human passions, whims and fancies... be they of the majority or the minority." This kind of thinking is not limited to Islam. Many Christian and Jewish fundamentalists and indeed the members of the Moral Majority in the United States say the same thing. Those who attack abortion clinics in the United States and kill or injure the doctors who are carrying out abortions do so because they believe that the law of God supersedes the laws made by men. Is there a way of bridging the gap between these two points of view? I believe one answer to this anxiety felt both by sincere Muslims and Christians is to point out that modern concepts of democracy and human rights have themselves evolved out of a religious context. In a broad-ranging book, The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century, Professor Owen Chadwick argues convincingly that the concepts of democracy and human rights and the separation between religion and state developed out of religious debates in Europe and America.5 They were born out of a desire to put an end to the conflict among various denominations and to provide an environment in which different sects could hold on to their own principles and follow their own religious injunctions. I would go a step further and argue that, in fact, religious concepts that regard man as being created in the image of God according to Christianity, or as the vicegerent of God on earth according to the Koran, provide the proper underpinning for human rights. If we regard human beings as mere flesh and blood, as economic consumers or as animals in a human zoo, we would have fewer qualms about suppressing their rights than if we believe that human beings have an intrinsic value in themselves, that they are masters of their own fate, that they are the children of God and that they are related to us as members of a universal human family. The third way of bridging this gap, and arguing particularly from an Islamic point of view, is to show that the Koran itself is not hostile to human rights. The Koran contains a variety of law-making provisions and legal injunctions interspersed throughout its chapters (suras) and verses (ayat). A number of rules exist for interpreting these provisions, such as the position of a given ayah within the context of the sura, which in turn is interpreted in accordance with its place in the sequence of revelation, its reference to other revelations, and its historical context in relation to particular conditions which existed at the time of the given revelation. These and other rules are known as the science of interpretation (ilm usul aI-fiqh). According to these rules, for example, one initially is to refer to a specific provision and then to a general provision dealing with a particular situation. In other words, religious injunctions must be placed in their historic context, and must be interpreted in such a way that they do not contradict the more general universal concepts. If one verse that refers to a particular event contradicts the more general and universal principles expressed in other verses, the universal principle must be adopted as it overrules the verse that referred to a particular event in the past. Reasoning by analogy (qiyas) is permitted, except where expressly prohibited. Simplicity and clear language are always preferred. Similarly, the clear spirit of certain prescriptions cannot be altered by inconsistent interpretations. A policy-oriented interpretation within the confines of the rules of jurisprudence is permissible and even recommended, as is the case with the doctrine of ijtihad (progressive reasoning by analogy). Most Muslim scholars do not consider Islam to be an evolving religion, but rather a religion and legal system, which applies to all times. It is, therefore, the application that is susceptible to evolution. Indeed, the provisions of the Koran are such that by their disciplined interpretation, with the aid of the Hadith and Sunna and other sources of interpretation, Islam can be interpreted in such a way that it can provide the solution to contemporary social problems. There are numerous verses in the Koran that tell the believers not to oppose or molest the followers of other faiths. For instance, The Koran preaches that there should be no forceful conversion. The believers are told to only discuss their faith with others in the kindliest manner: "Summon men to the way of the Lord with wisdom and kindly warning. Debate with them in the kindliest manner." (Koran xvi, 126). God admonishes the believers not to force others to join their faith: "Wilt thou force men to become believers?" (Koran, x, 10). There is this clear injunction in the Koran: "Let there be no compulsion in religion" (Koran ii, 257). The way the sentence has been formulated in Arabic has led many Muslim theologians to say that not only there should be no compulsion in religion, but by its nature religion is not susceptible to compulsion. Due to the nature of faith that is a matter of personal conversion and the relationship between man and God, there simply cannot be any compulsion in religion. Otherwise, conversion and faith mean nothing. Faith must be voluntary, or it is meaningless. It is a personal and fateful act and not a communal venture. Even the Prophet himself is ordered to desist from forcing other people to follow his teachings: "It is not for a Prophet to be fraudulent and put people in chains: for he who puts others in chains shall bring the fruit of enslavement upon himself on the Day of Judgement." (Koran, III, 161). This is a very important statement that teaches that anyone who tries to enslave other people’s minds and souls will enslave himself and will bring the fruit of enslavement upon himself on the Day of Judgement. Many early believers wanted Muhammad to force the Arabs to become Muslims, but he is told by God: "We are best aware of what they say, but thou (O Muhammad) art in no wise a compeller over them. But warn by the Koran him who feareth My warning." (Koran, 50: 45). Therefore, the Prophet’s job, as it is stressed elsewhere in the Koran, is merely to warn and to call the people towards God, but not to coerce them to follow it. Faith and guidance ultimately comes from God: "Say: The truth is from your Lord; then whosoever will, let him believe; and whosoever will, let him disbelieve." (Koran, 18: 28) Muhammad was unhappy that some of his close relatives, including his favourite uncle, had not become Muslims, but he was told in another verse: "And if thy Lord had willed, whoever is on the earth would have believed, all of them, altogether. Wouldst thou then compel the people, until they are believers?" (Koran, 10:98). Again: "Say: O mankind! Now hath the truth from your Lord come unto you. So whosoever is guided, is guided only for his own soul, and whosoever erreth, erreth only against his soul. And I am not a warder over you." (Koran, 10: 107) There are many references in the Koran, telling Muhammad that he is not people’s guardian, that he has no authority over them, and that he should not force the people to believe. Therefore, if the Prophet himself has no authority over others, and if his job is merely to warn and preach the word of God, clearly none of his followers can claim to have greater authority than him. They should not force those who are not members of the Islamic community to become Muslims or to be oppressed, and they should not force members of the Muslim community to do what the clerics or authorities tell them to do. People are responsible for their own action and must be given freedom to make their own choice freely. As far as jihad or the war against the non-believers is concerned, the most important Koranic verse that defines the limits and conditions for jihad is the following: "Fight in the way of God against those who attack you, but begin not hostilities. Verily god loveth not the aggressors… And if they [the enemies] incline towards peace, incline thou also to it, and trust in God." (Koran, 2: 189). According to many Muslim theologians, this verse means that the only form of war permitted by Islam is a defensive war. They regard this verse as providing the parameters of a "just war". Muslims are told to "fight in the way of God", in other words not for any personal or aggressive intention, but merely for the sake of God, "against those who attack you", but they are emphatically warned "but begin not hostilities". Therefore, there is absolutely no suggestion that Muslims should go and eliminate the people in the "House of War". There is another Koranic verse that allows the Muslims to fight against those who drove them out of their houses, and to pursue them until there is no persecution. The Koran says: "And kill them whenever you find them, and drive them out from whence they drove you out, for persecution is worse than slaughter… And if they desist, then lo! God is Forgiving, Merciful. And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is for God; but if they desist, then there should be no hostility except against oppressors" (Koran, 2:190-193). All Koranic commentators have said that this verse refers to the attacks that were launched by Meccans against Muhammad’s followers, and is not a blanket authority for waging war. That verse too only allows a defensive war against those who had attacked the Muslims, but even here it says, "but if they desist, then there should be no hostility except against oppressors." Therefore, there is absolutely no authority anywhere in the Koran or in Islamic jurisprudence for attacking the people in the "House of War". There is a long tradition of treaties and agreements going back to the time of the Prophet that allows other people to live in peace, so long as they do not attack Islamic communities. Those territories were said to belong to the House of Peace, or House of Security, as opposed to those who lived in the House of War, namely those who were engaged in a war against Muslims. When Muslims conquered Iran, Egypt and parts of the Byzantine Empire, at the beginning there was a certain amount of violence, but there was no attempt for the forced conversion of the conquered nations. The bulk of the Iranian population did not become Muslims until about two hundred years after the initial conquest. Large Christian and Jewish communities also survived in Egypt and other Islamic lands. In fact, as non-Muslims who lived in an Islamic country had to pay a higher rate of tax because they did not contribute to the military, very early in Islamic history some greedy rulers discouraged people from joining Islam in order to increase their own tax revenue. This was the case in Iran and Iraq under Hajjaj bin Yusef who was the governor of Mesopotamia in the first century of the Islamic calendar who sent orders to his local officials telling them to stop converting the people to Islam. The situation with Islam is the same as we find with other traditions. What is the Bible's position on war and violence? For some, the Bible authorised the Crusades, the Inquisition, slavery, the extermination of the American Indians, the killings of the Ku Klux Klan, the atrocity in Oklahoma City, and most recently, the organised genocide against Bosnian Muslims. For others, the Bible has motivated and sustained movements of non-violence, the anti-slavery movement, efforts to support Bosnian Muslims and others in the face of genocide, the nurturing of movements of democracy and social justice, and lifetimes of sacrifice in the service to other human beings. Many reformist Muslims have started interpreting Islamic texts with the help of Hermeneutics. A great Iranian reformer, Ayatollah Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari has written many volumes about the need to interpret the Koranic verse in a way that they can be applicable to the present age. Shabestari maintains that Islam has three main categories of teachings. They are: Spiritual and devotional [Ibadat]; issues dealing with social matters, including politics, economics, various forms of transactions between people [Mu’amilat]; and finally religious injunctions [Ahkam], including hudud (religious punishments) and qisas (retribution), based on the Shari’a or Islamic law. He maintains that the spiritual elements of Islam – like those of other faiths – are eternal and unchangeable and can provide Muslims with guidance and spirituality today. Some of the teachings belonging to the second category, namely social teachings, and can be adapted to present circumstances through ijtihad (independent interpretation of the law). As far as the third category, namely ahkam, hudud, qisas, etc are concerned, their time is passed, in the same way that the laws dealing with slavery are no longer operative because the time for slavery has come to an end. In the modern world, Muslims must formulate new laws on the basis of modern requirements. 6 He says that when he asks his friends why they do not refer any more to the Koranic teachings regarding slavery, they say that the time for that has been passed. He then asks them why they cannot see that the time for harsh Islamic punishments, flogging those who drink, killing the adulterer and the adulteress, chopping off hands, unequal treatment of women, etc has also passed. If we wish to create a more harmonious world, we must seek ways of reducing differences and hostility. Instead of dwelling upon differences, we must stress similarities. Instead of giving the most negative and limited interpretation to any Koranic or Biblical text, we must look for the most enlightened and the broadest interpretation. There is no disagreement among different religions that a good society, a well-governed society, is one in which people feel that they have equal chances to find fulfilment and where there is a sense of justice. How do we achieve that in the world? I believe that the idea of human rights, the rights of individuals, can be achieved through dialogue and collaboration among nations, rather than as the result of recrimination and point scoring. I must add that this is a difficult task to perform, especially in the light of the clash among various cultures and civilisations that we are witnessing today. The way to begin is by supporting institutions like the International Criminal Court. Religious and secular leaders and scholars must lay down the principles and concepts that are acceptable and those that are not. We need to encourage the United Nations to begin to develop regional courts of human rights to try those who violate the principles of the Human Rights Charter. Step by step, we'll get closer to a Supreme Court of human rights within the context of the United Nations. It is very shortsighted for the US – alongside Somalia and a few other undemocratic nations - to refuse to join that court. In the light of the terrorist attacks, now we need such international institutions more than ever. What we can also do as individuals and organisations is to encourage dialogue among people and civilisations. Instead of spending hundreds of billions of dollars on weapons of war, we can achieve much greater harmony in the world by spending a fraction of that on bringing the people from various countries together and encouraging dialogue between them. Of course, dialogue is much more difficult in practice than it sounds. It requires listening, as well as talking. It requires a feeling of genuine respect for the views of others and a desire to learn. At the moment, due to its technological, military, economic and intellectual pre-eminence, the West is more interested in lecturing others and telling them what to do, instead of engaging in a real two-way dialogue. Andre Gide said once that the individual was the most irreplaceable of beings. A moment's thought indicates how true this is. Individuals are irreplaceable. All religions also stress the uniqueness and the sanctity of human beings. Therefore, their rights are absolutely vital and extremely precious, and their rights must be preserved. We must insist that human rights are universal and we must apply them without discrimination, both in the West and in the rest of the world.
Endnotes [1] Quoted in an Internet letter by Peter Challen, entitled “Peace, personal witness and the rule of law”, 08.12.2002. [2] For a further discussion of “hegemonic abstentionism” see Fred Halliday, Nation and Religion in the Middle East (Saqi Books, 2000), pp 15-30. [3] Salam newspaper, dated 9.9.1376 (30 November 1997), Tehran, p 2. [4] Sobh newspaper, No 80, Farvardin 1377 (March 1998), p 44. All other quotations are from the same article. [5] Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the 19th Century (Cambridge University Press, 1991). [6] See Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Hermeneutics, the Book and Tradition (Tehran, Tarh-e No, 1996).
... Payvand News - 4/16/07 ... DEN KRIGERISKE SEX-MUFTI9.4.2007
DEN KRIGERISKE SEX-MUFTI
Kvinder skal have formindsket deres klitoris. Hunde kan smitte mennesker med en farlig bændelorm, der har gjort 43 pct. af islændingene syge. Hunde bruges til at trække slæder i Holland. Muslimer bør leve i ghettoer, indtil de kan tage magten i Europa og Amerika. Alt dette fremføres af verdens for tiden måske mest indflydelsesrige islamiske ideolog, Yussef al-Qaradawi, som også er forbillede for Islamisk Trossamfund i Danmark. Når han ikke har travlt med at udsende fatwaer, laver han kursusmateriale for Dansk Journalistforbund. Hans danske tilhængere har hyppigt folkeskoleelever, gymnasieelever mv. på besøg i moskeen. Af Helle Merete Brix Robert Redeker måtte gå under jorden "Det er den sidste normale aften i mit liv, og jeg ved det ikke”. Sådan skriver den franske filosofilærer Robert Redeker i bogen Il faut tenter de vivre ("Man må forsøge at leve"), der i dagbogsform beskriver, hvad der skete, efter at han den 19. september 2006 offentliggjorde en kritisk kronik om Muhammed og islam i Le Figaro. Truslerne begyndte hurtigt at komme, og rigtig alvorligt blev det, da en gruppe med forbindelse til al-Qaeda lagde Redekers billede, privatadresse, arbejdsadresse, mobilnummer og email ud på sin side på internettet. De Muslimske Brødre rasede over dette ”svin”, der havde vovet at fornærme profeten. En af brødrene kom med en opfordring til ”de franske løver” om at handle i samme ånd som Mohammed al-Bouyeri, altså at handle i samme ånd som den mand, der i 2004 myrdede filminstruktøren Theo van Gogh. Siden har Redeker og hans familie ikke kunnet leve et frit liv. Havde de blodtørstige mænd læst kronikken i Le Figaro? Formodentlig ikke. Nyheden nåede muslimer jorden over, da Al-Jazeera, den arabiske tv-kanal med 50 millioner seere på verdensplan, den 20. september, altså dagen efter kronikkens offentliggørelse, lod prædikanten Yussef al-Qaradawi udråbe Redeker til ”øjeblikkets islamofob”. Det satte øjeblikkelig trusler i gang. Qaradawi indskrev sig denne dag i en særdeles ubehagelig, men effektiv islamisk tradition. Fra ayatollah Khomeini over Qaradawis mentor Hassan al-Banna og Muhammed al-Ghazali, en lærd tilknyttet det magtfulde Al-Azhar Universitet i Cairo, har man regelmæssigt betegnet muslimske og ikke-muslimske kritikere og tvivlere som ”frafaldne” eller ”dødt kød” og derefter ladet andre gøre det nødvendige arbejde. Da Ghazali i 1992 udråbte forfatteren Faruq Fouda som frafalden, på grund af hans lille skrift Nej til sharia, gik der kun fem dage, til to medlemmer af en radikal islamisk gruppe myrdede Fouda på åben gade i Cairo. I retten forsvarede Ghazali morderne. Viagra og selvmordsterrorisme Den 80-årige Qaradawi, der er født i en egyptisk landsby ved Nildeltaet, har livet igennem bevaret en tæt tilknytning til Det Muslimske Broderskab. Han siger selv, at han har brudt med bevægelsen, men det forhindrer ham ikke i at dele Brødrenes ideologi. Qaradawi beskrives da også ofte som Broderskabets åndelige leder og som en af verdens mest indflydelsesrige muslimske prædikanter. Hans tv-program ”Sharia og livet” sendes hver søndag kl. 21.05 Mekka-tid på Al-Jazeera, med mindre Qaradawi er bortrejst i vigtige, islamiske forretninger. Med næsten 10 millioner seere er det et af stationens mest populære programmer, og gamle optagelser af det sælges så langt væk som i Indonesien og Malaysia. Tusindvis af seere skriver og ringer ind hver uge til prædikanten med stålbrillerne, det grå hageskæg og den hvide hovedkalot, med spørgsmål fra det almindelige liv, ikke mindst det ægteskabelige. Qaradawi med sin gode ven, Londons borgmester Ken Livingstone Qaradawi har i sit program skabt misnøje hos endnu mere radikale muftier og imamer, fordi han har gjort det klart, at en muslimsk far ikke må gifte sin datter væk til en mand, hun ikke vil have. Men denne udtalelse må tages med et gran salt, for andre steder skriver Qaradawi, at en muslimsk ”jomfrus” tavshed i denne forbindelse må betragtes som et samtykke. Ligesom han offentligt har fordømt angrebet på USA den 11. september 2001, men samtidig i en fatwa (en religiøst begrundet mening eller afgørelse) har opfordret til at dræbe både amerikanske soldater og civile i Irak. Qaradawi er heller ingen ven af Israel eller jøderne. En fatwa legaliserer selvmordsterrorisme mod israelske civile, og Qaradawi har gjort det klart, at ”der er ingen dialog mellem os og jøderne". Deres eneste samkvem sker gennem "sværdet og geværet”.
