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    Tænk på, hvad vi kan lære af muslimerne

    11 april 2007

    Og vi skal labbe al deres kultur i os

    Tænk på, hvad vi kan lære af muslimerne, jeg synes, at vi skal lade verdens flygtninge vælte ind over vore grænser, og labbe al deres kultur i os.
    Gregers Dirckinck-Holmfeld, EB 3-10-86




    500 terrorangreb i EU på et år

    Det europæiske politisamarbejde Europol offentliggjorde tirsdag en ny rapport over omfanget af terroraktiviteter i EU-landene i 2006.

    Der blev registreret hele 498 terrorangreb i 11 forskellige EU-lande, mens 704 personer i 15 medlemslande blev anholdt i forbindelse med terrorisme.

    Flere end fem ud af seks terrorangreb blev foretaget af separatistbevægelser i Korsika i Frankrig og i den baskiske region i Spanien, mens der kun er registreret et [fuldført, udeladelse!] terrorangreb med islamistiske motiver.

    Statistikken lyder mere alvorlig end virkeligheden, fastslog chefen for Europol,
    Max-Peter Ratzel, tirsdag i Bruxelles.

    - Langt størstedelen af angrebene resulterede i begrænset materiel skade og havde ikke til hensigt at dræbe. Men de mislykkede angreb i Tyskland og London viste, at islamiske terrorister også sigter efter mange ofre, sagde han.

    Hvorfor nævner Max-Peter Ratzel islamiske terrorister, når det nu tilsyneladende er korsikanske banditter og siciliansk mafia, som er problemet? Hvorfor?

    De følgende citater fra "toneangivende" "danskere" - med kildeangivelser - er sakset fra Nomos:


    Kun ved at underminere forestillingen om, at der findes en fælles kultur for indbyggere i Danmark, kan man åbne og efterhånden afskaffe begrebet danskhed som pædagogisk og dannelsesmæssigt ideal. Danskfagets formål er derfor at undergrave danskheden.
    -
    Peter Heller Lützen, litterat, i bogen Danskfagets danskhed – en bog om danskfaget mellem metode og national identitet, 2003.

    [Om Undervisningsministeriets udvalgsarbejde med at formulere "klare fagmål" for Folkeskolens historieundervisning] Således havde vi søgt at afnationalisere historieundervisningen yderligere i forhold til det gl. CKF [Centrale kundskabs- og færdighedsområder, red.], hvor der bl.a. står, at »Dansk historie skal stå centralt« og »Danmarks historie i sammenhæng med ...«. Det havde vi blandt andet gjort ved at undlade begrebet »Danmarkshistorie«, og i præamblens sidste bullets havde vi skrevet »danske kulturer«. Begrundelsen var, at nationalhistorie i bedste fald kun er en hensigtsmæssig kategori i meget afgrænsede »situationer«. I arbejdsgruppen havde vi forsøgt med en formulering om, at Danmark havde udviklet sig til et flerkulturelt samfund. [...] Den kompetente historielærer (gid der måtte blive flere af dem, der faktisk underviste i faget) får nok forklaret eleverne det der med det nationale, fædreland, det fler-kulturelle osv.
    -
    Jens Aage Poulsen, lektor, i "Historie og Samfundsfag" nr. 1, 2002, s. 9.


    Jeg synes, danskhed er det grimmeste ord, der overhovedet findes.
    -
    Paprika Steen, skuespillerinde. Som led i Lars (von) Triers smædekampagne op til Folketingsvalget 20. november 2001.


    [Om Dannebrog] – det danske svastika. Det burde samles ind og afbrændes
    -
    Lars (von) Trier, filminstruktør. TV-Zulu, 24-3-01

    Som situationen er nu, er der en masse tegn på, at danskerne tror, at vi ejer dette land, fordi vi har arbejdet i det. Gu´ gør vi ej. Vi ejer det ikke mere end kineserne gør. Den hjemmefølelse skal suppleres med åbenhed. Hvis der kan være flere mennesker i det her land, hvorfor skulle de så ikke have lov til at være her.
    -
    Peter Seeberg, forfatter. Politiken 19-11-97

    Jeg vil overhovedet ikke sætte nogen grænse overhovedet [for hvor mange flygtninge og indvandrere, vi kan tage imod, red.]..... ikke bare integration men samgifteri – blanding af racer – er racens overlevelse....Er der noget smukkere end mulatter? Der kommer fantastisk flotte fyre buldrende fra Tyrkiet og Pakistan og alle mulige andre steder fra, og sikke nogle herlige børn, der kunne komme ud af det.....
    -
    Klaus Rifbjerg, forfatter. Aktuelt 14-12-91.

    Der findes ikke nogen dansk identitet. Vore rødder ligger i det gamle Hellas, i Rom og Frankrig.... Den danske identitet er rugbrød, kogte kartofler og opbagt sovs.
    -
    Johannes Sløk, filosof. JP 16-5-91

    Etiketter: , , , , , , , , , , ,

    http://annalyttiger.blogspot.com/index.html

    Nedrivningsdag af ungdomhuset forløb uden gnidninger

     

     Se Også:

    http://politiken.dk/system/topicRoot/Ungdomshuset/

     

                     Nedrivningsdag forløb uden gnidninger

     

    Fredelige demonstrationer og tårevædede afskeder til Ungdomshuset. Ved 23-tiden stod kun en lille rest af stueplansfacaden på Jagtvej 69 endnu.

     

    Fredelige aktivister fulgte i dag nedrivningen af resterne af Ungdomshuset. - Foto: Jacob Ehrbahn
     
    Tirsdag blev den hidtil fredeligste dag, siden politiet i torsdags ryddede Ungdomshuset på Jagtvej 69 i København.

    En fredelig demonstration fra Nørreport Station til Christiania endte uden anholdte, og også en såkaldt larmedemonstration ved Vestre Fængsel her til aften var fredfyldt og førte ingen anholdelser med sig.

    »Ligesom de sidste par dage er tirsdag gået rigtigt godt. Aktivisterne formår at formidle deres budskab på en god og fredelig måde«, siger politikommisær Lars Borg til Politiken.dk.