Spørgsmål til tv-programmet ”Sharia og livet” kan være, om en mand må bruge Viagra, og om man må dyrke oralsex med sin ægtefælle? Ja, Viagra er ok og oralsex er ok, kun analsex og sex med ens hustru under hendes menstruationsperiode er forbudt. Qaradawis ligefremme svar om for eksempel oralsex har i det egyptiske, sekulære magasin Rose Al-Youssef givet ham tilnavnet ”sex-muftien”. Det skal nu ikke forlede én til at tro, at der er noget som helst liberalt ved Qaradawis syn på sex. Den populære prædikants hjemmeside www.qaradawi.net er kun på arabisk. Men i 1997 oprettede Qaradawi, der er en stor tilhænger af internettet, portalen www.islamonline.net. Den er både på arabisk og engelsk, og her kan man læse nyheder, følge diskussioner og stille spørgsmål. Islam Online har også en dansk korrespondent, Nidal Abu Arif, der hører til i kredsen omkring Islamisk Trossamfund. I reklamespots på diverse arabiske tv-kanaler opfordres muslimer til at skrive ind og spørge de lærde, der er tilknyttet Islam Online, om råd og vejledning og dermed få en fatwa om et bestemt anliggende. Man kan også stile et spørgsmål specielt til sin yndlings-mufti. Død over homoseksuelle og ja til omskæring I en fatwa dateret den 17. maj 2004 svarer Qaradawi spørgeren ”Sarro”, der har bedt "den eminente muslimske lærde" udtale sig om homoseksualitet. Det er en ”perverteret handling”, får han at vide, og muslimske lærde diskuterer, hvad straffen for denne ”afskyelige” handling skal være. ”Skal den være den samme som for utroskab, eller skal både den aktive og passive part dræbes? Skønt sådanne straffe kan forekomme grusomme, er de blevet foreslået for at opretholde renheden i det islamiske samfund og holde det fri for perverterede elementer.” Qaradawi forsvarer naturligvis også polygamiet. Ikke alene kan han henvise til Koranen, der tillader mænd at have op til fire koner. Der er også andre begrundelser. Hos nogle kvinder, som Qaradawi har forklaret på Al-Jazeera, varer menstruationsperioden ti dage eller mere. Skal manden vente så længe på sex? Vist ej, siger tv-prædikanten. Andre argumenter er mænds store sexdrift og det problem, der opstår, hvis hustruen viser sig at være steril. Det er vigtigt at forstå, at en fatwa fra en autoritet som Qaradawi ikke er en udtalelse, muslimer kan skalte og valte med, som de synes. En fatwa har afgørende betydning for, hvordan for eksempel de mange organisationer og moskéer i Europa, der i dag anerkender Qaradawis position, stiller sig til det pågældende anliggende. Qaradawi har selv to koner, en egyptisk og en afghansk. Han har syv børn, og ifølge prædikanten selv er tre af hans døtre, der bor i Storbritannien, både højt uddannede og aktive i erhvervslivet. Det er der, ifølge Qaradawis skrifter heller ikke noget i vejen for. Qaradawi støtter også islamisk aktivisme hos kvinder, blot kvinden ikke forsømmer sine fornemste pligter, mand, hjem og børn. Måske er det sådanne oplysninger, som helt misvisende, får også vestlige islamforskere til at betegne ham som moderat i sit syn på kvinden. Et eksempel er Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, dr.phil. og leder det Dansk-Egyptiske Dialoginstitut i Cairo. I en kronik i Information 21. februar 2007 skriver han, at Qaradawi går ind for en ”islamisk jura, der skal tilpasses nutidige forhold”, især inden for ”juraen om kvinder”. Hermed må læseren få den opfattelse, at selvom Skovgaard-Petersen også betegner Qaradawi som ”patriarkalsk og ingen liberal”, er han ikke så slem endda. Samme opfattelse har de måske også i Dansk Journalistforbund, der sidste februar i Cairo gennemførte et kursus for danske journalister med titlen "Islam i politik og hverdag". Ifølge kursuskataloget stod Islam Online for en del af undervisningsmaterialet. Den 23. november 2006 spørger Ameena fra Egypten, hvad islam siger om kvindelig omskæring. Qaradawi svarer på Islam Online, at det er et ”kontroversielt anliggende mellem jurister og endda doktorer”. Men det mest korrekte er, siger Qaradawi, omskæring på ”den moderate, islamiske måde”. Han citerer en hadith, hvoraf det fremgår, at Muhammed skulle have sagt følgende til en jordemoder: ”Formindsk klitoris' størrelse, men overskrid ikke grænsen, for det er bedre for hendes helbred og foretrækkes af ægtemænd.” Qaradawi konkluderer, at omskæring er ”ikke obligatorisk, men den der mener, at det tjener hans datters interesser bedst, burde gøre det, og personligt støtter jeg det, sådan som forholdene er i den moderne verden”. Hollandske slædehunde og hustruvold En af Qaradawis mest populære bøger, også i Vesten, hedder The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam ("Det tilladte og det forbudte i islam"), der udkom første gang på arabisk i 1959 og på engelsk i 1960. I sin bog om Det Muslimske Broderskabs netværk i Frankrig betegner den libanesisk-franske politolog Fiammetta Venner bogen som en ”bibel” for fundamentalister. Den fås i enhver islamisk boghandel med respekt for sig selv. Sappho købte sit eksemplar i Al-Dawa Centre i Bayswater-kvarteret i London. Bogens popularitet skyldes blandt andet, at den med dagligdags eksempler, naturligvis underbygget med koran-citater og hadith, forklarer shariaen for de muslimer (læs, muslimske mænd), der ikke har tid til grundige studier af emnet. Den giver svar på et væld af spørgsmål så som det tilladelige i at tage renter og farve sit hår, regler for jagt, skilsmisse, om det er nødvendigt at indhente forældrenes tilladelse for at drage i hellig krig (det er det), ægteskab, sex, adoption, kvindens status med mere. Blandt "Det tilladte og det forbudte i islam"s mest ejendommelige afsnit er Qaradawis forklaring på, hvorfor islam betragter hunden som et urent dyr, der om muligt helt bør undgås. Her henviser Qaradawi til videnskabelige undersøgelser, der skulle påvise en særligt ondartet bændelorm, der kan smitte fra hunde til mennesker. Bliver mennesker smittet, skriver øjeblikkets måske mest indflydelsesrige muslimske lærde på side 123 i den engelske udgave, kan de udvikle bylder, der er på størrelse med en ”knyttet næve eller endda et spædbarns hoved; den er fyldt med gul væske og vejer fra ti til tyve pund”. Qaradawi skriver videre, at som regel er der ikke rigtig nogen effektiv kur mod denne bændelorm. Kemoterapi virker ikke, og normalt er der ingen anden udvej end at skære de inficerede områder af kroppen væk. Det er særlig galt med denne bændelorm i lande som blandt andet Holland, hvor hunde, ifølge Qaradawi, ”bruges til at trække slæder”. Og i Island lider hele 43 procent af befolkningen, ifølge forfatteren, af denne sygdom. Disse oplysninger er medtaget i en fransk udgave af bogen fra 2005. I Qaradawis populære bog behandles også spørgsmålet om kvinders ret til et liv uden for hjemmet. Qaradawi fastslår, at manden blandt andet på grund af ”sine naturlige evner” er hjemmets og familiens leder. Men kvinden skal have ret til at forlade hjemmet i nødvendige ærinder som for eksempel bøn og studier. Samtidig citerer Qaradawi på side 204 en hadith, der understreger, at det ikke er tilladt for en muslimsk kvinde at gå ud af huset, hvis hendes mand ikke bryder sig om det. Hun må heller ikke lukke nogen ind i huset, som manden ikke bryder sig om. På side 218 gør Qaradawi det klart, at kvinden kun har ret til skilsmisse, hvis manden har behandlet hende slet, eller der er en anden gyldig grund. Den ærbare muslimske kvinde skal naturligvis gå tildækket, så hun er til at skelne fra ikke-muslimske og ikke-praktiserende muslimske kvinder. Qaradawi citerer gerne de hadith'er, der på malerisk vis forklarer, at helvede er fyldt med de slette og forføreriske kvinder, og at det er bedre for mænd at blive slået med en glødende stang end at røre ved en kvinde, der ikke er tilladt for dem. Derfor vender Qaradawi sig naturligvis også mod enhver form for frit samkvem mellem kønnene, på universiteter, i biografer, i offentlig transport med mere. Vistnok forbudt, men nem at skaffe Det er ikke påkrævet, mener Qaradawi, at kvinden også dækker sit ansigt til, når hun går ud. Men samtidig skriver han, at ”på grund af den udstrakte umoral og slaphed med hensyn til at efterleve de islamiske pålæg i vor tid”, er det bedst også for en muslimsk kvinde at dække ansigtet, hvis hun kan.
På side 205 skriver forfatteren, at ægtemanden har krav på sin hustrus ”lydighed og samarbejde”. Hvis han fornemmer, at hun er på vej til at blive ulydig og oprørsk, skal han først prøve med venlige ord og overtalelse. Hjælper det ikke, kan han lade hende sove alene om natten. Men hvis heller ikke det gør fra eller til, er det tilladt ham at ”slå hende let med hænderne, idet han skal undgå hendes ansigt og andre følsomme områder”. Denne passus om mænds ret til at slå deres hustruer medførte, at bogen forbudt i 1995 blev forbudt i Frankrig. Den forhandles dog stadig, og Sappho har uden besvær købt et eksemplar af den franske udgave, Le licite et l'illicite en Islam, gennem den islamiske boghandel Tawhids internetsalg. Tawhids to butikker i henholdsvis Lyon og Paris har også både denne og en række andre af Qaradawis bøger til salg. Muslimbroder og mangemillionær Havde Qaradawis forældre fået lov at bestemme, var han blevet håndværker. Men allerede som tiårig kunne Qaradawi Koranen udenad. I 1953 var han uddannet fra sunni-islams vigtigste religiøse institution, Al-Azhar Universitetet. Inden da havde han nået at møde grundlæggeren af Det Muslimske Broderskab, Hassan al-Banna, der blev hans mentor: ”Jeg havde chancen for at høre Hassan al-Banna, og jeg blev forført af hans veltalenhed og hans ideer”, forklarede Qaradawi i 2004 til den franske journalist Xavier Ternisien. Qaradawi har også udtalt, at han med få undtagelser er enig i al-Bannas ideologiske program. På grund af sine politiske aktiviteter har Qaradawi siddet i fængsel adskillige gange, både under kong Farouk og præsident Nasser. Nasser slog hårdt ned på Broderskabet i 1950erne, og i 1963 måtte Qaradawi gå i eksil i Qatar, hvor han har boet lige siden. Her er han dekan for sharia-fakultetet ved Qatars universitet, ligesom han har ledende poster i forskellige religiøse sammenslutninger i en række muslimske lande. Qaradawi kan dog stadig frit rejse ud og ind af Egypten, og i dag tilbringer han som regel en måned om året i sit fædreland, hvor han dels opholder sig ved kysten ud for Alexandria dels i en lejlighed i et af Cairos velhaverkvarterer. Lejligheden er, forklarede Qaradawis sekretær i 2004 til Xavier Ternisien, symbolsk placeret midtvejs mellem en kirke og en moské, helt i tråd med den tolerance, som sekretæren forsikrede, at hans arbejdsgiver stod for. Men mens mange vestlige politikere synes at have svært ved at klassificere Qaradawi, er han kommet på listen over de prædikanter, som en større gruppe intellektuelle fra muslimske lande sidste år udråbte som ”had-prædikanter”. Han har indrejseforbud i USA, hvor han ikke har været siden 1998. Blandt Qaradawis specialer er islamisk finansiering. Således er han ifølge Fiammetta Venner blevet mangemillionær på at rådgive arabiske prinser og andre formuende folk i kunsten at omgå islams forbud mod at tage renter uden at overtræde religionens påbud. Qaradawi vedkender selv, at ”han sidder godt i det”. Muslimbroder og Al-Taqwa-stifter Youssef Nadas kontor i Lugano, Italien Dette er, ifølge Venner, årsagen til, at Qaradawi i sin tid afslog tilbuddet om at blive ny leder af Det Muslimske Broderskab. I sin nuværende position har han frie hænder til enhver forretningsmæssig og politisk aktivitet. Det er heller ikke kommet ham til skade. Blandt hans udmærkelser er Den Islamiske Banks pris for udvikling af en islamiske økonomi i 1990 og den prestigetunge Kong Feisal pris for islamiske studier to år efter.
Det var naturligvis også Qaradawi, der overvågede, at den nu nedlagte Al-Taqwa banks operationer stemte overens med muslimske principper. Al-Taqwa blev oprettet af to fremtrædende muslimbrødre Youssef Nada og Tariq Ramadans far, Said Ramadan, og er mistænkt for at have fungeret som bank for al-Qaeda. Det er en væsentlig årsag til, at amerikanerne ikke vil lukke Qaradawi ind. ”Røde Kens” gode ven I Europa kan Qaradawi stadig rejse frit og nyder stigende popularitet. Han hyldes med tilråb om takbir (erobring, ekspansion) på konferencer i London og støttes af Storbritanniens største muslimske paraplyorganisation, Muslim Council of Britain, der betegner ham som en ”fremragende lærd” og en ”fornuftig og forstående stemme”. Londons borgmester, Ken Livingstone, også kendt som ”Røde Ken”, modtog i sommeren 2004 den ”moderate” islamiske lærde med åbne arme, da Qaradawi sammen med den kendte prædikant Tariq Ramadan var i byen for at lede det første møde i organisationen Prohijab, hvis formål er ”lægge pres” på europæiske politikere og organisationer for at få accepteret kvinders ret til at bære hovedtørklæde. På grund af Qaradawis udtalelser om homoseksualitet og jøder blev besøget mødt med voldsomme protester og kritik i medierne. I vrede over den uvenlige modtagelse forskansede Qaradawi sig på sit hotelværelse og nægtede at tale med medierne bortset fra The Guardian. Bag efter roste han Ken Livingstone som en ”ædel og modig mand”, der stod fast over for den israelske efterretningstjeneste Mossad, som Qaradawi påstår forsøgte at blokere besøget. I Frankrig inviteres Qaradawi ikke længere som taler på den årlige konference i Bourget uden for Paris, der trækker titusindvis af muslimer. Det er Unionen af Frankrigs Islamiske Organisationer (UOIF), der står for denne fire-dages begivenhed, der byder på foredrag, bogsalg, Koran-recitation og debat. UOIF er Frankrigs største muslimske paraplyorganisation og domineret af Det Muslimske Broderskab. Men selv om Qaradawi igennem sin post som præsident for Det Europæiske Råd for Fatwa og Forskning er UOIFs højeste religiøse autoritet, kan man ikke så godt invitere en taler, der åbent går ind for at dræbe jøder og amerikanere, så længe UOIF forsøger at placere sig som moderat. I 2000 var Qaradawi dog inviteret som taler og forestod blandt andet en offentlig konvertering til islam, et fænomen, der er kommet på mode under islamiske konferencer i Vesten. Fiammetta Venner har beskrevet, hvordan tre unge, franske kvinder fremsagde den muslimske trosbekendelse både på fransk og arabisk, som de tydeligvis ikke forstod et ord af. Men under Qaradawis forsæde blev Marie, Aurélie og Aurore til Loubna, Assia og Kenza. Lav muslimske ghettoer Også i Danmark har Qaradawi tilhængere. Han var en af de prædikanter, som danske imamer besøgte under rundrejsen til Mellemøsten efter Jyllands-Postens offentliggørelse af Muhammed-tegningerne, og det var også Qaradawi, der fra den moské i Qatar, hvor han prædiker hver fredag, opfordrede til boykot af danske varer og udråbte en fredag i februar sidste år til at være ”vredens fredag”. Mostafa Chendid, der har efterfulgt Ahmed Abu Laban som leder af Islamisk Trossamfund i København, siger ligeud, at Qaradawi er et forbillede for ham. Så når Trossamfundets repræsentanter har danske folkeskoleklasser, gymnasieklasser og studerende fra højere læreanstalter på besøg – hvilket ifølge Trossamfundets hjemmeside forekommer hyppigt – har Yussef al-Qaradawi grund til at glæde sig. Qaradawi har skrevet mere end 80 bøger. En af dem, Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase, der kom i 1990, kan ifølge den amerikanske terrorekspert Lorenzo Vidino betragtes som det mest aktuelle manifest fra den islamiske vækkelsesbevægelse. I indledningen gør Qaradawi målet klart: at gøre islam til samfundets ledende magt, at genoprette kalifatet og indføre den islamiske lov, shariaen. Qaradawi taler om, at muslimer skal operere gennem dawa, (mission), ikke mindst de muslimer, der bor i Vesten. Og han har denne opfordring til dem: ”Prøv at få jeres eget lille samfund i det større samfund. Prøv at få jeres egen muslimske ghetto”. Det er derfor ikke overraskende, at Sammenslutningen af Islamiske Organisationer i Europa, FIOE, der er en paraplyorganisation for flere af Det Muslimske Broderskabs vigtigste forgreninger i europæiske lande, nu barsler med en forfatning for Europas muslimer. FIOE, der blev stiftet i 1989, har gennem sine medlemsorganisationer udført lobbyarbejde blandt europæiske politikere, kristne organisationer, anti-racismeorganisationer m.fl. med det formål at skaffe sig indflydelse. Sammenslutningen har til huse på Markfield Institute, der er den akademiske gren af den pakistansk baserede ekstremistbevægelse Jamaat-e-Islamis europæiske højborg, Det Islamiske Center i Leicester i England. FIOEs ungdomsorganisation, FEMYSO, blev stiftet i 1996, og har formentlig af strategiske grunde valgt at have hovedkvarter i Bruxelles, hvor paraplyorganisationen plejer gode kontakter til Europaparlamentet, Europarådet og FN. Frafald og discount-islam I 1997 etablerede FIOE Det europæiske Råd for Fatwa og Forskning. Det har Qaradawi som formand, og i rådet sidder i dag 29 fremtrædende muslimske retslærde, de fleste med tilknytning til Det Muslimske Broderskab. Seksten af medlemmerne bor i Europa, resten i muslimske lande. Den danske imam Fouad al-Barazi, der var med til at hidse danske muslimer op under Muhammed-krisen, har været medlem, men trak sig sammen med to andre medlemmer i protest mod, at et flertal i rådet støttede en fatwa, der accepterede rentetagning under visse omstændigheder. Alle medlemmer er naturligvis mænd, og ifølge Fiammetta Venner har kvinder ikke ret til foretræde for rådet. Dets afgørelser henvender sig til muslimer i Europa. Det Europæiske Råd for Fatwa og Forskning har hovedkvarter i Det Islamiske Kulturcenter i Dublin. Ifølge flere iagttagere fordi Irland ikke forfægter det sekulære princip så nidkært som for eksempel Frankrig og heller ikke har særlige problemer med islamiske grupper. Rådet kan her operere i fred. Medlemmerne træder sammen hvert halve år, men er der en akut sag, som da tørklædeforbuddet blev indført i Frankrig, kan der kaldes til ekstraordinært møde. En gang om året er et medlem af rådet vært for mødet, og der har således været afholdt i blandt andet Sarajevo, London og Köln. Alle rejser og ophold sponsoreres af Makhtoum-familien, der regerer Dubai. Tariq Ramadan – den formodede "euro-islamist", der har skrevet forord til Qaradawis fatwa-samling I 2002 kom den første samling af rådets fatwaer på fransk, Recueil de fatwas, udgivet af forlaget Tawhid. Bogen har forord af Tariq Ramadan, der roser initiativet og betegner Qaradawis med ærestitlen sheik. Ifølge Ramadan viser samlingens fatwaer ”en vej og dens grænser”. Hvis enhver vil bestemme selv, får man en ”discount-islam” – en ”islam uden islam”. Bogen bringer eksempler på fatwaer om bøn, forretningsanliggender, ægteskab, skilsmisse og meget mere. Der er også en om kvindens tildækning, der svarer til, hvad Qaradawi skriver i bogen The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam. En anden fatwa taler om det problematiske i at lade muslimske piger cykle, for mødommen kan springe. Man må her, mener rådet, afveje risikoen over for nødvendigheden af, at hun cykler. I Fatwa nr. 4, placeret i et afsnit for fatwaer af stor betydning, vil en muslim vide, hvad rådet mener om straffen for frafald i islam. Er det rigtigt, som det hævdes af en ateist, der har spurgt til dette anliggende, at dødsstraf for frafald er en knægtelse af samvittighedsfriheden? I svaret gør rådet det klart, at straf for frafald ikke vedrører muslimer i Europa, men kun den islamiske stat. Det kan diskuteres, mener rådet, om der altid er dødsstraf, eller kun dødsstraf, hvor den frafaldne åbent erklærer sin uenighed eller vil skade Gud og de troende: ”Hans død sigter på at beskytte religionen og samfundet.” Der er således ikke tale om en knægtelse af samvittighedsfriheden: ”Statens og samfundets interesser går forud for individets personlige interesser.” Dødsstraf for frafald kan således sidestilles med dødsstraf for ”højforræderi”. Qaradawi lægger ikke skjul på, hvad hans endelige mål er: ”Vi erobrer Europa, vi erobrer Amerika, ikke med sværdet, men med vores budskab.” Altså ikke direkte gennem terror, men gennem fatwaråd, islamiske lobbyorganisationer, propaganda og stempling af islams fjender. Det er sådan, Det Muslimske Broderskab vinder magt i Europa, og i denne proces kan Qaradawis rolle næppe overvurderes. Islamism in the Past and the Present.From Anti-Colonialism to Global Jihad Islamism in the Past and the Present.From Anti-Colonialism to Global Jihad
What are the roots of political Islam and what are the ideological tenets and goals of radical Islamic activists in Muslim countries? Franz Kogelmann provides an historic overview The creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1929 led to the first Islamist mass movement | No other phenomenon is making more headlines around the world than religious-political movements that proclaim to act in the name of Islam. Up until a few decades ago, it was primarily just academics who were familiar with the religiously-inspired liberation struggles of Muslim societies during the colonial period. But that level of awareness changed in the late 1970s when religious leaders overthrew the regime of the Shah of Iran, drawing world attention to the revolutionary potential and mobilizing power of Islamic political movements. Over the past few years, not only regimes and occupational forces in the Muslim world have been confronted with this phenomenon, but also Western countries to an increasing degree within their national borders. Islamic political movements range from moderate factions that call for certain aspects of Islam to play a more active role in public life, to radical groups that launch terrorist attacks aimed at bringing down entire political systems of government. This wide range of activism is generally referred to as Islamism. Conflict with European colonial powers Present-day Islamism has its roots in the confrontation between Muslims and European colonial powers. In 1798, a French military expedition occupied Egypt, clearly demonstrating to Muslim leaders that they were no match for Europeans when it came to military matters. Many Muslims were quick to interpret this lack of military strength as an indication of economic, political, and finally even intellectual backwardness. In addition to acquiring scientific knowledge from Europe, reform efforts aimed to shape the political systems of Muslim countries. Reforms of the legal system greatly diminished the influence of Islamic law. Islamic institutions came under the control of a centralized state bureaucracy, making Islamic scholars directly dependent on the state. The Salafiyya movement In reaction to this overwhelmingly strong European influence that left many Muslims feeling powerless, Islamic leaders founded the Salafiyya movement in the late 19th century. This movement, which inspires Islamists even today, reveres the first generation of Muslims, called "the venerable predecessors" (as-salaf as-salih). The two main leaders of this movement, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935), published a magazine called al-Manar, and soon discovered that it was the ideal medium to disseminate their reformist Islamic ideas to almost every corner of the Muslim world. In their opinion, the first Muslim society should not be copied, but should serve as an inspiration to overcome the rigidness of present systems and to emulate Islamic teachings. They felt that the relative weakness of Muslim societies was due to an erroneous understanding of Islam, and that the only way to overcome contemporary problems was to reinterpret Islamic sources. Institutionalized Islamism – the Muslim Brotherhood In contrast to Salafiyya, whose original sphere of influence was largely confined to the elite in society, the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1929 led to the first Islamist mass movement. Until it became a banned organization and was persecuted in the 1950s and 1960s, the Muslim Brotherhood had gradually become a state within the state of Egypt, and was also active in many other Muslim countries. The success of the Muslim Brotherhood was based primarily on its socio-political activities. Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), founder and first leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, defined Islam as an all-embracing "Islamic system" based on the Koran and the Sunnah, a universal system that could be applied everywhere and at all times. However, al-Banna failed by and large to formulate a rigorous ideology. Key issues, such as how such an "Islamic system" could be concretely defined – aside from firmly anchoring Islamic law in public life – remained unresolved. It was left to the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) to work out a systematic ideology for the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb was imprisoned for ten years, and his view of the world from behind bars became increasingly radical. Islam, Jahiliyyah and Jihad Inspired by the Indian-Pakistani Islamic scholar and political activist Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi, Qutb popularized in his writings a number of terms that he said were essential characteristics of an Islamic society. For instance, he wrote that the only legitimate rule was "the sovereignty of God" (al-hakimiyyah li'llah) and the "only being to worship is God" (al-'uboodiyyah li'llah). One of the cornerstones of Qutb's ideological approach is the concept of "jahiliyyah," which describes the period of ignorance in pre-Islamic Arabian society. Qutb characterizes it in modern society as the transfer of political rule and law to the despotism of man, replacing the rule of God and His laws. Even if individual members of society are true Muslims, Qutb claims that society in general remains in an intolerable state of jahiliyyah. This deplorable state, according to Qutb, can only be overcome by force in the form of jihad. In Qutb's writings, jihad becomes a revolutionary struggle for liberation, a religious war, a struggle for God, and a struggle to free people from oppression. Many contemporary militant Islamist groups base their ideologies on the ideas of Qutb. One of the key tenets of this doctrine is the concept of an individual struggle for Islam, or against everything that is nonislamic, which even justifies the killing of unarmed civilians. Although Islamic scholars have a multitude of interpretations for the term jihad, militant groups have reduced its meaning to an armed struggle, and even proclaimed it as the personal religious duty (fard 'ayn) of each and ever Muslim. Bombers who sacrifice their lives in suicide attacks are motivated by promises of sumptuous rewards in the afterlife. Rise to power of the Islamists Ever since numerous national modernization programs began to fail in the 1970s, the political leadership of Muslim states has come under increasing pressure from Islamist oppositional groups that use religious arguments to question the legitimacy of the power of the state. As a result, significant emphasis is given to Islamic issues in political debates. This has had effects on a number of levels. Many rulers have moved into political arenas that until recently had been occupied only by Islamists. To combat the influence of the Islamists, politicians have also enhanced the status of the Islamic establishment – a sector of society that is dependent on the state and despised by the Islamists. In some countries, moderate Islamists have been given an opportunity to establish legal parties that have enjoyed success at the polls in free elections. When it comes to security issues, confrontation has intensified between the state and militant Islamists. There have been a rising number of terrorist attacks and the state has reacted with increasingly repressive measures. One of the catalysts of this development was the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. During the conflict, Muslim countries sent volunteer combatants to fight against the Soviet occupation. When the war ended, thousands of ideologically steadfast and battle-hardened Mujahideen returned to their home countries. While the military struggles of these former Afghanistan fighters were largely limited to the confines of national borders during the 1990s, today's militant Islamist movements have taken on a global dimension. Global Jihad Long-term stationing of Western troops in core Muslim countries, Western support for authoritarian regimes, and inequitable economic and political developments have lent weight to the arguments of Islamist demagogues. From a Muslim perspective, the push for a global war on terrorism, coupled with Western campaigns to promote self-determination and democracy in Muslim countries, is perceived as nothing more than lip service. Islamists argue that Western commitment to Muslim countries only serves to secure key natural resources. This reminds many Muslims of the era of European colonialism, when the Salafiyya movement inspired a struggle to liberate national territory. Currently the Islamist threat is perceived as global, thus legitimizing a worldwide reaction. The fight against global Islamist terror, however, has essentially proven counterproductive. In addition, independent predictions on the continued development of militant Islamism are not particularly optimistic. Franz Kogelmann © Qantara.de 2006 Translated from the German by Paul Cohen When Is Opposition to Israel and Its Policies Anti-Semitic?When Is Opposition to Israel and Its Policies Anti-Semitic?
http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-627/_nr-3/_p-1/i.html INTERVIEW WITH FOUNDER OF "COUNCIL OF EX-MUSLIMS""Not Possible to Modernize Islam"Human rights activists have formed a "Central Council of Ex-Muslims in Germany" to help women renounce the Islamic faith if they feel oppressed by its laws. Its Iranian-born founder Mina Ahadi, under police protection after receiving death threats, talks to DER SPIEGEL about its goals.
Mina Ahadi has received death threats after founding the group.
Iranian-born Mina Ahadi, 50, said she set up the group to highlight the difficulties of renouncing the Islamic faith which she believes to be misogynist. She wants the group to form a counterweight to Muslim organisations that she says don't adequately represent Germany's secular-minded Muslim immigrants. Ahadi has been put under police protection in recent days. Renouncing Islam can carry the death penalty in a number of countries including Iran, Saudi-Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan and Mauritania. In other countries people who turn their backs on the faith aren't punished by courts, but they are often ostracized by family and friends. It's a difficult subject among Muslim communities in Europe too. Ahadi said she wants the new organization to help women who feel oppressed by the rules of the faith to find a way out. The Council will hold a news conference in Berlin on Wednesday to outline its goals. DER SPIEGEL spoke to Ahadi. SPIEGEL: Together with 29 other immigrants from Muslim countries you have declared that you have renounced Islam. The campaign is similar to one launched in the 1970s by women who declared publicly that they had had abortions. What is your purpose? Ahadi: I haven't been a Muslim for 30 years. I'm also critical of Islam in Germany and of the way the German government deals with the issue of Islam. Many Muslim organisations like the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD) or Milli Görüs engage in politics or interfere in people's everyday lives. They were invited to the conference on Islam (hosted by the government in Berlin last year). But their aims are hostile to women and to people in general." SPIEGEL: Why? Ahadi: They want to force women to wear the headscarf. They promote a climate in which girls aren't allowed to have boyfriends or go to discos and in which homosexuality is demonized. I know Islam and for me it means death and pain. SPIEGEL: What will your organization do? Ahadi: One example: One representative of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany said that a carnival procession float (during the recent carnival in Germany) showing Islamists with explosive belts had offended Muslims. But there was no evidence of that. The associations pretend that they represent everyone and to some extent are acknowledged as such by the German side. That's bad. We have to give a signal against that and say: Not in our name. We are secular humanists. We want to give these people a voice. Someone has to make a start. We're advocating human rights.