    Kranen strejkede
    Arbejdet med at jævne Ungdomshuset med jorden skred planmæssigt frem indtil ved 17-tiden, da nedrivningskranen angiveligt gik i stykker.

    Derfor står der her til aften stadig en lille stump af Ungdomshuset stueplansfacade, mens lastbiler i pendulfart kører murbrokker væk med politieskorte.

    Det meste af dagen blev nedrivningen fulgt af aktivister med våde øjne.

    »Vi er her for at sige farvel til vores hus. Vi er rigtig kede af det, men det er bare en mur nu. Derfor må vi forsøge at se fremad og håbe på et nyt hus«, sagde Daniel til Politiken.dk.

    Sammen med sine venner var han mødt op ved Nørrebros runddel for at sige farvel.

    Selv om de fysiske rammer for Ungdomshuset stort set er væk, er politiet fortsat talstærkt til stede ved Jagtvej 69.

    Sympatidemonstrationer i Italien
    I Italien blev der i dag demonstreret to steder i sympati med Ungdomshuset.

    I Milano mødte demonstranter op foran Danmarks generalkonsulat med bannere og tilråb.

    Tidligere på dagen blev det danske konsulat i Venedig besat, da 50 demonstranter tiltvang sig adgang til bygningen.

    I New York demonstrede små seks demonstranter foran det danske generalkonsulat.

    De seneste dage har der også været demonstrationer i Tel Aviv, London, Oslo samt en lang række tyske byer.
     
    Se vidio klip:
     
     

    Problemerne, der ikke lod sig sælge

    Lettelsens suk var enormt, da Københavns Kommune i sin tid solgte Ungdomshuset. Men da begyndte problemerne først for alvor.

     
    Brugerne af Ungdomshuset på Jagtvej 69 i København skal være ude senest 14. december 2006. - Foto: Martin Bubandt Jensen
    Kampen om Jagtvej 69
    • 1982: Københavns Kommune overdrager Folkets Hus på Jagtvej 69 til Ungdomshusets brugere.
    • 1999: Københavns Kommune sætter Ungdomshuset til salg til højestbydende.
    • 2001: Human A/S køber Ungdomshuset af Københavns Kommune.
    • 2002: Menigheden Faderhuset køber alle aktier af Human A/S.
    • Nytårsaften 2001/2002: En gruppe fra Faderhuset forsøger at trænge ind i Ungdomshuset for at udskifte låsene. De blev mødt af vrede unge, og flere kristne måtte en tur på skadestuen.
    • 2003: Faderhuset stævner Ungdomshusets brugere med krav om ejendomsret.
    • 2004: Københavns Byret afgør, at Faderhuset har ret til at smide Ungdomshusets brugere for porten, hvilket bliver anket til landsretten. Indtil retten endelig har afgjort striden, har brugerne ret til at blive i huset.
    • 2006: 28. august stadfæster Østre Landsret byrettens dom. De unge skal ud af Ungdomshuset 14. december. I november garanterer Københavns Politi dog, at Jagtvej 69 først bliver ryddet efter årsskiftet.
    L
    Kort om sagen
     
    Ungdomshuset blev til i 1982, hvor Københavns Kommune overlod brugsretten til bygningen på Jagtvej 69 til de unge. I 2000 bliver bygningen solgt til Human A/S, der året efter videresølger til den kristne frimenighed Faderhuset. Siden da har Faderhuset kæmpet for at få huset ryddet.
    København kan snart fejre sølvbryllup med Ungdomshuset på Jagtvej, og den skrammede og forrevne facade i nummer 69 vidner om et stormfuldt og slidsomt forhold. Med meget få og små oaser af ægteskabelig lykke.
     
    Det gamle hus på Nørrebro var i sin egen ungdom et Folkets Hus, men fagbevægelsen trak fanerne tilbage, og i slutningen af 1970’erne og begyndelsen af 1980’erne fyldte sangforeningen Tingluti de højloftede lokaler.

    Lidt store forhold til korsang, syntes nogle af de unge politikere på Københavns Rådhus – herunder den senere overborgmester Jens Kramer Mikkelsen (S).

    Samtidig bankede en gruppe unge, oprørske og ikke mindst ihærdige mennesker fra den såkaldte Initivgruppe på kommunens dør og forlangte et sted at være.

    Tidens rytmer flytter ind
    Efter utallige møder frem og tilbage blev adressen i 1982 til Ungdomsuset, og næsten fra dag 1 har der været problemer. For da sanglærkerne rykkede ud, flyttede tidens rå rytmer ind. På højeste volumen.

    Naboklagerne blev en fast del af diskussionen om Ungdomshuset, og ved de fleste demonstrationer i København lød forklaringen – retfærdig eller ej – at protesterne var født og iscenesat i Ungdomshuset.

    Samlivet mellem Københavns Kommune og Ungdomshuset nåede et kritisk lavpunkt midt i 1990’erne. Konstante klager over støj og møg fra huset og en erkendelse af, at de oprindelige aftaler om at betale husleje og overholde et minimum af regler slet ikke bliver efterlevet, giver politisk tummel.

    Brand starter salg
    Københavns Ungdomscentre (KUC) får overdraget ansvaret for at holde øje med huset, og selv om der opstår en fornuftig dialog, retter det ikke op på husets renommé. Og heller den fysiske tilstand i nummer 69.

    En brand i huset i starten 1996 afslører i al sin gru husets forfald og farlige tilstand. Nogenlunde samtidig indebrænder mange unge ved en tragisk diskoteksbrand i Göteborg, og de to begivenheder sætter en skræk i livet på politikerne på Københavns Rådhus.

    Unge mennesker overnatter nemlig på Jagtvej – mod reglerne, ganske vist – men tænk, hvis branden virkelig havde fået fat ...

    Et hurtigt overslag viser, at det vil koste adskillige millioner kroner at gøre huset bare nogenlunde egnet til menneskeligt ophold, og den bevilling samler ikke opbakning. I stedet opstår tanken om at sælge, og her er der til gengæld hurtigt et flertal.

    Advokat køber huset
    Det kniber længe med buddene, men i 2001 kommer ud af det ukendte advokat Inge Lolk med god vilje i sindet og 2,6 millioner kroner på lommen.