SPIEGEL: Some of your members are also active in communist organizations in their home countries. Ahadi: Yes, many were active in left-wing groups. We have received more than 100 membership applications in recent days. We want to create a new movement, in other European countries too. We hope that soon there will be 10,000 of us representing many more people. SPIEGEL: Won't your campaign just harden the battle lines? Ahadi: I don't think it's possible to modernize Islam. We want to form a counterweight to the Muslim organisations. The fact that we're doing this under police protection shows how necessary our initiative is. http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,468828,00.html The Rise of the Wahhabi Movement and the Saudi State
The Rise of the Wahhabi Movement and the Saudi StateProfessor Says Politics, Not Religion, Pushed Stringent Branch of Islam
Khalid al-Dakhil Assistant Professor of SociologyMonday, February 5, 2007; 11:00 AM
Khalid al-Dakhil, assistant professor of sociology Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, was online Monday, Feb. 5 at 11 a.m. ET, to discuss his research into the ascent of Wahhabist Islam -- the strict interpretation adhered to by some al-Qaeda members -- and the Saudi state in the early 20th Century. The Saudi writer and academic holds a doctorate in sociology from UCLA. Read the story: Saudi Writer Recasts Kingdom's History (Post, Feb. 4)
The transcript follows. ____________________ Helsinki, Finland: What is the relation of the early history of the Wahhabi movement -- vis a vis the conflicts that King Abdul Aziz had with the Bedouin Ikhwan man Ata' Allah -- to what we currently see in the ideological views of the modern terrorist groups? It does seem that they have taken it upon themselves to revive the rebellious tendencies and extremism that was fought by King Abdul Aziz. Khalid al-Dakhil: There is a difference between the early and modern Wahhabis. In its early time the Wahhabi religious establishment was sort of unified institution. The current Wahhabism is starting to disintegrate into different trends -- now you have what might be called the establishment Wahhabis, the neo-Wahhabis and the Jihadists, who seem to be behind the terrorist phenomena in Saudi Arabia. As to the Ikhwan movement of King Abdul Aziz's time, that is again another story. On the one hand they were closer to the early and traditional Wahhabis; on the other they were using religion to make a political claim in the newly established state -- a claim they saw should be proportionate to the role they played the creation of the state. _______________________ Bonn, Germany: Most Europeans believe that Saudi Arabia is financing the constructions of Mosques all over the world -- in Muslim countries and those where Muslims are a minority. Wahhabism supposedly is taught in these Mosques, thus influencing Muslims all over the world with this most-intolerant form of Islam. I wonder, is that correct? If it is correct, is it a problem for Islam and the rest of the world and should countries thus infiltrated try to prevent it? Khalid al-Dakhil: I think that is correct, and it may be a problem, but the solution is not to silence the Wahhabis or anybody else -- the solution is to have a dialogue between cultures, religions and nations. The crux of the problem is in the behavior of the nation-state and the fact these nations are in a state of constant conflict without allowing enough room for cultural and political exchange and dialogue. Lately there seems to be a change from that -- let's hope for the better. _______________________ New York: Dr. Al-Dakhil: Marhaba from NYC. How is the political influence of the Wahhabi movement constraining the Saudi government's range of response to foreign policy challenges? Can the Saudi government exert a level realpolitik or is it bound by doctrine? I'm especially interested in how that colors actions to co-opt or undercut Iranian influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, etc. Khalid al-Dakhil: Well, I would say that the influence of the Wahhabi ideology on the foreign policy of the Saudi state is very limited. It should be recalled that the Saudi relations with the U.S. ( a Christian nation) are more than 70 years old -- it was an alliance forged by the founding father of Saudi Arabia. In other words, this relationship started during the time the Saudi society was most conservative, and closer to the Wahhabi society of the 19th century. The power of the Wahhabi establishment then was at its peak, and yet there was no problem. The problem started after the 1980s, and specifically after the war to liberate Afghanistan from the Soviet occupation. In the Saudi state there is a clear distinction between the realm of religion, where the ulama are accorded a wide leeway, and the realm of politics, where the ruler is given a free hand to run the affairs of the state. So the Saudi government can co-opt or undercut the Iranians in Iraq without having to answer to the Wahhabi clerics. It's a matter of the political interests of the state, and the clerics. And remember that the Saudi role in the events in Iraq since the American invasion has been limited not because of the Wahhabis but because of the Bush administration. _______________________ Sarasota, Fla.: "Wahhabism" seems to be a catch-all term used to describe/define all forms of fundamentalist Islam -- and often with a subtext of violence. Can you help differentiate between the various threads such as "salafism," "neo-salafism," "Deobandism," "Muslim Brotherhood tendencies," etc., in order to find useful terms for the discussion of Wahhabism and its role in contemporary Saudi Arabia? Khalid al-Dakhil: The central concept here is "Salafism", or "assalafiyyah" in Arabic. It denotes a way or method of thinking, and so it's a school of theological and legal thought in Islam. It is the dominant school in Islam in the past and in the present. Wahhabism, the Muslim brotherhood, etc. are variations or trends of the same school. _______________________ Athens, Ga.: Can you discuss the political and doctrinal divisions that exist within contemporary Wahhabism? Khalid al-Dakhil: I previously answered part of this question. Wahhabism now is a unified establishment as it used to be in the past. There are different trends within, and that is a development that came about as a result of the tremendous changes that the Saudi society experienced in the past half-century or so. _______________________ Toronto: Dear Prof. Khalid al-Dakhil: Salaam Alaikum. What was the role of the British and did they have any contact or links to Abdul Wahab, directly or indirectly, in trying to undermine the Ottoman empire? Khalid al-Dakhil: There was no role that the British played in the rise of the Wahhabi movement whatsoever. There is nothing in the history of the Wahhabi movement to suggest that there was such a role. _______________________ Washington: Are there more moderate interpretations of Islam in Saudi Arabia today that have popular appeal -- i.e. alternatives to the interpretation of Wahhabism adopted and enforced by the state and the extremist interpretations adopted by jihadis? Khalid al-Dakhil: Yes there are. There is what I called before the neo-Wahhabis, or the Sahwah, which tend to combine Wahhabi ideology and the political convictions of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. This trend is a real challenge to the traditional Wahhabis. There is also what I like to call to call the liberal Muslims -- this is a new trend that champions a more open and liberal interpretation of Islam, according to which pluralism and diversity is acceptable and encouraged. _______________________ Washington: What are the points of tension and of common ground between reactionary Wahhabists and reactionary Shiites in Iran? In other words is a confrontation brewing between the Saudis and Iranians in the Gulf, and if so, what form(s) might it take? Khalid al-Dakhil: The central point of tension between the reactionary Wahhabis and reactionary Shiites is the old theological differences between the Shiites and the Sunnis in general. The tension here revolves mainly around the political question of who should have been the successor to the prophet. Around this question is a huge body of thought and beliefs that kept growing and creating the gulf between the two. I don't think a confrontation is brewing between Saudi Arabia and Iran at this point -- after all, the two are leading the efforts to find a solution to the political impasse in Lebanon. What is brewing between the two at present are political and strategic interests in the Gulf and the Middle East as a whole, not theological dispute. You know, there is the nuclear issue, Iraq and Lebanon. Iran is trying to reap the fruits of the disastrous American failures in Iraq and Palestine, and also the Arab weakness on both fronts. On the other hand Saudi Arabia is trying to salvage the situation, so that it can put a limit to growing Iranian influence in the region and minimize the disruption of the balance of the power in the Arabian Gulf as a result of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq. I'm not trying here to minimize the role of religion; rather, I'm trying to recognize the political context of this role. Maybe the role of religion is more crucial in the case of Iran, which is ruled by the clergy. _______________________ Anonymous: Dear Dr. Khalid al-Dakhil: Are Saudi historians like yourself attempting in any systematic way to conduct oral history interviews of Saudis (and Aramcon Americans perhaps) who played a role in the development of the Kingdom in the past 50 years? Are there historical archives available to historians? Cheers. Khalid al-Dakhil: As far as I know, yes there are efforts along this line. You should contact the Foundation of King Abdul Aziz and the Archives for research about this. My understanding is that they are doing something about this. _______________________ Lappeenranta, Finland: For a westerner the role of Saudi women is quite restrictive. This is exemplified by a recent case receiving a lot of play in the Saudi press, i.e. the lady known as Fatima. She was forced into divorce by her brothers and this was upheld in court. The lady is now in jail because she has refused to submit to this verdict. Can you delineate how much of women's roles in the KSA are influenced by Wahhabism as opposed to traditional Arab mores. washintonpost.com: Saudi Lawyer Takes On Religious Court System (Post, Dec. 23, 2006) Khalid al-Dakhil: The case of Fatima is a case of discrimination on the basis of descent, or what is called in the legal jargon "kafa'at annasab." It is illegal and runs against the teachings and principles laid out in the Quran. In fact this ruling is based more on old traditional Arab attitudes and values, not on Islamic principles -- but of course for such values to be acceptable and justified they are presented in the cloak of religion. And that shows the big influence of religious thought, and with it the Wahhabi role. _______________________ Washington: Would you agree with Thomas Friedman's article last week where he said that the U.S. may have more in common culturally with Iran than with Saudi Arabia? Khalid al-Dakhil: I did not have the chance to read Mr. Friedman's article, and so I don't know what he means by this. _______________________ Washington: What do you think of the Saudi writers/intellectuals based outside of Saudi Arabia, such as Mai Yamani, Madawi al-Rasheed and Fahad Nazer, in terms of what they can contribute to reforms in Saudi Arabia? Khalid al-Dakhil: I think they can contribute a lot to the literature on reform in SA. We just need them to cast their ideas and thought in a liberal and rich perspective. _______________________ Washington: Khalid al-Dakhil, would you say that Wahhabism and other forms of Islam are compatible with democracy? Why or why not? Khalid al-Dakhil: This is a tricky question. When you say Wahhabism and Islam, you're talking about the part and the whole at the same time. As I said before, now we have in SA what you might call Muslim or Wahhabi "liberals." Does that mean that Wahhabism can embrace democracy? Maybe. What is certain is that Wahhabism in its original form and content cannot be democratic. Can it evolve in that direction? Well, it could. More important however is to take up the notion of democracy with all its prerequisites, and to see if Wahhabism can accommodate itself to it. We know that there is no democracy without secularism -- maybe there is a room in the Wahhabi political tradition for a prototype secularism. That is if we recall that in traditional Wahhabism there is the clear distinction between the political and the religious in the structure of the state. _______________________ London, U.K.: How can one judge or evaluate the support of extremism in Saudi Arabia if there are no public opinion polls in the country? Can we trust the polls that have been done by external companies or agencies? Khalid al-Dakhil: If these polls were conducted inside SA, and on scientific bases, then we should trust them. Now the fact there are no polls in SA itself, that is a Saudi problem. There is no reason to complain in this case. _______________________ Washington: Good Morning, and thank you for participating in this chat. I spent many years in Riyadh as a child in the '80s, when my parent worked for a US company there. I have such strong memories of the beautiful desert, of Diriyah, where my school would take us on field trips, and of the souks where I spent so many hours looking around. There were so many vendors who were kind enough to take the time to talk to us little kids who never had more than 20 riyals in our pockets, and a lot of broken Arabic that we used to negotiate what we thought were killer bargains. I left in 1987, and have heard and read that the country has become more conservative than what I remember, and less tolerant of foreigners. Is this true? Do you think any part of Saudi Arabia will ever be open to non-Muslim tourists? I and many of my ex-pat friends would be so happy to visit the places we loved, and introduce friends and spouses to the country that we were so happy in as children. Khalid al-Dakhil: On the one hand, you're right the country has grown more conservative than what it used to be during the time you were there. At the same time there is a recognition of this and its negative effects, even at the official level. So sure, you can come and reminisce as much as you want. There is a government. agency in the country for tourism. _______________________ Washington: Osama bin Laden, for better or for worse, is the de facto promoter of Wahhabism to the world's general public. How is this being viewed by the liberal neo-Wahhabis? Is there any public attempt to counter Bin Laden's message? Khalid al-Dakhil: For one thing, bin Laden is not a Wahhabi -- and the Wahhabi neo-liberals are against bin Laden. _______________________ Athens, Ga.: Do you believe that Wahhabism can be tolerant towards other forms of Islam (much less other religions) without rejecting the core teachings of Muhammad ibn al-Wahhab? Khalid al-Dakhil: Yes, they can. But then again that depends on what you you mean by Wahhabis in this case. As I said, Wahhabism now is not what it used to be in the past. It also depends on what we mean by other Muslims. Do we mean by that the other so-called Sunni Muslims? The Wahhabis, old and new, do differ with these Muslims but at the same time share so much with them that they always have tolerated each other. On the other hand other Muslims, like the Khawarij and the Mu'tazilites, are not tolerated by the Wahhabis. _______________________ Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Don't you think that the source of Wahhabi ideology (sheikh Muhammad bin Abdulwahab) was very much an adherent of the pure, excellent Islamic teachings and had no catches at all ... yet his followers and those who came afterward added certain restrictions and chains to its practices? Thank you. Khalid al-Dakhil: No I don't think so. The restrictions you're referring to are in the original teaching of sheikh Ibn Abdul-Wahhab. _______________________ London: How can we explain the fact the most Saudi students who are going abroad for education prefer the U.S., not to mention the popularity of western movies among Saudi youth, at the same time be told that Saudi Arabia is conservative society? Khalid al-Dakhil: Many of the Saudis you're talking about like to enjoy the lifestyle of the West, yet they won't vote for such a style in SA. This a very complicated cultural issue. You may want to know too that there are Saudis trying to bring a film industry to SA. The problem is these are still in the minority. Therefore, yes, the country is conservative, but that does not necessarily mean that people will not enjoy their life. Remember, the majority of Saudis are against women driving, for example. _______________________ Columbia, Md.: What strikes me is how much the unifying factor of Wahhabism mirrors the trajectory of the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages. Church leaders sold the ideas of the Crusades as a short-cut to heaven and giving money and support to the Crusaders as almost as good as fighting yourself. I see much of the same themes running through Wahhabi inspired Jihadist and Salafi media. Perhaps the Crusades began as an attempt to maintain access to the Holy Land for pilgrims, but it grew to justify campaigns of territorial expansion that included the voyages of discovery and conquest in the Americas. Europe's nation-states were unified and became powerful as a result the unifying force of religion and politics. That power supported the art, culture, and science from which we still benefit from today, yet it also inspired the Inquisition and the witch-hunts in Europe and cultural destruction and genocide in the Americas and Africa. I see the global Jihad movement as an Islamic version of the Crusades and Inquisition combined into one; not only are they trying to remake governments in the image of the "perfect" Islamic-state, they are also trying to remake Islam into a single, "pure" denomination. I know that the West "benefited" from the history of the Crusades and from their Church-enforced unity, but the price was tremendous in human suffering and in corruption of the Church and faith, which continues to roil the present with toxic eruptions from history. How does the Islamic world and the present world reach the "benefits" of a pluralistic, democratically cooperative global society without running the same dark path that the West traveled? All I can see is the global Jihad movement blazing an even darker path. Khalid al-Dakhil: You may have a point on this, but there is an important difference between the two: The Crusaders controlled the state. The Salafis now are extra-legal organizations. The main concern of the Jihadi-Salafists is to gain access to political power, and to control the state in which they live and operate. As for the Wahhabis of the 19th century, they represented a movement to create a state that was not there. It is in this sense not expansionist, as was the case of the Crusaders of the Middle Ages. The Crusaders were expansionists beyond their European territories. They went as far as the current Middle East, and they used religion to justify their expansionism. Both of course used jihad as a shortcut to heaven, but that does not make them the same. _______________________ Hofuf, Saudi Arabia: Last year you were speaking during a cultural event in Riyadh and you were fiercely attacked