    På vegne af Human A/S køber advokaten byens problemhus, og rådhusets gamle mure dirrer eftertrykkeligt af det store lettelsens suk, som suser gennem Borgerrepræsentationen.

    Men Inge Lolks gode vilje mødes med vandkamp og afvisning, da hun vil besøge sit nye hus. Så i al stilfærdighed sælger hun allerede året efter ejendommen Jagtvej 69 til den kristne menighed Faderhuset.

    Og de unge indleder endnu en protestaktion.

    Bragt i Politiken 20. oktober 2006
     
     
     
      Kig ind i Ungdomshuset
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Næste
                                                            
    Politiet gav pressen et kig indenfor i Ungdomshuset efter rydningen.   - Foto: JENS DRESLING
     
     
    Ungdomshusets sidste dage som Politikens fotografer så dem.
    se:FOTOS fra frontlinjen
    Her er et par af dem:
     
     

     
      Ungdomshuset ryddes
    Barrikader på Nørrebro torsdag 1. marts.   - Foto: Jacob Ehrbahn

      Voldsom torsdag aften på Nørrebro
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Næste
    Politiet rydder demonstranternes barrikader.   - Foto: Martin Lehmann
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Næste
    Politiet skyder med tåregas.   - Foto: Jacob Ehrnahn

     

      FOTO: Fredelige søndagsdemonstrationer og blomster
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Næste
    Bagsiden af Ungdomshuset kunne ikke lide det skånselsløse solskin efter oprydningen.   - Foto: JACOB EHRBAHN

     

      Nørrebro i flammer fredag nat - en demonstrant er ramt
    Nørrebrogade.   - Foto: JACOB EHRBAHN
     
      Fredagens fest på Nørrebro udartede til gadekampe
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Næste
    De unge samledes til fællesmøde i Folkets Hus tidligt på aftenen fredag.   - Foto: JOACHIM ADRIAN

     

      Lørdag formiddag: Nørrebro og Christianshavn ligner en krigszone
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Næste
    Christianshavns Gymnasium fik smidt deres undervisningsmateriale på gaden..   - Foto: Jens Dresling

    Danmark vil med i missilskjoldet

     
     

    Lykketoft: Missilskjold kan føre til oprustning

    En dyr og dårlig idé, kalder Mogens Lykketoft de danske planer om at tilslutte sig det amerikanske missilskjold. SF vil rejse sagen i det udenrigspolitiske nævn i morgen

     

    Socialdemokraternes Mogens Lykketoft mener, at deltagelse i et globalt missilskjold kan føre til oprustning. - Foto: TOKE HAGE
    Tidligere udenrigsminister Mogens Lykketoft advarer mod dansk deltagelse i det globale missilskjold.

    »Vi er meget skeptiske overfor missilskjoldsidéen. For det første er der ingen, der ved, om det kan lade sig gøre. For det andet er det helt sikkert, at det vil koste hundredvis milliarder dollar at udvikle det. For det tredje kan det føre til en destabilisering og ny oprustningsbølge«, siger Mogens Lykketoft.

    Advarslen kommer efter, at Dansk Folkeparti og regeringen har meldt ud, at Danmark bør være med i det amerikanske missilskjold.

    Risiko for provokation
    Socialdemokraternes udenrigsordfører mener, at dansk deltagelse kan være med til at provokere stormagterne Kina og Rusland.

    »Det kan provokere Kina og Rusland, hvis de mener, at deres raketafskrækkelseskapacitet kan sættes ud af kraft af missilskjoldet. Det kan få dem til at udvikle nye, mere slagskraftige våben, der kan banke igennem et sådan missilskjold. Og så har vi balladen«, siger Mogens Lykketoft.

    Han vil ikke afvise, at man kan opbygge lokale missilskjold mod lande som Iran og Nordkorea. Men han går ikke ind for den amerikanske plan om et global missilskjold. Lykketoft mener ikke, at tiden er inde til, at Danmark melder selvstændigt ud, før sagen er drøftet i den samlede NATO-kreds.

    Helt uacceptabelt
    Den tidligere udenrigsminister er ligeledes særdeles pikeret over, at regeringen og Dansk Folkeparti melder ud uden at drøfte sagen med de øvrige forsvarsforligspartier.

    »Det er meget, meget mærkeligt, at de ikke afventer drøftelser i kredsen af forligspartier. Det er højst mærkværdigt, at de uden at snakke med Socialdemokraterne og de Radikale går ud og lægger sig fast på noget. Det er i virkeligheden helt uacceptabelt«, siger Mogens Lykketoft.

    SF’s Holger K. Nielsen er også bekymret for, om missilskjoldet vil føre til oprustning i bl.a. Kina og Rusland. Han har nu stillet spørgsmål til økonomien i projektet til forsvarsministeren, og tager sagen op i udenrigspolitisk nævn i morgen.

     
     
     Læs også:
     
     
     
     
     
    Regeringen og støttepartiet Dansk Folkeparti siger ja til at komme med i et missilskjold. - Foto:
     

                     Danmark vil med i missilskjoldet

    Dansk Folkeparti bakker op om regeringens ønske om at være med i det amerikanske missilskjold. Dermed er der flertal for dansk deltagelse i det storstilede projekt.

     
    De amerikanske raketbatterier i Europa er ikke klar endnu. Men amerikanerne fastholder, at de bliver klar indenfor et par år.

    Og hvis det lykkedes at danne et missilskjold, der kan ramme fjendtlige missiler i europæisk luftrum, skal Danmark med i projektet.

    Det mener forsvarsminister Søren Gade (V), udenrigsminister Per Stig Møller (K) og nu også Dansk Folkeparti.

    »Det er et forsvar mod eventuelle løsgående missiler fra alle mulige mærkelige steder. Iran kunne sagtens tænkes en dag at kunne fremstille så langtrækkende missiler. Selv Nordkorea vil før eller siden kunne nå Europa. Og det er en ren forsvarsforanstaltning, som vi meget gerne vil være med i«, siger Dansk Folkepartis udenrigsordfører, Søren Espersen.

    Sund skepsis
    Med Dansk Folkepartis opbakning er der flertal for dansk deltagelse i det amerikanske missilskjold. Men ikke alle er glade for den beslutning.