by a religious man when you described the Shiite minority as a part of Saudi Arabia and that the rest of Saudis should understand and accept that. Do you think this attitude toward Shiites in the Kingdom will ever change? How do you see the future of Saudi Shiites? Khalid al-Dakhil: There are indications that change is taking place here. I think it will change, although this will take time. The government. should play the leading role to promote such a change. The Shiites in SA are citizens just like everyone there and should be taken as such, but at the same time the Shiites themselves should not behave as Shiites -- they should behave and act as citizens and insist on their rights first and foremost as Saudi citizens, not as Shiites. This does not mean they should abandon their beliefs, but these beliefs should be enriching part of the culture and politics of the whole society. In other words, the Shiites should be promoters of religious diversity in the country. _______________________ Athens, Ga.: Can you comment on the role you feel the United States played in creating the modern "Jihadi" phenomenon? How much of a role do you think Afghanistan played in its emergence around the world? Khalid al-Dakhil: The U.S. has had a big role in the rise of the Jihadi Islam of the 20th century, but the U.S. does not want to recognize that. It is easy to export this problem to other countries, like SA. _______________________ Philadelphia: There was some discussion that some of the anti-Israel sentiment expressed by some Wahhabists seemed to be traceable back to anti-Jewish propaganda spread in the Middle East by Nazis and by Christian missionaries. Have you seen any evidence that such links in fact exist? Khalid al-Dakhil: Now this is far-fetched. No need to go back to the Nazis to be anti-Israeli -- The state of Israel is the the reason and the source of this. Its expansionist, ruthless policies, and its refusal to reach a reasonable settlement with the Palestinians is very disturbing for people of the Arab world, and not only the Wahhabis. The plight of the Palestinians, which has been running now for more than a half-century, mainly is caused by the state of Israel. You don't need to fall back to such a racist ideology to see what is wrong with the state of Israel. _______________________ Herndon, Va.: Professor, is it possible to explain simply the differences between Saudi Wahhabism and Syrian Salafism? Are they merely regional variants of the same faith or is there some crucial difference between the two? Have they grown closer since radical elements of both apparently began cooperating with the Sunni insurgents in Iraq? Khalid al-Dakhil: The Wahhabis are Salafists and so share many things in common with the Syrian Salafis. But the Jihadists that are going to Iraq are not the same as the traditional Wahhabis -- the latter don't believe in the notion of Jihad if it is not declared and sanctioned by the ruler, or as they say, "wali-ul amr." From this it can be said that those who go to Iraq are doing that against the will of the main Salafi establishment, both in SA and Syria. Further, remember, there also are nationalists going to Iraq. Finally, these foreigners are small part of the insurgency in Iraq -- and that is according to the American estimates. _______________________ Washington: Would it be fair/accurate to compare the conflicts and division in the Middle eastern world today to the division and conflict in Europe centuries ago between Catholics and Protestants? Are the Shiites and Sunnis the Muslim versions of Catholics and Protestants? Khalid al-Dakhil: In a way that is correct. The Middle East now is dominated by religion, just like what it used to be in Europe of the Middle Ages. In other words, the Middle East can be seen as living in this sense in the Middle Ages. The conflict between the Sunnis and Shiites is very similar to the past conflict between the Catholics and the Protestants. You're right. _______________________ Khalid al-Dakhil: I think our exchange here has already run for almost two hours. I'm pleased to have had this opportunity to chat with such educated readers, who threw very intelligent questions and comments at me. My thanks goes to you all, and especially to The Washington Post and Chris Hopkins, the producers of this chat. Take care, and goodbye.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2007/02/01/DI2007020101782.html
Ayatollah issues fatwa calling for two journalists in Azerbaijan to be killed3 December 2006
Ayatollah issues fatwa calling for two journalists in Azerbaijan to be killed
Reporters Without Borders voiced deep concern today about a fatwa (religious decree) issued by an Iranian ayatollah calling for two journalists in neighbouring Azerbaijan to be killed for an allegedly blasphemous article. The fatwa’s targets are Rafiq Nazar Oughlo Taghizadh of the Azerbaijani fortnightly Sanat (“Industry”) and his editor Samir Sadaght Oughlo. “We urge the Iranian authorities to calm people down as there has been a great deal of tension since the publication of Mohammed cartoons in a Danish newspaper last February,” the press freedom organisation said. “We also ask the Azerbaijani authorities to do everything necessary to protect these two journalists.” Reporters Without Borders added: “It is deeply shocking and completely unacceptable that religious fundamentalists should call for the murder of two people who just expressed their opinions.” The offending article was written by Taghizadh, 56, for the newspaper’s 6 November issue. Entitled “Europe and us,” its claim that European values were superior to those of Muslim countries sparked outrage in both Azerbaijan (a Muslim country) and Iran. Fazel Lankarani (photo), one of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s leading ayatollah’s, issued the fatwa in response to appeals for advice from Azerbaijani Muslims. Posted on his website (www.lankarani.org) on 25 November, it calls for both the “apostate” journalist who wrote the article and the editor who published it to be killed. Ayatollah Lankarani The fatwa can be read online (in Farsi) at http://www.lankarani.ir/far/new/view.php?ntx=104033 For an Open Interpretation of the Koran For an Open Interpretation of the Koran The reformist thinker and philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush is one of a new generation of theologians that openly speaks out in favour of human rights and secularism in Iran. Katajun Amirpur about an awkward Iranian intellectual.  Abdolkarim Soroush | Most people consider the Islamic Republic of Iran to be a fundamentalist theocracy that fosters a radical interpretation of Islam. However, such an interpretation of the Koran is now being rejected by a group of Iranian theologians. The group, which is supported by the forces of social reform in the Islamic Republic, is significant not only for Iran, but also for the Islamic world far beyond its borders. A changing religious cognition Abdolkarim Soroush is one of the protagonists of this movement. The crux of his main scientific theory is the changeability of religious cognition. Soroush argues that because human cognition is changeable, so too is humankind's cognition of its religion because cognition in any era generally depends on the prevailing state of science in that era. This is why faith is continually being elucidated in new ways. These new interpretations are adapted to suit the conditions in which the interpreting person lives. Soroush is trying to justify a political system that is both Islamic and democratic. His starting point is the approximate nature of cognition. Humankind cannot really ever know what God expects of it. It will never find out what God's law really is or what purpose it serves. God's intentions are unfathomable. The Koran: open for interpretation Humankind can only ever know and understand God's aims. That is all. Soroush goes on to say that this religious aim simply cannot contradict humane concepts. The text of the Koran is, like every other text, open to interpretation. Soroush says that a rigid explanation of belief is a modern phenomenon. He points out that in past times, people assumed that religious cognition changed with time. This changeability, says Soroush, leaves room for new interpretations. And this is why democracy, Islam, and human rights are indeed compatible. This attitude is sure to ruffle feathers in Iran, where discourse on such matters is still chiefly dominated by the opinion of the founder of the Iranian state, Ayatollah Khomeini. According to his image of humankind and God, God is the only one who has rights. Humans have no rights. Above all, humans do not simply have rights because they are human, as is the assumption in the western world. While humans do have obligations to God; only God has rights. While God or his representative on earth might grant humans rights, he can just as easily taken them away again because rights are a gift of God, not of nature. According to Ayatollah Khomeini, every human must submit to the good of the community, i.e. the Islamic community. This anti-liberal world view also permits the violation of individual rights for the benefit of the community because the community always takes priority. This explains why censure, force, and infringements of human rights are justified if the well-being of the umma, the Muslim community, requires it. Human rights and religion in harmony Soroush refutes this line of argument. For him, human rights are the commandments of human reason. This means that they cannot be in conflict with religion because on principle, nothing unreasonable can be God's will. The fact that human rights were established in a non-religious context does not mean that their implementation is impossible or unnecessary in an Islamic state system. On the contrary. While human rights are the brainchild of humans, the fact that they do not contradict religion means that God's rights are not being infringed. The logical consequence of this line of argument is that a whole series of punishments recognised by Islamic law need no longer be applied, e.g. the amputation of hands for stealing. Nor is it, according to Soroush, absolutely necessary to follow Islamic laws down to the letter. To justify this point, he differentiates between first- and second-degree values. Second-degree values relate exclusively to the details of belief and therefore differ from religion to religion. First-degree values, on the other hand, such as justice, are the really important ones. Searching for the essence instead of the dogmas Details such as Islamic criminal law or dress codes are less important. They are the "skin" that outwardly keeps religion together and have nothing to do with the actual essence of religion. Soroush argues that anyone who believes in the five irrefutable dogmas of Shia - the unity of God, the prophets, the twelve Imams, the resurrection and the justice of God - is a Shiite. In his opinion, strict observance of religious rules is not essential. This is why human rights can be observed even in an Islamic system. In this way, Soroush is fundamentally adopting an attitude towards human rights that is generally upheld by secularists. Like them, he assumes that humans also have non-religious rights simply because they are humans. A concept such as this does not rigidly adhere to the interpretation of the Koran, but is instead guided by the ultimate will of the Creator. In principle, it is completely different from another school of liberal Islamic thought. Other liberal Islamic thinkers' apologetics describe how tolerant Muslims have been towards other religions in the past. They gloss over attacks on those who lapsed from the faith and emphasise how rare and politically motivated - not religiously motivated - such attacks were. Soroush, on the other hand, completely ignores the question as to whether Islam was tolerant in the past or not. He does not employ the argument that Jews in Spain were better off under Muslim rule than they were under the Christians after the reconquest. Nor does he play down the higher taxes and the lower blood money imposed on non-Muslims. Such aspects are irrelevant to his argument because he is trying to adapt his understanding of religion to suit the modern concept of human rights. He does so because he considers it necessary in the modern world. Soroush is convinced that there is no alternative to this course of action. After all, the fact that the Islamist experiment in Iran has failed requires no further proof. Katajun Amirpur © Qantara.de 2004 Translation from German: Aingeal Flanagan Published: 05.04.2004 - Last modified: 04.02.2005
Adapting to Contemporary Islam Adapting to Contemporary Islam
Is Islamic law compatible with democracy and human rights? One of Iran’s best-known reformist clerics has an answer to this question – an answer that challenges Islamic orthodoxy. Journalist Bahman Nirumand reports on a progressive and uncomfortable reformist theologian.  Iranian clerics read papers as they wait for the house arrest to be lifted in order to meet Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, January 2003 | Born in 1959, Mohsen Kadivar originally wanted to be an electronic engineer. However, after only a few semesters, he turned his back on the Technical University in the south Iranian city of Shiraz and made his way to the holy city of Ghom, where he devoted 17 years of his life to studying Islamic law, philosophy and mysticism at the Theological Centre. Two years later he received a doctorate from the Teaching Training College. He spent the years that followed working as a teacher and researcher. To date, he has published twelve books and written numerous articles for newspapers and magazines. He is currently lecturing at the Teaching Training College’s Department of Philosophy. The trials and tribulations of a pugnacious cleric A hallmark of Kadivar’s character is his habit of bluntly and consistently transposing his theological/philosophical knowledge into the political sphere, even into everyday politics – a highly risky strategy to pursue in view of the ruling Islamists’ ruthless and brutal manner of dealing with their critics. This is borne out by the fact that he spent 18 months in prison as a result of an interview he gave the daily newspaper Khordad. The reason for his incarceration was his review of the Islamic Republic’s achievements in the twenty years since its proclamation and a lecture entitled ‘Condemnation of terrorism from a religious point of view’. But despite all attempts to hinder him, Kadivar refused to be intimidated. At a remembrance service for the 1998 series of murders in which the political couple Forouhar and the two writers Mohammad Mokhtari und Mohammad Dajafar Pujandeh lost their lives, he said: ‘Five years ago I was sentenced to 18 months in prison because I protested against these bestial murders. Today, I would like to repeat what I said back then.’ Kadivar, a member of the board of the Association for the Defence of Freedom of Expression, says that some of the perpetrators were subjected to show trials, but those on whose orders they were acting were not. He demands that those who pulled the strings behind the scenes be brought to court. Two interpretations of Islam Like most reformers, Islamic law is one of Kadivar’s main preoccupations. The debate hinges on the question as to whether Islamic law, the Sharia, is compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles of democracy. Kadivar’s point of view is one of the most radical to be expressed in public to date. He says that there are two ways of interpreting Islam: a traditional and a modern way. In an interview with the Iranian magazine Aftab, he stated that the traditional interpretation of Islam is completely incompatible with the principles of human rights and democracy. However, he went on to say that this incompatibility applies not only to interpretations that have repeatedly misled the faithful down through history, but also to the most important pillars of the Islamic faith, in other words to the Koran, and the sayings and doings of the Prophet (Hadith). This assessment is more than revolutionary when one considers that Muslims believe that the Koran is the word of God and that the testimony of the Prophet was given by inspiration of God. To illustrate his point, Kadivar points out that Islam has different laws for different groups of people: i.e. for members of the Islamic community, Christians and Jews, men and women. However, there are no universally applicable laws for all people, independent of their religious beliefs, gender and social position. Without human rights, says Kadivar, there can be no democracy. Islam and human rights: an irresolvable conflict? But how can this dilemma be resolved? Kadivar writes that scholars who aim to adapt Islam to suit democracy and human rights are going about the matter in different ways. Some scholars, he says, are trying ‘to justify or shift the focus on Islam away from’ rules that stand in contradiction to human rights while others ‘are trying to emphasise those parts of existing scriptures that are in accord with human rights’. But Kadivar refuses to make do with such slapdash solutions. He says that there can be no doubt that not only religious traditions, but also the Koran itself, contain certain rules that are at variance with human rights. In his opinion, the decisive issue is how to deal with these rules. Traditional Islam considers the Koran to be the word of God: words that are inviolable and will endure for all eternity. Modern Islam rejects this stance on certain issues. The ideal solution: putting Islamic law into a historical context Kadivar says that the entire teachings of Islam can be divided up into four different parts: the first three parts relate to belief in God and the prophets, ethics and morality, and prayer. These parts, he says, are inviolable and will endure for all eternity. This is not the case with the fourth part, which governs the way people live together in a community, i.e. commercial law, individual law, criminal law etc.
Modernists believe that all rules in these teachings relate to a specific era and can and must be adapted to meet the specific requirements of the day, even if they are written in the Koran. Putting Islamic law into a historical context in this way is the key that opens the door to the modern world, to human rights and democracy. The way people live in a community – in other words, how they shape politics, education and upbringing and how they punish crimes and offences – is regulated by intellect, reason, experience and science on the basis of real circumstances, which are in a permanent state of flux. Ultimately, however, this means that Islamic legislation should be rewritten and religion should be separated from politics. Bahman Nirumand, © Qantara.de 2003 Bahman Nirumand has read German studies, Philosophy and Iranian studies in Munich, Tübingen and Berlin. He was a victim of political persecution under the Shah’s regime and was forced to leave Iran in the 1960s. He now works as a freelance journalist in Berlin. Translating Islam Translating Islam
How can Muslim societies shake off their intellectual paralysis and inject a new momentum and vitality into Islamic thought, allowing it to engage in a meaningful way with the contemporary world, asks Turkish-born writer and social critic Zafer Şenocak  ´Born in Ankara in 1961, Zafer Senocak has been living in Germany since 1970, where he has become a leading voice in the German discussions on multiculturalism, national and cultural identity, and a mediator between Turkish and German culture.