    »Jeg har en sund skepsis overfor den slags. Og der er masser af spørgsmålstegn. Men jeg har ikke hørt noget samlet fra regeringen, så jeg ved ikke noget om det«, siger Niels Helveg Petersen (RV) til Ritzau.

    Dansk Folkeparti har også overvejelser om funktionsduelighed og økonomi. Men idéen er god, så den skal forfølges, argumenterer Søren Espersen.

    »Alle nye våbentyper starter med en idé, som man går i gang med at undersøge. Men idéen er vældig god, så vi skal gøre alt, hvad vi kan for at have de bedste forsvarssystemer«, siger Søren Espersen.
     
     

    USA: Iran kan angribe Europa med missiler i 2015

    »Iranerne er i fuld gang med et meget aggressivt missilprogram«, advarer chefen for det amerikanske missilforsvar. Derfor vil USA opstille raketbatterier i Europa.

     

    - Foto: GREG BAKER

     

    USA kan ikke vente på godkendelse fra NATO eller Rusland, før amerikanerne udvider deres missilforsvar til at omfatte europæiske lande.

    Den besked gav direktøren for det amerikanske missilforsvars-agentur, Missile Defense Agency, da han i aftes besøgte forsvarsalliancens hovedkvarter for at forklare planerne.

    »Den amerikanske regering er ikke i tvivl om, at vi i løbet af få år vil stå over for en meget reel trussel om angreb med mellem- og langdistance missiler fra Nordkorea og Iran. 11. september har lært os, at man skal være forberedt på alt«, siger general Henry Obering på en briefing for udvalgte journalister, som Politiken.dk har deltaget i.

    I fuld gang med aggressivt atomprogram
    »Vi har brugt nogle år på at klargøre baser i Alaska, Californien og Hawaii for at imødegå den nordkoreanske trussel. Nu koncentrerer vi os om Iran. Vi ved, at iranerne er i fuld gang med et meget aggressivt missilprogram«, siger han.

    »For effektivt at kunne standse et angreb fra Iran har vi brug for radarstationer og missilbaser i Europa. Iranerne er ikke klar endnu, men vi er overbeviste om, at de vil være det omkring 2015. Hvis ikke vi kommer i gang nu, vil det være for sent«.

    Voldsom retorik fra russerne
    I det seneste uger har Rusland reageret med usædvanlig voldsom retorik på, at USA forhandler om opstilling af en radarstation i Tjekkiet og 10 raketsiloer i Polen. Russerne frygter, at de amerikanske raketbatterier kan bruges til at sætte russisk militær ud af spillet.

    Regeringerne i Warszawa og Prag beskylder til gengæld Moskva for skræmmetaktik og afpresning, efter at en russisk militærleder i sidste uge truede med at vende Ruslands missiler mod de to tidligere Warszawa-pagtlande.

    »Vi forstår ikke russernes reaktion. De små missiler, vi ønsker at stille op i Polen, er ikke angrebsvåben, og de er på ingen måde vendt mod Rusland. Vi har intet at skjule. Vi har holdt russerne informeret i over et år, og de har en stående invitation til at besøge vore baser«, siger general Obering.

    USA søger partnere, ikke godkendelse
    USA er parat til at samarbejde med både Rusland og europæiske allierede, der måtte være interesserede, siger den amerikanske missilforsvarschef. Men han gør det samtidig klart, at amerikanerne agter at gennemføre planerne under alle omstændigheder.

    »Vi søger partnere, vi søger ikke godkendelse«, siger han.

    General Henry Obering takker Danmark og Storbritannien for hjælp med opgradering af radarbaser i Thule og Nordengland som en del af udvidelsen af missilforsvaret.

    »De to radarstationer vil hjælpe USA til hurtigere at opdage missiler på vej henover Europa. Men de kan ikke forsvare Europa imod et angreb fra Iran. Det vil baserne i Polen og Tjekkiet kunne gøre. Planen er altså i alles interesse«, siger Obering.

    »Selv hvis iranerne ikke angriber Europa, så vil iranske missiler affyret mod USA uundgåeligt flyve henover jer, hvor de risikerer at falde ned. Som situationen er i dag, kan I intet gøre ved det«.
     

    Per Stig tier om terrorliste


     
                                 
     
                                  - Han anerkender slet ikke EF-domstolens dom og vil ikke diskutere indholdet af dommen. I stedet henviser han til, at der er kommet en ny terrorliste. Det er rigtigt, at EU`s terrorlister evalueres hvert halve år. Men indholdet er jo præcis det samme. Det er rystende, at udenrigsministeren stiller med den slags argumenter, siger Enhedslistens Rune Lund, der deltog på samrådet i Europaudvalget 
     
                        Per Stig tier om terrorliste

     

    Udenrigsministeren tav om, hvorfor EU-systemet - trods en dom ved EF-domstolen - fastholder en iransk modstands-bevægelse på EU`s terrorliste

     
    Folketingets Europaudvalg sætter nu gang i en debat om, hvordan retsgrundlaget for EU`s terrorlister kan forbedres.

    Det blev konklusionen af et møde i Folketingets Europaudvalg i går.

    På mødet skulle udenrigsministeren svare på, hvilke konsekvenser den dom får, som har underkendt at den iranske modstandsbevægelse, Folkets Mujahediner, er sat på EU`s terrorliste.

    Ligeledes skulle Per Stig Møller forklare, om Danmark tager særlige initiativer for at sikre et minimum af rettigheder til folk, som opføres på terrorlisten.

    Det er EF-domstolen, som har fastslået, at den iranske modstandsbevægelse er sat ulovligt på terrorlisten. Især fordi de aldrig fik lov til at forsvare sig eller fik en begrundelse for, hvorfor de står opført på listen.

    Udenrigsministeren var imidlertid lige så tavs som den hemmelige arbejdsgruppe, der sætter organisationer og personer på EU`s terrorliste.

    - Han anerkender slet ikke EF-domstolens dom og vil ikke diskutere indholdet af dommen. I stedet henviser han til, at der er kommet en ny terrorliste. Det er rigtigt, at EU`s terrorlister evalueres hvert halve år. Men indholdet er jo præcis det samme. Det er rystende, at udenrigsministeren stiller med den slags argumenter, siger Enhedslistens Rune Lund, der deltog på samrådet i Europaudvalget.

    På trods af dommen fastholder EU-systemet, at den iranske modstands-bevægelse skal stå på terrorlisten.

    - Per Stig Møller har været med til at underkende dommen fra EF-domstolen. Derfor må han have en holdning til Folkets Mujahediner. Hans tavshed ligger desværre i naturlig forlængelse af EU-systemets systematiske afvisning af at lade de berørte på EU`s terrorliste forsvare sig, konstaterer Rune Lund over for Arbejderen.

    I dag deltager han på Foreningen Oprørs årsmøde i København. Årsmødet vil bære præg af den retssag, der til april indledes mod foreningens talsmand, Patrick Mac Manus.

    - Vi skal sikre, at sagen når langt ud over retssalen. På årsmødet vil vi i workshops udveksle ideer til aktiviteter. Vi har en stærk sag. Det er op til anklagemyndigheden, at bevise at vi har gjort noget ulovligt. At EU`s egen domstol har set sig nødt til at underkende EU-rådets forsøg på at stemple Folkets Mujahediner som terrorister, viser at udviklingen går i vores favør, fortæller Jens Henneberg fra Oprør til Arbejderen.

    I går kom det frem, at EU`s stempling af de iranske mujahediner ligner en politisk studehandel mellem EU på den ene side og den iranske regering på den anden. I et dokument om Irans atomvåbenprogram fra november 2004, som Arbejderen er i besiddelse af, skriver EU`s udenrigsminister Javier Solana at: '!EU og Iran bekræfter deres vilje til at bekæmpe terrorisme, herunder Al Qaida og andre terrorgrupper, som MeK`s (de iranske mujahediner, red.) aktiviteter'.
     

    Europe's Iran Problem

     
     
    Europe's Iran Problem; Problem? What problem? - Weekly Standard

    Feb. 26, 2007 Monday
    BYLINE: Daniel Johnson, The Weekly Standard
     
    Læs også:
     


    London
    The leaders of Europe can no longer pretend that they don't know what Iran is up to. A leaked internal document prepared for the European Union's foreign ministers warns that it is probably too late to prevent the Iranian government from acquiring nuclear weapons. "At some stage we must expect that Iran will acquire the capacity to enrich uranium on the scale required for a weapons programme." The document also admits that efforts to impede the Iranian nuclear program have failed. "In practice . . . the Iranians have pursued their programme at their own pace, the limiting factor being technical difficulties rather than resolutions by the U.N. or the [International Atomic Energy Agency]." Nor do the limited sanctions announced by the U.N. Security Council hold out any hope: "The problems with Iran will not be resolved through economic sanctions alone."

    So now they know. Years of diplomacy have made virtually no difference. Carrots and sticks have been tried and failed. The regime in Tehran is determined to become a nuclear power--the first nuclear power with a yearning for martyrdom. Europe's strategy has hitherto been merely to play for time--but time is on Tehran's side.

    Europe's reaction? Nil. By tacit agreement, it has been left to Israel and the United States to hint at possible military action to destroy the nuclear facilities that European companies have helped to create. Europe has done little to isolate Iran or put pressure on its leaders and its people. Germany and other European Union states head the list of trading partners with Iran. As was the case with Iraq, the fact that so many Europeans are making so much money out of an evil regime has contributed to Europe's political paralysis.

    Yet Europe has an overwhelming interest in preventing the emergence of an Islamist bomb. European territory would be directly threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran, equipped with long-range missiles. Europe would also be in greater danger than the United States from terrorist organizations armed with radioactive ("dirty") or even nuclear bombs from Tehran. Iranian terrorists have a history of setting off bombs in Europe. Nuclear blackmail is far more likely to be used against European states than against the United States, and European states are judged by Tehran to be far less likely to retaliate than Israel.

    For these and many other practical reasons, Europe should be reacting far more vigorously than it is to the Iranian provocation. But there is an even more important reason Europe should be forcing the issue rather than appeasing the mullahs.

    The moral case for stopping President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Khamenei in their tracks is that both have vowed to annihilate Israel. Ahmadinejad's threat ("Israel must be wiped off the map"), repeated in different forms several times over the past two years, is well known. He was quoting Ayatollah Khomeini, whose successor as supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, set out his solution to the Middle East problem in 2000: "the annihilation and destruction of the Zionist state." The means to accomplish the eradication of Israel are now almost in their grasp.

    Why, the political establishment of Europe implicitly asks, should we lift a finger for Israel? Well, Israel is Europe's orphaned offspring. It was Europe--specifically Britain--that conceived the Jewish National Home in Palestine with the Balfour Declaration in 1917. It was Europe--specifically Germany, but with help from collaborators in almost every nation on the Continent--that drove hundreds of thousands of Jews to emigrate, and then murdered six million who could not escape. It was Europe--specifically the E.U.--that gave the Holocaust a unique status in defining the values that Europe's institutions enshrine. Generations of children have been taught that the commemoration of the Holocaust is not only a moral imperative, but constitutive of European civilization.

    Now that the threat of a second Holocaust is staring Europe in the face, however, its leaders are in denial. Worse: They seem insouciant. Why is the E.U., which makes so much of its humanitarian credentials, which sees itself as a creature of the Enlightenment, so seemingly indifferent? The answer, I fear, lies in the process that has deprived Israel of legitimacy and branded Zionism as a relic of European imperialism. That process has been grinding away for decades, but only now is it becoming plain that Europe's vast superstructure of collective atonement for the Holocaust has been hollowed out from within. The calumny that Israel--the most liberal and egalitarian country in the Middle East--is an "apartheid state" has hardened into a conviction. The mud has stuck.

    Yet if Israel is attacked and--God forbid--destroyed by Iranian nuclear bombs, then European civilization will have perished, too. The destruction of Israel would signal the demise of the Judeo-Christian morality that ennobled Greco-Roman culture to create the only Europe that was ever worth preserving. I for one could not live in a society that could even contemplate such a second Shoah. I would turn my back on such a Europe, shake the dust from my feet, never to return.