Zafer Şenocak: "Islam has a spiritual, poetic dimension, which has been thoroughly eclipsed" | Current perceptions of Islam tend to be based on a few, very expressive symbols. Above all it is the veil worn by women that has become definer of both body and identity, a designating, delimiting symbol with no clear division discernible between the wearer’s self-determined exclusion and that that is imposed from without. The prominence given to the veil overshadows the debates on the roles and relationships between the sexes. Islam has always been a canonical religion demanding conformity from the faithful, regulating the detail of their lives and daily routine. Nevertheless this world religion has a spiritual, poetic dimension, which has been thoroughly eclipsed, so that nowadays there seems to be nothing more than a residue of directives and bans. Long since deprived of their power by the media-led hegemony of the image, places such as Toledo and Cordoba in Moorish Spain or Konya in Seljuk Anatolia, were once Muslim-inspired intellectual centres, where the monotheistic religions rubbed shoulders in an atmosphere of liberality and tolerance, where literature and philosophy flourished, and where fruitful exchange on topics such as creation, the meaning of life and man’s relation to his creator were possible. Ritual and intellectual desiccation Muslim philosophers only rarely achieve canonical status in Western philosophy. With a few rare exceptions that only serve to prove the rule, one is likely to seek in vain for a history of philosophy that can adequately convey the intellectual traditions of the East.  Zafer Şenocak | Tasawwuf, the Islamic mysticism, once the brightest of stars in the Eastern heavens, producing poetry of the highest order, such as that of Dschalaladdin Rumi, now serves as little more than a lucrative source of income for those keen to make money by catering to the needs of the spiritually undernourished West. With no small success. In Islamic countries themselves, the inspirational spring of the mystic tradition has long since dried up, become reduced to formulaic ritual, with its corollary of intellectual desiccation, often described as the "Crisis of Islam". But how are we to move on from the present situation of stasis? Some sociologists predict that the adoption of modern lifestyles and the slow daily grind of the mills of uniformity will inevitably lead to the integration of Muslims into the modern world. But the fact that a veil-wearing Muslim woman may be integrated into her working environment says nothing about her spiritual relationship to her faith. Just as little as the fact that the number of Muslim academics has risen enormously in recent years. Shutting out the Modern Muslims tend to end up in technical occupations. They cut themselves off from the cultural and intellectual aspects of modernity. A Muslim infiltration of modern society and its institutions would only have an emancipatory effect were it to breach the intellectual ghetto and lead to a more critical attitude towards their own traditions, as well as a willingness to discuss their position with regard to followers of other religions and non-believers. Otherwise it would be nothing more than a creeping undermining of the Modern and simply pave the way to future conflict with open society. Islamic thought badly needs fresh impulses and momentum, which would allow it to engage with the world and current ways of thinking. That is the central issue of every dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims. After all, thinking that is no longer capable of communication is also incapable of dialogue. But communication needs a language that can also be understood by others. Translation is its foundation. Tradition that is not translated petrifies to ritual, and ritual allows neither communication, nor challenge. Muslims today do not possess this ability to translate. Their faith has been left without a voice in the modern world. It has taken on an apologetic character; it is reactive, but not innovative. Had it not been for the efforts of philosophers such as Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig or Emmanuel Lévinas taking on the massive task of translating between Hasidic literature, the Talmud and Western philosophy, the Jewish religion would today be facing the same problems as Islam. Without a doubt, there are strictly dogmatic, orthodox and fundamentalist-oriented strains within contemporary Judaism. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned philosophers did succeed in opening a window to the world beyond. Fundamental dominance They succeeded in opening up lines of communication, making it possible for Christians, Muslims, agnostics and atheists, for anyone at all, in fact, regardless of religious persuasion, to become involved in intellectual exchange with Judaism. Such intellectual exchange can itself provide the basis for a productive dialogue. But what about the Muslims today? Fundamentalist fanatics and clannish functionaries dominate the image in the Western press. Intellectuals are a rarity. What is lacking is a language to inspire to bolder, more challenging and controversial thinking, as well as a Star of Redemption. Yet discussion, the exchange of ideas, was once the central pillar of the Muslim system of faith. Even those sayings of the Prophet Muhammad that have been preserved are in a dialogical form. Islam is a religion of exchange, of conviction and persuasion, though not of coercion. In its beginnings, Muslim culture was receptive to other monotheistic faiths, to the culture of Persia and India. It was open to inspiration and to critical questioning. Most Muslims today do not understand translation as the hermeneutical interpretation of a reality, of a language into another reality or language, but rather as photomechanical transfer, for example, of the Koranic laws onto contemporary society. Languishing in the "golden age of Islam" This results in strange mutations, a caricature manifestation of Islam, glorifying a past which becomes a cure-all for present ills. But the cure is illusory, for in disposing of the problems of one’s contemporary world, one also disposes of a true grasp of the time one lives in. Once we begin to feel ill at ease in our own time, we also lose our ability to communicate in the here and now, and have no way of expressing our unease. No wonder then, that in spite of the radical rejection of Western culture, no Islamic motivated cultural criticism of the modern West has appeared, nor any melancholic literature capable of fathoming the depths of the Islamic psyche. For Muslims, the Koran is the Word of God, sacred scripture, the very core of their faith and their guide in life. As with Jesus for Christian believers it is sacrosanct. Nevertheless, from the earliest periods of Muslim culture and, of course, during periods of intellectual flowering, there has always been fierce and controversial debate on the hermeneutic implications of the text of the Koran. How is a text to be discussed or studied if the richness and diversity of its interpretative possibilities are ignored? An aesthetics that grew up around the Koran also made possible the kind of bigotry that has become such a characteristic of Muslim societies today. In the prison of the sacral While there may be admiration for the calligraphy, the intonation of the sermon, the meaning of the text becomes secondary. The Koran has become trapped in a sacral prison, like a nightingale in its golden cage. But the question of its interpretative richness, the eternal validity of its canons, the spirit of the Word, was one with which Muslim philosophers were once very much engaged. The conditions necessary for understanding, for human comprehension of the divine message, raised philosophical questions. A differentiation was made between the language of God, the eternal Word of his revelation and the human understanding of the text of the Koran. The divine meaning could be intuitively grasped, but not fully comprehended by human beings. In Islamic, mysticism signifies enlightenment, coming closer to the divine, closer to God. The current integralist interpretations of Islam are trying to give a literal interpretation to the Koran. They deny the hidden divine meaning, disregard the diversity of interpretation and declare the human interpretation to be the holy, eternal text. Is this not a cardinal error? Nothing is more reprehensible to Islam than the deification of the human. Truth is the preserve of God. Yet man strives for truth. The rediscovery of man’s humility, of doubt, and of the richness and variety of the possible meanings of the Word, of the transitoriness of understanding or interpretation, these are the foundations for a critical approach that needs to become re-established in Islamic culture. Only those who have doubts about their own understanding can attain a true understanding. A plurality of perspectives and opinions can, by itself, create a communicative atmosphere and allow dialogue with an other. Faith needs translation. Translation between God and man is the fundament of all communicative activity. Those who are unable to communicate may suffocate silently. Zafer Şenocak © Zafer Şenocak/Qantara.de 2006 Translated from the German by Ron Walker http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-478/_nr-549/i.html Are Sharia Laws and Human Rights Compatible?Are Sharia Laws and Human Rights Compatible?
In their correspondence, Emran Qureshi (journalist and expert for Islam and human rights) and Heba Raouf Ezzat (lecturer for political science and womens' rights activist) discuss the role of the sharia in Islamic countries and in how far sharia laws are compatible with human rights.
Dear Heba, | Bild:  Emran Qureshi | The Sharia law, as is practiced in many Muslim countries today, is clearly incompatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Today Sharia is a source of injustice that profanes Islam and shames Muslims who adhere to a compassionate and merciful interpretation of their faith. At the same time I cannot see why a more humane and gentler Sharia law that is confined to the personal realm could not emerge in the future. Traditional Muslims - apart from Salafi and Wahhabi Muslims who are dominant in Saudi-Arabia - have long recognized the legitimacy of multiple schools of Islamic jurisprudence. This is in addition to latitudinarian Islamic juridical practices, e.g. the borrowing of more liberal practices from other schools of thought. It shows that there is a remarkable capacity in Islam for reinterpretation. Nevertheless, I sadly think that a gentler Sharia is unlikely to emerge since today we are presented with the anti-intellectualism, authoritarianism, and moral depravity of these self-appointed Salafi guardians of Sharia. Instead one should ask the question: Why has Sharia become the marker of the Muslim state? Thus Islam as envisioned by Islamist intellectuals is simply a penal code, and an Islamic State, a penal colony, which enforces the "pure" Islam. This is an extraordinary failure on the part of modern Muslim thinkers. Khaled Abou El Fadl, a prominent Islamic intellectual reformer in the United States, has observed of contemporary Islamist intellectuals "Instead of Islam being a moral vision given to humanity, it becomes constructed into the antithesis of the West. In the world constructed by these groups, there is no Islam; there is only opposition to the West." This is sadly true. These corrosive ideas do not spring from a vacuum. They arise instead from impoverished Salafi and Wahhabi discourses, which are corroding Islam from within. There is a straight line between the Salafi/Wahhabi interpretations - a puritanical, anti-rationalist, misogynistic Islam with a punitive, intolerant Sharia - and the violence, which now bloodstains our faith. Those who challenge this moral and ethical perversion of our faith are instead attacked as heretics as we can witness in Saudi-Arabia. Sincerely, Emran Qureshi Dear Emran, | Bild:  Heba Raouf Ezzat | The Sharia law is not only compatible with human rights but also the most effective way to achieve human rights. Human rights violations in Muslim countries - whose regimes are usually supported by Western allies - are not due to Sharia law. The violence in Islamic countries is mainly exercised by the state and dates back to the post-colonial era. There was an attempt to secularize the different laws of the Islamic societies and to remove Sharia. The legal systems of the late French and British colonial powers were seen as a model for the judicial reformation and as a basis for modernising the state. However, these new secular and socialist regimes were totalitarian. They manipulated the up to then independent traditional religious institutions and appointed the heads of religious bodies and universities. Islam, when reduced to a penal code, was used to violate human rights. Modern Islamic intellectuals were influenced by this. In their eyes the state was the means by which society and religion were being reshaped. In order to achieve an Islamic renaissance - and that is why Sharia has become the marker of the Muslim state – they tried to get their hands on the state. In the struggle against the totalitarian regimes they wanted and want to bring back the law of Sharia. For them it is only through the Sharia that the strength of Islam can be recaptured. This struggle is a matter of power, with religion used and abused by both sides. The Muslim Brotherhood that is banned in Egypt advocates Sharia and has been running for elections for more than a decade accepting the rule of law. The word "Sharia" means path. The road of Islam encompasses belief and morality for an individual, as much as a legal, economic and social framework, to govern a society. Moreover, Sharia is a progressive platform which empowers the people and protects their rights against totalitarianism and utilitarian ultra-capitalism. It can be an egalitarian force for democratic social justice, in the Muslim countries and globally. Islam’s central values are justice and personal freedom. However, they can also threaten Western economic interests when Muslim societies defend not only their cultural values but also aspire for economic independence. Reducing Islam to the individual moral dimension, as you would suggest, means that Islam loses its core as a progressive socialist liberation theology with a vision of a just society. Ironically, the Islamic groups themselves are far from recognizing that and instead focus on penal codes and some outdated interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence. It is true though that some Islamic groups regard Islam as an anti-thesis of the West. However, this mainly results from Western support for some of the most despotic regimes in the Middle East. Sincerely, Heba Raouf Ezzat Dear Heba, | Bild:  Emran Qureshi | On the whole I agree with you though with a caveat: Sharia may one day in the distant future be a positive force for change. Though for me it is emblematic of what is profoundly and pathologically wrong with the Muslim world. It seems that existing reality does not filter into the consciousness of this discussion. Sharia as practised today illustrates injustice and denies human freedom. For example, in parts of the Muslim world like Pakistan and Nigeria, women who are raped are prosecuted under Sharia law for fornication. In Saudi-Arabia the amputation of limbs as a punishment still occurs. Is that an act that is morally defensible? Finally, women under the reign of the Taliban were denied basic human elementary freedoms such as mobility, education, and healthcare - all in the name of Islam. To their everlasting shame, many Islamist intellectuals remained for the most part indifferent or silent to these crimes. The ideals of the existing Sharia are imbued with a Salafi and Wahhabi ideology. That’s why I do not only criticise Sharia as practised today, but also Salafism and Wahhabism, which provide the intellectual framework for the Sharia. I noticed that you could not bring yourself to say anything remotely critical or even mention these two ideologies by name. Certainly there is no denying that colonialism was a disaster of epic proportions for Muslims - mostly because of the pathological reactive Islamist ideologies and despotic states that played a role in perpetrating violence that emerged. And I cannot at all disagree with you on Western state support for despotic regimes. However, it does not alone explain the violence in Muslim lands today or deny the fact that this violence is largely a result of a congealed globalized Salafi and Jihadi ideology. This Islamist globalisation must be resisted. It is a violence that profanes past traditions of Islamic pluralism and tolerance (I know it is Ramadan in Pakistan because that is when Sunni Jihadi organisations best like to firebomb Shiite mosques). You define Islam as a political ideology and criticise Islam for being relegated to the realm of the personal moral dimension. Islam should apparently not be viewed as a moral vision for humanity, but instead be received as a utopian political ideology one in which the state enforces virtue, and has a socialist inflection. Thus Islam for Islamists is nothing more than a utilitarian receptacle for their favourite ideologies de jour. I also sense a denigration of ideals that deal with personal liberties and freedoms, but I hasten to note that the human freedoms, which matter the most are those that are the closest to the individual. Sincerely, Emran Qureshi Dear Emran, | Bild:  Heba Raouf Ezzat | I do not limit the Sharia to a political ideology, but instead view it as a solution, one that encompasses the public and private spheres and centralizes around civil and individual values. Civil morality and civic virtues have been, and will continue to be, central to the future manifestation of Islam. These are rooted in a solid system of socio-economic welfare advocated by Islamic jurists over centuries, in which the average citizen is empowered and in which the grass root politics of presence is stronger than the elitist politics of representation. If today there is an "over-legalization" of the concept of Sharia - I am referring to abuses in the name of the Sharia - one cannot only blame the Islamists. The spread of global capitalism and its impact on human rights should be ignored in this discussion, because for many Islamists - apart from the Salafis and Wahhabis who defend a puritan and exclusive understanding of the Sharia which they want to impose on Muslims and non-Muslims alike - Sharia presents a form of resistance to the global capitalist order which they feel is infringing on their communal and national rights. If some Islamists resort to violent means in order to impose Sharia we should also remember that for many other millions of civil activists Sharia remains a legitimate source of dignity and freedom and a trigger for global justice and equality. In order to respect the right of Muslims to an alternative world view, a new vision needs to be established between how Muslims and the global civil society interact. Your reference to the misuse of Sharia in Nigeria or Pakistan is right, but in these cases Sharia was manipulated. Atrocities also occur in non-Muslim where there is no Sharia and where other cultural and religious values get abused. We need to understand in more depth why humans resort to violence. Otherwise we will continue to look at Muslims and their cultures as barbaric and view their Sharia as the root of all evil. That would mean that Muslims can only hope for the future if they trivialize the role of Islam in their public life and restrict it to personal morality. This is simply not fair. Sincerely, Heba Raouf Ezzat Dear Heba, | Bild:  Emran Qureshi | A democracy offers intrinsic political, economic and social benefits and does not deserve the condescension that you offer by "elite representation". I have problems with the "civic virtue" that you describe. On the one hand, Islamists, especially Salafis, tend to generalize their interpretations and project it backward into history in order to enforce validity. On the other hand "civic virtue" has historical as well as geographical specificities. In "Islamic" Indonesia civic virtue is shaped by different influences than in cosmopolitan centres of Islam or in agrarian and nomadic regions. Centuries ago, civic virtues denied women denied the right to education. However, enforcing "virtue" and Sharia are staples of Islamist discourse: Thus Pakistani mullahs obsess about their citizenry watching Indian "Hindu" Bollywood movies and music and this pattern repeats itself elsewhere. Notice how here aesthetic and artistic endeavours are restricted in the guise of "virtue". I also sense Islamists continue to profoundly define their worldview reactively vis-à-vis the West. Thus Islamism today is both a by-product of globalization. Islamists, as the Taliban in Afghanistan, who are ideologically driven will fail. Against that Islamists parties as you find them in Turkey that attempt to meet the needs and aspirations of its citizenry will be successful. In effect, these Islamists will help to secularize their societies. Thus, Islamists are the harbingers of globalization: democracy, secularization, and individual rights. So I must congratulate them for this. Iran is a perfect example. There the young people of that country put bluntly want freedom from the Mullahs. Who would but think that possibility would arise from within political Islam? You also disparage capitalism in the name of Islam, but I suspect would not deny the appeal of the latest capitalist gadgetry (e.g. the laptop computer, cell phone, television, and Hermes scarves). Please remember that Prophet Mohammad and his wife were humane business people that engaged in commerce. Recall the Hadith: "He who accumulates earnings by honest trade is the beloved of God." Interestingly, it was thanks to mainly Muslim traders that Islam spread into India and South East Asia. That is a kind of Islamic globalization if you will that is not criticized by present-day Islamists. Finally, the intellectuals are responsible for criticizing their received traditions and practices. But I do not know one - not one single Islamist intellectual that criticizes in a sustained manner Salafism or Wahhabism (a cancer corroding Islamic traditions from within), and is further willing also to acknowledge the corrosive effects of Jihadi "suicide" violence. To mention this is to not demonize Muslims, as it should be apparent that no people have a monopoly on virtue or vice. I also note that when Islamist regimes engage in genocide or mass murder we see little internal condemnation - witness the reaction to the genocide campaign in Darfur against African Muslims by the fascist Sudanese regime. What we see today is nothing less than a profound anti-intellectualism and immorality that is corroding the soul of Islam by those that purport to unfurl and defend the banner of Islam. Sincerely, Emran Qureshi Dear Emran, | Bild:  Heba Raouf Ezzat | I support liberal as well as Islamic civic virtues as well as the celebration of human dignity and social welfare. But I do not believe that democracy necessitates a specific economic system. As Islam is more of a social democracy than an economically liberal one, it can be viewed as a democracy and platform to tame capitalism. If we enjoy the fruits of modernity, mainly science and technology as you pointed out, it does not mean that we should not be critical to the ultra utilitarian ideas some modernists advocated. Capitalism is not what we are keen to defend but rather an egalitarian and humanist Islam. Darfur is a sad story if you wish to give an example of how a regime that advocates a narrow legal notion of Sharia can become so authoritarian and ignore equal distribution of national wealth and social justice as well as true power sharing. Yet allow me to ask: is this a problem of Islamic politics or rather a recurrent policy of African political elites? Iran is enjoying a dynamic political change and that we can only hope that other regimes in the region would allow the same transparency and openness. I do not advocate an Iran without Mullahs in the public sphere, as the grip of Shii doctrines is strong, but I do advocate a larger presence of progressive voices. We should admit that an Islamic Iran has been relatively more democratic that the secular rule of the former "Shah of Persia" who was an ally of the "liberal" American administration. Moreover, many Muslims have raised their voice against atrocities committed in the name of Islam. The Wahhabis and Salafis were subject to harsh criticism by Muslim intellectuals such as Yusuf Qaradawy and late Mohamed Ghazali. Both these intellectuals stressed democratic notions of women’s rights and minorities’ equality. Many other names can be mentioned in other contexts who had critical views regarding the practices of Wahhabis in the domestic politics of many regimes in the Arab peninsula. It is true there are those who abuse Islam. In the same way we see liberals or socialists abusing the moral core of their respective ideologies, be it individual liberty or the primacy of social justice. In a global age we need to unite across ideologies, religions and cultures to defend us of extremists of any kind. Through constructive debates we could come to democratic experience that, with time, sweeps away injustice, hegemony and arrogance in each and every corner of this small world and allows the heart of Islam to be recaptured as a message of mercy, justice and power sharing. Sincerely, Heba Raouf Ezzat *** The correspondence was conducted between June and August 2004. The letters were first published in the German daily Frankfurter Rundschau on 4 October 2004. The correspondence was initiated by free-lance journalist Monika Jung-Mounib, currently working in Switzerland. Emran Qureshi is a journalist and expert for Islam and human rights. He is currently a fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University. "The New Crusaded, Constructing the Muslim Enemy" is his most recent publication (Columbia University Press, 2003). He resides in Ottawa, where he is working on his next book, "A Study of Islam and Human Rights". Heba Raouf Ezzat teaches political theory at the Department of Political Science, Cairo University. She is co-ordinator of the Civil Society Program at the Center for Political Research and Studies at Cairo University and editor of the Global Civil Society Yearbook. She also works as womens' rights activist. Published: 12.11.2004 - Last modified: 12.11.2004 Tørklædet som politisk spydspidsMens europæerne endnu ikke rigtigt har forstået tildækningens betydning, beskriver den muslimske presse ligeud, hvad sagen drejer sig om: De tilslørede piger skal bruges til at islamisere Vesten
Af Helle Merete Brix En af Frankrigs kendte tegnere René Pétillon udgav tidligere i år tegneseriealbummet L'affaire du voile (affæren om sløret). Det er en meget vittig historie om detektiven Jack Palmer, som er på jagt efter en ung pige, der siges at være forsvundet i det islamistiske miljø i Frankrig. I historien indgår en demonstration til fordel for sløret, hvor en gruppe af sortklædte og tildækkede unge piger alle sammen råber "Sløret, det er mit valg". Ude i siden går mændene, og en stor kleppert med skæg og kalot skråler glad med på "Sløret, det er mit valg". Hans mandlige sidekammerat skubber arrigt til ham: "Nej, ikke dig."