    Daniel Johnson, a journalist in London, is a columnist for the New York Sun and a contributor to Contentions, a blog at commentarymagazine.com.
     

    AN INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT MAHMUD AHMADINEJAD

     
     
    AN INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT MAHMUD AHMADINEJAD
    ABC GOOD MORNING ACERICA
    Feb. 12, 2007



     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
    EXCERPT:
    Ms. Sawyer: I can begin. They say 170 troops and some 600 have been injured by Iranian weapons. Are you sending weapons into Iraq to kill Americans?

    President Ahmadinejad: Let me first say good morning to the viewers all over the states and let me tell them we have spring weather in Iran. I hope it will be spring all over the world.
    We shy away from any kind of conflict and any kind of bloodshed, and we will be sad by such. We are opposed to any kind of conflict and as we have said repeatedly we think the world problem can be solved through dialogue, the use of logic and a sense of friendship. There is no need for the use of force.
    When it come to Iraq, we have made it clear that kind of lack of security, insecurity in Iraq is also to our disadvantage and also disadvantage to the nations of the region. Iraq only for a period when Saddam [Hussein] was in power had a good relationship. We have a very good relationship with Iraq. We are historical friends. We have intermarriages between the two nations, and millions of Iranians and Iraqis travel to each other's countries.
    And our position for Iraq is very clear: We are asking for peace, we are asking for security, and we will be sad to see people get killed, no matter who they are. It could be Iraqis. We will be sad if we hear they are killed or anyone who is brought there by force and is put in the middle of the conflict.

    Ms. Sawyer: But how is it possible to believe this? The Americans have been given evidence. They say they have rocket-propelled grenade launcher. … It speaks for itself.
    President President Ahmadinejad: Well it's very easy to make a judgment when you don't have good defense or making a one-sided judgment. I think that Americans have made a mistake in Iraq and unfortunately are losing, and this is a shame for Americans of course and that's why they are trying to point their fingers to other people and pointing fingers to others will not solve the problem. I think that we should be honest and face the reality.
    Ms. Sawyer: But they say they have serial numbers from Iran?
    President Ahmadinejad: But we don't need such things. I can give you figures and number, which are known: More than 160,000 American troops are in Iraq, 100 more … aircraft, helicopters, what are they doing in Iraq? I think the reason for insecurity of Iraq are these things, and these are some excuses to prolong their stay in Iraq, if they prolong their stay in the first place there would be no insecurity.
    Ms. Sawyer: Are you saying there are no Iranian weapons in Iraq? Will you close down border? Will you punish anyone found to be taking weapons in? 
     President Ahmadinejad: You see the position of the government is important. We are opposed any kind of conflict in Iraq. This is not to our advantage. Anyone who gets killed in Iraq will make us sad no matter from which religion they are. Can American close their long borders? … No, we are opposed to any conflict and also the presence of foreign forces in Iraq, and that's why we are opposed to the Americans. We tell them leave the country and no other foreigners should be in Iraq, then you see that you have peace.
    Ms. Sawyer: Will you prosecute anyone trying to bring Iranian weapons into Iraq?

    President Ahmadinejad: To say the U.S. administration and Bush are used to excusing others, the fact that you are showing us some piece of papers and you call them documents, they should not solve any problem. There should be a court to prove the case and to support the case.
    The position of the government as I told you and the position of the Revolutionary Guard is also the same. We are opposed to any kind of conflict in Iraq. We do not want the presence of armed forces in Iraq, foreign armed forces in Iraq. We would like to have the strengthening of Iraq and the stability of the Iraq government because it is the legit. … But we think that the U.S. is following another policy trying to hide its defeats and failures and that's why is pointing its fingers to others. This is not a solution to the problem.

    Ms. Sawyer: Does Iran deserve the right to send Iranians in ... Americans have said they had false identities that they were trying to shave their heads, trying to flush evidence ...

    President Ahmadinejad: I don't think that in the legal system in the U.S. you have this postulation that if you arrest someone you have automatically accused someone, only people who have committed something wrong can be taken to court. I think it was childish for the U.S. government to do something like that to arrest defenseless people, not allowing them to talk to anyone and to publish information in a biased way. I think that this is not a solution to the problem in Iraq; the solution is somewhere else.
    Our diplomats are now in Iraq, what are the Americans doing there? These people are now in Iraq, what are the diplomats supposed to do, what is the task of the consulate, of the embassy? We have diplomatic relations with Iraq, we have extensive diplomatic relations, political, cultural ties, every year we have millions of people traveling across the border, so the question is why are the Americans doing there and why against international relations, they attack a consulate office and they will not solve the problem? The administration problems with management can be solved somewhere else.
    Ms. Sawyer: So you may send more Iranians in. Are they training militia forces?

    President Ahmadinejad: I do not know what you mean by militia?

    Ms. Sawyer: ... talking about Shiite forces.

    President Ahmadinejad: Let me ask you a question, those people who are killing the Shiites, are they organized by Americans?

    Ms. Sawyer: Sunnis? Baathists?

    President Ahmadinejad: Anyone, anyone. Are the Baathists organized in Kuwait by Americans? Why do you say no? No, I am just asking you a question, who organizes them? Now based on international regulations, occupation forces are also in charge for trading security. Americans have failed and that's why they are accusing others and as I told you this will not solve the problems.
    You see the conflict in Iraq is not in our control. It is controlled by the Americans. I think that Americans that change their behavior so the conflict will end ... Iraq has got its own constitution, it's got its own parliament, it has got a democratically elected president, and I think they should be in charge. The root of the insecurity must be found and if the Iraqi government asks for our assistance we will provide intellectual support and we are also ready to supply Americans with intellectual support so they will pull out.

    Ms. Sawyer: The Iraqi government has announced that the country would face with a real chaos if the US withdraws its troops from Iraq as soon as tomorrow morning? What is your opinion?

    President Ahmadinejad: Are you here to solve the problem of the American government in Iraq?

    Ms. Sawyer: I hoped that you provide us with a solution for the Iraqi issue.

    President Ahmadinejad: These are some points that must be discussed at the
    diplomatic level. You are just a journalist. And of course we think that the Iraqi government has asked the U.S. administration to hand in security to the Iraqi government. And we think that it will help us in solving the problem.

    Ms. Sawyer: If you could have a nuclear weapon today, tomorrow, would you want one?

    President Ahmadinejad: Well, our position is clear: We are opposed to any proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons. We believe that the time is now over for nuke weapons. It is a time for logic, for rationality and for civilization. Instead of thinking of finding new weapons, we are trying to find new ways to love people. And if talking about the "Death to America" slogans, I think you know it yourself, it is not related in any way to American public. Our people have no problem with American public, and we have a very friendly relationship.

    Ms. Sawyer: What did you think when you saw the hanging of Hussein? He was your enemy?

    President Ahmadinejad: Yes, but who equipped this enemy? Who made him fight with us for eight years? Who supported him? The U.S. administration. The U.S. administration could support us.

    Ms. Sawyer: Did you feel sympathy?

    President Ahmadinejad: What about you? Did you have any kind of sympathy?

    Ms. Sawyer: No, I am a journalist, solely a journalist.

    President Ahmadinejad: But you've come here in the disguise of politician, I guess.
    Well, naturally when a criminal is eliminated, all the people will be happy, but we think that if the U.S. administration had not supported Saddam he would never have attacked Iran or Kuwait.

    Ms. Sawyer: Quick question about the nuclear issue if I may. … A negotiator seems to be saying there will be settlement, that Iran is ready to settle the outstanding issues before or at least soon. Is Iran ready to settle issues?

    President Ahmadinejad: When it comes to … within framework of regulations, we're always ready to cooperate. We've always cooperated, and we'll continue to cooperate. We want to have dialogue, but within the framework of regulations and … on a fair basis. If regulations are used as a tool of inquisition though.

    Ms. Sawyer: So this should be solved within 10 days before sanctions imposed? Additional sanctions?

    President Ahmadinejad: I think my answer was clear. We are always ready to talk in the framework of regulation. … As long as rights of human nationals are safeguarded. You see tens of millions took to the streets yesterday and insisted to have … what belongs to them. We are a member of the agency, and we intend to have what we are entitled to. … Within this framework we are ready to negotiate.

    Ms. Sawyer: I talked to IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency ] yesterday, and they say something different, that there are gaps, but I'd like to move on if I can … because the president has said we will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. Do you think America is preparing to take military action against Iran?

    President Ahmadinejad: Well, of course the current president doesn't feel obliged to speak within the framework of law. He thinks to be above the law. We work within the framework of the agency, and we work based on laws and regulations and we want to have what we are entitled to, not war. I think it's quite clear. And President Bush cannot pass the buck to others and and solve the problems of Iraq by pointing fingers.

    Ms. Sawyer: Do you personally fear an attack by us? And air strikes against Iran by the U.S.?

    President Ahmadinejad: Fear? Why should we be afraid? First the possibility is very low, and we think that there are wise people in the U.S. that would stop such illegal actions but our position is clear. Our nation has made it clear that anyone who wants to attack our country will be severely punished.

    Ms. Sawyer: You said you have 52,000 suicide bombers. Where would you deploy them?

    President Ahmadinejad: Did I say that?

    Ms. Sawyer: One of the Iraqi officials said that ...

    President Ahmadinejad: Was this offical an Iraqi?

    Ms. Sawyer: Jalal Sharafi

    President Ahmadinejad: Jalal Sharafi? I don't Know him. Did he quote me? My words are clear.

    Ms. Sawyer: The did not quote you

    President Ahmadinejad: so who said that?

    Ms. Sawyer: I think it was their information, at least thi is my understanding.

    President Ahmadinejad: ... [Laughs] Well I think that you should check your source because people say different things. One of the interior ministry officials from Iran said that all of these terrors are done by American forces, and that was an official. He had an official position in Iraq.

    Ms. Sawyer: Let's turn to Israel for a moment. I do not want to debate again the whole question of the Holocaust -- whether the Holocaust is a myth, which you have said. Would you be willing to go to Auschwitz and see their documentation? You're a scientist. Would you be willing to look at the room with documentation?

    President Ahmadinejad: Do you think it would solve any problem?

    Ms. Sawyer: It would be information for you if you genuinely believe it's a myth.
     President Ahmadinejad: Well, one of the methods used for concealing the truth is diverting a topic. Question is if Holocaust is true. … To the Palestinian issue, why for the excuse of the Holocaust we have an illegitimate government in Palestine? Why in the name of Holocaust we allow people to occupy the land and make refugees and kill children? There are the questions that must be answered by American politicians, not to divert the attention.
    If something has happened in the past of historical nature, then why are people sensitive to it now, and if it's not related to the Palestinian issue … they should tell us where it is relevant. If it is unimportant and if it is true, then open the way to research. … These are serious questions. I have nothing to do with these questions of course.
    I'm asking why, for the excuse of Holocaust, we have an imposed regime here in the region with 60 years of invasion, making people refugees. We say that Palestinian children and women they are people … and love their homeland and if someone comes to the U.S. and with some pretense and some phony excuse, establishes a government and kills children, it's a serious question. You cannot let this question to go unanswered. This is a very serious question. The relationship, Holocaust and the … massacre of Palestinians. This is the question.
    Ms. Sawyer: You have said Israel should be wiped off the face of the Earth. You have said that anyone who recognizes Israel will burn in fire of Islam's fury. Do you still say those things? Do you still want to say those things today? And … if the Palestinian issue, from those talks, if they agree there should be two states, would you accept Israel into the United Nations?

    President Ahmadinejad: It seems that you are to broadcast everything. Is that true?

    Ms. Sawyer: Yes.

    President Ahmadinejad: You know some people cut the interview. They do not broadcast in full. And what we have said about Palestine, it's quite clear, based on the charter of the U.N., based on international regulations, we say let Palestinians decide. … Please allow the Palestinians to decide. Please respect their decision. But please give them the opportunity for decision making.
    If what happened to the former Soviet Union, it disappeared, it disappeared from the face of the Earth, was it because of war? No, it was through the decision of the people and what we say is quite clear.

    Ms. Sawyer: But burn in the fire?