Diskussionen om tørklædet i Frankrig er derfor ofte på et andet niveau end herhjemme, som vi kunne opleve det i den aktuelle diskussion om den tildækkede studievært på DR2. Da jeg for nylig i Paris mødtes med den franske journalist Nicole Leibowitz, der i dag er chef for internettidsskriftet www.proche-orient.info, spurgte hun forundret i den forbindelse: "Hvorfor tillader Danmark noget sådant?" Synet på tørklædet og det aktuelle forbud mod at bære synlige, religiøse symboler i de franske skoler deler dog den franske feministfløj. Visse feminister, for eksempel Mellemøstspecialisten Elisabeth Schemla og Fadela Amara, præsident for organisationen Ni putes ni soumises (hverken ludere eller underdanige), støtter tørklædeforbudet. Amara, der selv er praktiserende muslim, går ikke med tørklæde, hun betragter det som et "undertrykkelsesinstrument". Amara mener, forbuddet er nødvendigt for at beskytte de piger, der pålægges at bære det. Andre feminister, som sociologen Francoise Gaspard, tidligere socialistisk borgmester i Dreux, er imod prostitution, men for tørklædet. Feministen Christine Delphy, grundlægger af magasinet Nouvelles questions féministes (nye feministiske spørgsmål) er citeret for følgende udtalelse: "En feminisme sammen med islam, hvorfor ikke?" Ikke overraskende mener Delphy da også, at loven, der forbyder religiøse symboler i skolerne, er "uretfærdig og racistisk".
Altså, hvor europæerne endnu ikke rigtigt har forstået tildækningens betydning, beskriver den muslimske presse det ligeud, ligesom frit tænkende arabiske og muslimske intellektuelle åbenlyst konkluderer, at de tildækkede piger i Vesten bruges i en kamp for at islamisere omgivelserne. Frankrigs første tørklædesag fandt sted i 1989 i Creil. Der var der tale om tre muslimske gymnasiepiger, der pludselig mødte tildækkede op. Der blev i første omgang indgået et kompromis: pigerne fik lov at bære tørklædet i skolens gange, men måtte ikke have det på i selve klasseværelset og til undervisningen. Dette kompromis blev ikke overholdt, måske fordi paraplyorganisationen UOIF (Unionen af franske, islamiske organisationer), der er nært forbundet med Det Muslimske Broderskab, blandede sig i sagen. Generalsekretæren mødte personligt op hos skolelederen sammen med en leder fra en anden muslimsk gruppering. Her gjorde de to herrer det klart for skolelederen, at islam påbyder kvinder at dække sig til. Sagen endte med, at pigerne blev opfordret - eller presset - til ikke at overholde det indgåede kompromis og derfor bortvist. Tørklædesagen i Creil blev også en anledning for UOIF til for første gang at rette henvendelse til den franske stat. Præsidenten for organisationen, Ahmed Jaballah, sendte et brev til premierminister Michel Rocard, hvori han protesterede over, at pigerne ikke fik lov at bære tørklæde. I brevet understregede han, at tørklædet er påbudt i Koranen og dermed en pligt for alle muslimske kvinder. I de følgende år bølgede debatten frem og tilbage. Muslimske demonstrationer til fordel for islamisk tilhylning, nu støttet af organisationen SOS-Racisme, vekslede med lærerdemonstrationer imod. Bl.a. filosoffen Alain Finkielkraut opfordrede lærerne til ikke at "kapitulere". Tankevækkende er det, at man ikke skal længere tilbage end til 1983 og den store "March des beurs" ("beur" er betegnelsen for en ung, der er født i Frankrig af indvandrere fra Nordafrika, red.) – en march for lighed og mod racisme – hvor en enkelt deltagers anråbelse af islam blev anset for aldeles upassende. Så upassende, at episoden i en artikel i et tidsskrift for unge indvandrere kort efter blev beskrevet under overskriften "En UFO hos les beurs". Få år senere var dele af den franske venstrefløj altså svinget om, og de islamistiske organisationer havde styrket deres magt, ikke mindst over en ny og væsentlig gruppe, nemlig indvandrerelever på landets skoler og gymnasier. Symbolsk navneskift
Islams dekonstruktionIslams dekonstruktion
Efter den store konference om shariaen på Købehavns Universitet, måtte flere af deltagerne spørge sig selv, om der overhovedet er noget fast indhold tilbage af islam. Desuden sprang det i øjnene, at der er store divergenser mellem den traditionelle islam-tænkning, der præger det københavnske universitetsmiljø, og den forskning, der bedrives af de internationale reformtilhængere
Af Lars Hedegaard Oplæget til Demokratiske Muslimers og Institut for Tværkulturelle og Regionale Studiers internationale konference "Sharia i en moderne kontekst" på Københavns universitet den 25. og 26. november var lovende. Som en af indlederne, professor Bassam Tibi fra Cornell University, bemærkede, havde man her samlet de fleste af de muslimske reformtilhængere, der betyder noget i den internationale akademiske verden. Hertil regnede Bassam Tibi, der heller ikke ved denne lejlighed satte sit lys under en skæppe, sig selv, foruden indlederne Nasr Hamed Abu Zayd, der er Ibn Rushd professor ved Leidens Universitet, og Abdullahi an-Na'im, der har et professorat i jura ved Emory University i Georgia, USA. De øvrige indledere var Muhammed Mahmud, der ligesom an-Na'im stammer fra Sudan, men som nu underviser i komparativ religion ved det amerikanske Tufts University, samt tre forskere med tilknytning til Carsten Niebuhr Afdelingen ved Københavns Universitet, professor Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, som for tiden er direktør for det Dansk-Egyptiske Dialog Institut i Cairo, Ph.D.-studerende Dorte Bramsen og Ph.D. Rubya Mehdi. I diskussionerne deltog desuden professor i islamologi ved Aarhus Universitet Mehdi Mozaffari og den egyptisk-amerikanske islam-kritiker Mona al-Tahawy. Interessant nok, var der ikke en eneste indleder med tilknytning til læreanstalter eller forskningsinstitutioner i muslimske lande. Men det havde sin naturlige forklaring, idet der var enighed blandt i hvert fald de muslimske indledere om, at der ikke foregår nogen videnskabelig forskning i islam i de muslimske lande. Dekonstruktionen af begreber og opfattelser, som vi vænnet os til at betragte som islams grundsten, startede allerede med konferencens første oplæg, nemlig Nasr Abu Zayds foredrag om "shariaens rekonstruktion". Abu Zayd, der i 1995 ved en egyptisk domstol blev dømt for apostasi, dvs. frafald fra islam, og pålagt at skilles fra sin kone, har videreført sit videnskabelige arbejde i Vesten – først og fremmest i Holland og Tyskland. Hans hovedbestræbelse har været at bygge bro mellem islams traditioner og den moderne verdens frihed, lighed, menneskerettigheder og demokrati. Sharia er ikke en lov Ifølge Abu Zayd er sharia historisk set ikke et lovsystem, således som begrebet opfattes i dag. Ibn Rushd, f.eks. opfattede sharia som islams totale indbegreb, og argumenterede i øvrigt for, at shariaen således forstået ikke stod i modsætning til filosofien. Beklageligvis er islam i dag reduceret til et lovsystem – et system af restriktioner. Som shariaen i dag opfattes, bygger den på fire kilder, Koranen, sunna (dvs. Muhammeds praksis), konsensus blandt de retslærde og endelig rationel tænkning – fire retskilder, som Abu Zayd derefter gik i gang med at pille fra hinanden. Nasr Abu Zayd – pillede shariaens grundlag fra hinanden Koranen gav han ikke meget for som retskilde. Den var, sagde han, en "diskurs" – altså en slags samtale – der havde stået på gennem 23 år, og som efter hans opfattelse var baseret på ikke-verbal kommunikation. Desuden er det kun 500 af Koranens vers, lig med 16 pct. af hele teksten, der rummer retsregler.
Profetens sunna var heller ikke nogen pålidelig kilde. Dens bestanddele – de såkaldte hadither – beror på kæder af overbringere, og disse transmissionskæder er usikre. I nogle hundrede år efter Muhammeds død betragtede muslimerne da heller ikke sunnaen som bindende. Den blev den først med Muhammed ibn Idris al-Shafi'i (grundlæggeren af en af de fire sunni-muslimske retsskoler, død 820), der gjorde sunnaen til en retskilde, der betragtes som lige så guddommelig som Koranen. Konsensus (ijma) mellem ortodokse retslærde var efter Abu Zayds opfattelse heller ikke meget værd som retskilde, for som han vittigt bemærkede, er der ingen konsensus om, hvad konsensus indebærer. Hertil kommer, at konsensus nu er reduceret til konsensus i den første generation af profetens efterkommere, selv om de var så uenige, at de førte krige mod hinanden. Men den første generation af Muhammeds følgesvende betragtes nu som så hellige, at de ikke kan portrætteres på film. Det samme gælder efterhånden medlemmer af den anden generation efter profeten. Ikke Guds ord 'Nasr Abu Zayd knyttede flere kritiske – for ikke at sige opsigtsvækkende – bemærkninger til Koranen. Den er ikke Guds ord, sådan som den normalt opfattes af rettroende muslimer. Den skal i det hele taget ikke opfattes som en tekst, men som det Abu Zayd betegnede som en "discourse", der i denne sammenhæng vel nærmest kan oversættes med "samtale". Nogle steder er det en samtale mellem Muhammed og araberne, andre steder mellem Muhammed og de troende. Koranen rummer mange stemmer. Sommetider er stemmen Muhammeds, sommetider er den andres. Interessant nok nævnte Abu Zayd ikke Gud som en af Koranens samtalepartnere. Koranen er affattet på en blanding af forskellige dialekter og ikke på ét klassisk arabisk sprog, som de rettroende også plejer at hævde Når den forekommer kvindefjendsk, hænger det efter Abu Zayds opfattelse sammen med, at den i alt væsentligt henvender sig til mænd. Den rummer derfor et lovsystem for mænd og ikke for kvinder. Spørgsmålet er, sagde Abu Zayd, om Koranens mening er fastlagt, eller om vi har ret til at genfortolke den. Selv gik han ind for det sidste, bl.a. fordi meget af indholdet ganske klart skyldes Muhammed. Abu Zayd understregede imidlertid, at en ændret forståelse af Koranen, sunnaen og shariaen har meget lange udsigter. Overraskende nok mente han, at Muhammed var feminist og henviste til profetens kærlighed til Aisha – pigen som han giftede sig med, da hun var seks, og som han havde sex med, da hun var ni – og hans tilsvarende omsorg for hans første kone. Den menneskeskabte sharia Ligesom Nasr Abu Zayd har også Abdullahi an-Na'im måttet forlade sit hjemland – Sudan – af politiske grunde efter at have været aktiv i Mahmud Muhammed Tahas reformbevægelse, De Republikanske Brødre. Efter at have vendt sig imod indførelse af sharia som officielt lovsystem i Sudan blev den 76-årige Taha i 1985 henrettet for kætteri. Ligesom sin læremester fastholder an-Na'im, at shariaen ikke kan håndhæves af staten. Det ville være imod dens mening. Shariaen er en etik, der opstår i det civile samfund og skal implementeres der. Det var i øvrigt et synspunkt, der blev bakket op af såvel Bassam Tibi som Nasr Abu Zayd. Abdullahi an-Na'im – shariaen strider mod menneskerettighederne Shariaen er et menneskeskabt produkt af historien og har således ikke noget guddommeligt udspring. Det betyder også, fremhævede an-Na'im, at shariaen kan dekonstrueres og rekonstrueres.
Og han lod forstå, at der var meget at rette op på. Således efterlod han ingen tvivl om, at shariaen strider mod menneskerettighederne. Eksempelvis forkaster shariaen lige rettigheder for mænd og kvinder. Dog mente an-Na'im, at det med tiden ville være muligt at forene shariaen med menneskerettighederne. Blandt de andre overraskende pointer, som an-Na'im fremhævede, var, at der aldrig har eksisteret nogen islamisk stat. Tvært imod afhænger islam af, at der findes uafhængige fuqaha, dvs. islamiske lærde, som altså ikke kan blive en del af staten. Desuden kan staten ikke baseres på sharia, der jo ikke er noget lovsystem. Staten må derfor indføre sine egne sekulære love. Hvis en stat vælger at gøre dele af shariaen til lov, så ophører den med at være sharia. Det gælder også inden for familieretten. En stat kan naturligvis vedtage en lov, der eksempelvis forbyder banker at tage renter – men så kan den ikke påberåbe sig shariaen, men må hente argumenterne for denne lov andetsteds. Og an-Na'im satte sin opfattelse på spidsen: "Jeg behøver den sekulære stat for at kunne være den muslim, jeg ønsker at være. Jeg kan kun være muslim i en sekulær stat." An-Na'im definerede en sekulær stat som en stat, der hverken favoriserer eller vender sig imod nogen bestemt religiøs doktrin. Det betød imidlertid ikke, at man kunne skille religion fra politik, fordi folks religiøse anskuelser nødvendigvis må influere på deres politiske holdninger. De centrale begreber i an-Na'ims statsretlige tænkning var de samme, som har vundet hævd i vestlig tankegang: konstitutionalisme, menneskerettigheder og borgerrettigheder. Alliancen med imamerne Interessant nok overførte an-Na'im sin kritik af begrebet "den islamiske stat" til de vestlige stater, der nu har fået en muslimsk befolkning. Det var, sagde han, dårligt for muslimer, at vestlige stater udnævner imamer til "repræsentanter" for muslimerne og derefter begynder at forhandle med dem. Dermed udstyrer de vestlige stater imamerne med en autoritet, de ikke bør have, og således er man på vej til at indføre et system, der minder om det millet-system, der fandtes i Det Osmanniske Rige, og som betød, at visse ikke-muslimske religiøse samfund havde en slags indre selvstyre under deres religiøse anførere. Gennem denne politik er de vestlige regeringer i realiteten med til at undertrykke den frie meningsudveksling blandt muslimer. Anerkendelsespolitikken over for imamer som legitime repræsentanter for muslimerne giver også anledning til den misforståelse, at troen er et kollektivt anliggende, men religion kan kun være en personlig sag. Islam er ikke andet end, hvad muslimer gør den til. Der er ikke nogen islamisk essens, sagde han. I øvrigt var an-Na'ims præsentation spækket med opsigtsvækkende og ud fra en traditionel muslimsk tankegang klart kætterske udsagn: • "Hvis Koranen har en eksistens uden for historien, er det irrelevant". • "Kætteri er sandelig værdifuldt. Det har vi alle behov for." • "Saudi-Arabien er verdens mindst islamiske samfund. Landet er primitivt og grusomt." • Ummaen – altså ideen om at der findes et folk, der omfatter samtlige muslimer i verden – er en myte. "Der har ikke været nogen umma fra den dag, profeten døde." • "Og hvis der havde været en universel umma, ville det ikke være noget at tragte efter." • Logisk set kan der ikke findes tro, der hvor man ikke kan vælge. "Jeg kan kun være muslim, hvis jeg har retten til ikke at tro.“ Shariaens genopfindelse Bassam Tibi, der efter adskillige år i Tyskland nu har et professorat ved Cornell University i USA, lagde også ud med en sønderlemmende kritik af det herskende shariabegreb. Begrebet skal totalt genopfindes. Shariaen skal ikke nødvendigvis opfattes som lov. Der er snarere tale om en moral og en levevis, sagde Tibi, og anførte, at begrebet kun er omtalt én gang i Koranen. Efter Tibis opfattelse rummer islam heller ikke nogen forfatningsret. Den såkaldte Medina-konstitution – som Muhammed siges at have aftalt med de forskellige stammer i Medina, efter at han havde forladt Mekka – er intet andet end en overenskomst og kan ikke anvendes som ideal. I øvrigt mente Bassam Tibi, at totalitarisme i islams navn er ensbetydende med en forfalskning af islam. Den politiske islam, der udlægger religionen som "deen we dawla", dvs. som både religion og stat – begyndte i 1928 med grundlæggelsen af Det Muslimske Broderskab i Egypten. Den er baseret på den fejlagtige opfattelse, at shariaen er en guddommelig, altomfattende lov, dvs. et totalitært system. Af formen æt – Bassam Tibis familie nedstammer direkte fra profeten Men det er en misforståelse, understregede Tibi, der som støtte for sin udlægning henviste til sine egne forfædre. Fra det 13. til det 19. århundrede var medlemmer af Tibi-familien – som i øvrigt kan føre sine aner direkte tilbage til profeten – qadi'er, dvs. dommere, i Damaskus. Ingen af dem havde nogen sinde noget med politik at gøre. Ulykkeligvis er den islamistiske opfattelse af islam og shariaen på vej frem, ikke mindst som følge af saudi-arabisk støtte. Således gøres der nu forsøg på at påvirke den traditionelt tolerante indonesiske islam i fundamentalistisk retning, selv om Tibi ikke troede, at forsøget ville lykkes. Hvad Bosnien angik, forekom han dog mindre optimistisk, idet han påpegede, at de saudisk-støttede wahabbister har haft stor fremgang i Sarajevo. Han havde heller ikke noget godt at sige om de tyske imamer. Ikke en eneste af dem taler flydende tysk, og ikke en eneste tænker som en europæer. Tibi troede ikke, at Europa ville blive islamisk. Derimod anså han det for sandsynligt, at der ville opstå en europæisk islam. Ved flere lejligheder har Tibi gjort opmærksom på, at det er ham, der har opfundet begrebet "euroislam" og ikke den schweiziske prædikant Tariq Ramadan, som Tibi ikke kan udstå og hvis politiske og religiøse projekt, han nærer den største mistænksomhed over for. Ved et seminar i Sverige denne sommer havde Tibi betinget sig, at han ikke skulle være i stue med Ramadan, for så ville han ikke komme. Og da arrangørerne efter Tibis opfattelse ikke levede op til dette løfte, forlod Tibi salen i vrede. Tibi betragtede det ikke som noget problem, hvis Europa får en muslimsk majoritet. Det afgørende er, om denne majoritet bliver demokratisk eller islamistisk. Foreløbig måtte han dog erkende, at flertallet af de i Europa bosatte muslimer – hvis tal han anslog til 32 millioner – ikke er demokrater. Så det forekom noget uklart, hvad Tibi baserede sin optimisme på. Jihad Også det islamiske grundbegreb jihad – hellig krig – blev indgående diskuteret på konferencen. Nasr Abu Zayd understregede vanskelighederne ved at tage Koranen som autoritet på dette område. Mange fortolkere peger på, at Koranen rummer mange tolerante og fredelige vers. På den anden side er der andre, der hævder, at det såkaldte "sværdvers" (Sura 9.5) ophæver – abrogerer – alle de tolerante vers. Således antages det, at 800 koranvers er blevet abrogeret af dette ene vers, og faktisk er abrogering en af de såkaldte koraniske videnskaber. I den forbindelse henviste Abu Zayd til Sura 3.7, som siger, at kun Allah kan tolke Koranen korrekt. Så det er mildest talt uklart, hvordan den egentlig skal forstås. Derfor er den også blevet en slagmark for modstridende ideologier. Han opfordrede til, at man tolker Koranen ud fra den historiske sammenhæng, i hvilken den blev til. Koranen er historisk, og dens bud er tidsbestemte. Således mente han, at bogens stærke opfordringer til kamp og drab skulle tjene til at opmuntre folk til at gøre noget, som de nødigt ville. Og han gjorde opmærksom på, at de første muslimer ofte var nødt til at kæmpe mod deres egne familier. Opfattelsen af jihad som en hellig forpligtelse skyldtes ifølge Abu Zayd fuqaha, islamiske lærde, der var aktive under islams erobringskrige efter Muhammeds død. Jihad er således en imperialistisk lov knyttet til en bestemt fase af islams udvikling. Det samme kunne siges om jizya, kopskatten, der skal betales af ikke-muslimer i et islamisk samfund. Heller ikke denne institution anså han for bindende for muslimer i dag. Men når jihad er et begreb, der er knyttet til opbygningen og udbredelsen af det arabiske imperium, hvorfor er det så ikke forsvundet i dag, spurgte Abu Zayd. Og han svarede selv: Fordi muslimerne aldrig er blevet befriet for faren – en forklaring, der ikke blev problematiseret af nogen under konferencen, selv om der næppe har været en eneste befolkning i verdenshistorien, der kan siges at have været uden for fare. Statsprojektet Muhammed Mahmud, der ligesom Abdullahi an-Na'im er politisk flygtning fra Sudan, sagde, at en af kilderne til begrebet jihad er Koranens sværdvers, Sura 9.5. Det har abrogeret det berømte vers, Sura 2.256, som taler om, at der ikke bør findes tvang i religionen. (Og som konstant citeres af islams apologeter som bevis på, at islam er en tolerant religion, red.). Når jihad-begrebet blev en så fast bestanddel af islam, skyldtes det, at islam ikke blot var en religion, men hurtigt blev et statsprojekt. Sådan var det allerede under den første kalif – dvs. profetens efterfølger – Abu Bakr (632-34), der ikke betragtede sig som en religiøs leder, men som en politisk leder. Reglen om, at frafaldne fra islam skal straffes med døden, søger sin legitimering i hadith og blev udviklet af islamiske retslærde. Ifølge Muhammed Mahmud rummede både jødedommen og kristendommen (?) den regel, at frafaldne skulle dræbes. Når det gjaldt moderne muslimer, var der ifølge Mahmud ingen tvivl om, at de i stigende grad tager afstand fra trosfriheden. Således er muslimer i dag den gruppe i verden, der er mindst tilbøjelig til at give plads for andre religioner eller opfattelser. I den forbindelse nævnte han en række fatwaer, der havde opfordret til drab på intellektuelle, og han så truslen mod de danske Muhammed-tegnere som led i den samme tradition. En række muslimske lande fastholder dødsstraffen for apostasi, altså frafald fra islam, heriblandt Yemen, Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi-Arabien og Pakistan. I øvrigt er islams praksis med religiøst og politisk begrundede mord i tråd med profetens egen opførsel. Således pegede Muhammed Mahmud på, at Muhammed havde medbragt en dødsliste, da han i 622 drog ind i Medina, og at det var nødvendigt at tale ham fra at dræbe en vis skriver. Den voldelige islam Også professor i islamstudier Mehdi Mozaffari fra Aarhus Universitet kastede sig ind i diskussionen om jihad med kontroversielle synspunkter. Således spurgte han, hvorfor man skulle blive ved med at udbrede en bog, der er så fuld af modsigelser som Koranen, som et budskab, verden skal tage alvorligt. Mehdi Mozaffari – kan man overhovedet tage Koranen alvorligt?
Han gjorde sig heller ingen illusioner om islams fredelige natur. Islam griber gerne til vold og krig, og Muhammed startede selv flere krige. Faktisk kan islam ikke sameksistere med andre religioner eller verdensanskuelser. Derfor vil der være permanent krig, som dog kan blive afbrudt af ophold i kampene.
Kort sagt må man opfatte jihad som justum bellum – retfærdig krig – med det formål at udbrede Allahs herredømme til hele verden. Heri var Nasr Abu Zayd enig. Vold og krig var i høj grad en del af den oprindelige islam, og Muhammed holdt sig ikke tilbage fra at plyndre karavaner af økonomiske grunde. Han håbede dog, at hellig krig vil forsvinde ud af islam. Det fik Bassam Tibi til at bemærke, at de kristne korstog til Det Hellige Land måtte opfattes som "mod-jihader" – altså militære modstød mod en forudgående muslimsk aggression. Det blev for meget for Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, som pegede på, at også danskerne havde været krigeriske, bl.a. i forbindelse med korstog i Østersøområdet og i Vikingetiden – uden at det blev klart, hvad det havde med diskussionen at gøre. Ånden fra Niebuhr Afdelingen I det hele taget udmærkede de danske indledere fra Carsten Niebuhr Afdelingen ved Københavns Universitet sig ved meget traditionelle tolkninger af islam. Modsætningen mellem de "danske" indledere – minus Mehdi Mozaffari – og de udenlandske var slående. Dorte Bramsen, der er tilknytte Carsten Niebuhr Afdelingen, talte om den traditionelle opfattelse af sharia, der gennemsyrer Saudi-Arabiens juridiske system, og som har medført, at kvinders rettigheder er blevet begrænset gennem de senere år. Således blev det i 1980 forbudt kvinder at blande sig med mænd og i 1990 fik de forbud mod at køre bil. Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen var ikke bange for noget..... I Saudi-Arabien står det overhovedet ikke til diskussion, at loven må bygge på Koranen og profetens sunna. Det vil tage lang tid at ændre denne opfattelse, der på grund af Saudi-Arabiens rigdom udøver enorm indflydelse over hele verden. Alligevel kunne Bramsen ikke forestille sig, at nogen muslim i Danmark eller Europa kunne finde på at fortolke shariaen, som de gør i Saudi-Arabien. Der var således intet at frygte, sagde hun, eftersom shariaen altid kan udlægges på en anden måde.
Heller ikke Skovgaard-Petersen mente, at der var noget at være bange for eller bekymre sig om. Således lagde han afstand til den egyptisk-amerikanske islam-kritiker Mona al-Tahawy, som udtrykte frygt for, at det stærkt reaktionære Muslimske Broderskab var ved at vinde den politiske kamp i Egypten. Når det skete, var hun sikker på, at Broderskabet ville berøve hende hendes frihed. Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen derimod mente slet ikke, at man kunne forudsige, om Det Muslimske Broderskab ville optræde udemokratisk, hvis det skulle komme til magten. Det multijuridiske samfund Rubya Mehdi – forskellige love for forskellige mennesker Den mest interessante af de danske indledere var dog Rubya Mehdi, der forsker i islamisk lov ved Carsten Niebuhr Afdelingen, og som desuden ofte anvendes som shariakonsulent af danske kommuner, Hun talte om inkorporeringen af islamisk familielov i Europa.
Det viste sig at være en bestræbelse, som hun fuldt ud kunne støtte. Vi er allerede blevet et multikulturelt samfund, sagde hun. Nu må vi også acceptere at blive et multijuridisk samfund. Danske muslimer lever allerede i et "mentalt rum" behersket af ideen om en islamisk lov, og når de skal giftes eller skilles, forelægger de ofte deres sager for religiøse autoriteter i deres hjemlande, når de er på ferie der. På grund af globaliseringen er staterne således blevet meget svage. Så hvordan kan vi administrere diversiteten? spurgte Mehdi. Udgangspunktet måtte være, mente hun, at vi ikke længere kan insistere på centralisme i lovgivningen, således at den samme lov gælder for alle. Vi behøver forskellige love for forskellige mennesker. Her følte Rubya Mehdi sig især i overensstemmelse med Tariq Ramadans tanker. Hvad familielovgivningen angår, kan man opdele den herboende muslimske befolkning i tre grupper: 1) Dem, der fuldt ud lever efter dansk lov, 2) dem, der lever i overensstemmelse med islamiske love, og 3) dem, der følger en kombination af de to retssystemer. Det er den største gruppe. Mona el-Tahawy ville nødigt lægge krop til Rubya Mehdis plan Den manglende accept af islamisk lov her i landet betyder f.eks., at en muslimsk kvinde ikke kan få en dansk domstol til at håndhæve hendes – muslimske – rettigheder i tilfælde af skilsmisse.
Ifølge Mehdi skaber det problemer, når indvandrede muslimer uofficielt prøver at praktisere islamisk lov. Ofte går det ud over kvinder og børn. Hun pegede på, at nogle vestlige lande allerede er begyndt at tage hensyn til shariaen i deres lovgivning. Det gælder således den norske ægteskabslov fra 1991 og den canadiske delstat Ontarios lov om mægling fra samme år. Danmark burde følge disse eksempler, således at vi kunne stadfæste en liberal fortolkning af den islamiske lov i overensstemmelse med de internationale menneskerettigheder, f.eks. i sager om bodelingen ved skilsmisse. Specielt lagde hun vægt på at udelukke imamerne fra at praktisere familielovgivningen. Mona al-Tahawy var fundamentalt uenig i Rubya Mehdis forslag. Efter hendes opfattelse har de muslimske familielove intet at gøre i Europa. Hun ønskede ikke at stå i en situation, hvor nogen kunne praktisere muslimske love på hende. kilde:http://www.sappho.dk/Nr.%205%20december%202006/islamsdekonstruktion.html A Woman's Worth Relative to a Man's in Islam
A Woman's Worth Relative to a Man's in Islam
Dec 24, 2006 *************************** From the Hadith:
Additional notes: |
|
|