    President Ahmadinejad: I will tell you, just wait a little. Just be patient and listen. We believe that in Palestine, there should be a referendum and Palestinians, Muslims, Jews, any Palestinians, and this is based on international regulations and I think it's their right to determine their future. Any decision made by Palestinians must be respected, and I think this is a very clear proposition.
    Why are people opposed, what we say is clear. If you continue massacring innocent people, if you continue to make them refugees, and if you continue attacking neighboring countries, then the countries and the people of those countries, regions … get angry, because the Zionist regime was imposed upon them.
    You know many families, they don't function … where their members are either incarcerated or killed. … Many mothers are now mourning the death of their children.
    Even the Palestinian government, which was elected by democratic vote, is attacked by the Zionist regime. Members of the Parliament are arrested. The ministers are arrested. Israel is not following regulations. … Some American politicians support oppression. There is no other solution.

    Ms. Sawyer: Are you still heading toward the 3,000 centrifuges? Is that what you will announce April 9?

    President Ahmadinejad: The ninth of April? Am I supposed to give any piece of news?

    Ms. Sawyer: Yesterday you said.

    President Ahmadinejad: Did you listen to what I said?

    Ms. Sawyer: I don't speak Farsi but

    President Ahmadinejad: Well, we will say it clear when the time comes, we are the only country whose activities are completely transparent and we will just inform the world if we do something.

    [. . . ]

    Ms. Sawyer: . . .Are you often in tears? . . .

    President Ahmadinejad : Yes, that's true. Not overwhelm for Iranians, of course, they are very close to me and I love all Iranians. And anywhere — when I see people suffering I have the same reaction, and we feel sad for people of Iraq, for the people of Palestine. Anywhere we have war, we feel sad. Even when I see on TV, for example, some Americans, because of tornadoes or a hurricane, they have lost their homes, I become sad.
    Because, for us, human beings are respectable, no matter where they are. Human beings are respectable, and they have their own dignity. And all of us should help so that people should lead better lives to live at peace. And to live in peace and brotherhood. In the viewpoint of our religion, all people are respectable, and they must be loved. Regardless of their nationality, ethnicity or religion. This is part of our religious teachings, and we'll live with this religion.

    MS. SAWYER: As you know, there have been protests from university students saying forget the Holocaust, what about us?

     PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD: Well, in our country we have real freedom, it is a not a kind of showcase. And, for example, you see in a meeting maybe 2,000 people might support the president and 100 people may be opposed. This is the meaning of freedom in our country, and it's quite clear. Yes, we are trying to make our country make progress. We have taken some good steps. Of course we are doing it using our own resources and we don't need anyone else.
    [. . . ]
    END
     
     
     

    Fighting Iran With Patience

     
     
     
     
                               Fighting Iran With Patience

    By Jim Hoagland
    February 25, 2007


    Nuclear weapons have a way of forcing presidents to reverse policies thought to be carved in stone. So it was with Ronald Reagan and the Soviet Union, and so it may be now with George W. Bush and the two surviving members of the "axis of evil."

    To the outrage of some supporters and the mockery of his critics, President Bush has blessed a tentative, quarter-loaf diplomatic deal aimed at curbing North Korea's nuclear arsenal. And he has a shot at reaching a modus vivendi with Iran on nuclear proliferation as well -- if he disregards both the outrage and the mockery, as he should.

    "There is movement behind the scenes," a European diplomat who closely follows Iran told me last week. "The Iranians are nervous and want to get engaged." Details of a confidential Iranian proposal that has been circulating in Brussels and Tehran for four months support the view that there could be an opening on the Iranian front despite the angry rhetoric from Iran triggered by last week's new indictment of Iranian nuclear ambitions by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    Bush vigorously ruled out rewarding bad behavior by foreign adversaries in his first term. Saddam Hussein's manipulation of the international community was a driving force in Bush's labeling Iraq, along with North Korea and Iran, as irredeemably evil in 2002 and invading Iraq a year later.

    But now Bush countenances providing economic and diplomatic rewards to North Korea, and ultimately to Iran, to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of two regimes that behave as badly as anyone could want. The bravado of the first Bush term has been replaced by a sadder and quieter way of doing business abroad as Iraq has sapped U.S. capabilities and political cohesion.

    The sense of a U-turn is reinforced by Bush's reliance this time on the negotiating skills of his diplomatic corps and on European and Asian partners to reach, enforce and pay for the projected deals, which would serve as twin tombstones for a brief era of U.S. unilateralism.

    The change on North Korea is described by former administration officials as a strategic decision by the president to start "to pry the lid off" of that starving, tyrannized remnant of the Cold War by offering Pyongyang a path for peaceful change. Cooperation in the six-party negotiations would also help stabilize China's relations with Japan and the United States, in this view.

    The president reportedly surprised Chinese President Hu Jintao during their lunch at the White House last April by suggesting that, if the nuclear impasse could be resolved, the time was right for a formal peace treaty to end the Korean conflict. And when North Korea defied Chinese "advice" by conducting a nuclear test in October, China became more engaged in pulling Pyongyang back to the negotiating table.

    Unfortunately, Bush cannot rely on Russia to play a similarly helpful role with Iran. President Vladimir Putin seems willing to take enormous risks with global stability for short-term, largely commercial reasons. And divisions in Iran's leadership make the reaching of a "mutual suspension" accord -- under which Tehran will suspend enriching uranium in return for the suspension of U.N. sanctions -- more difficult.

    But U.S. and European policy should play on those divisions, which have visibly surfaced as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rants on in full-throated belligerence while officials closer to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, offer proposals that have the virtue at least of identifying the chief remaining obstacles to a deal.

    Last autumn, Iran's Ali Larijani told European Union negotiator Javier Solana that Iran could accept the Russian-E.U. proposal for an international consortium to enrich and reprocess nuclear fuel for Iran -- if the enrichment and reprocessing were done on Iranian soil.

    A diplomatic device known as a nonpaper (so its existence can be denied) and dated Oct. 1, 2006, describes a "gentlemen's agreement" by the two diplomats to use the proposal "to help open the way to negotiations." When I telephoned him in Berlin last week, Solana affably but deftly warded off questions about the nonpaper, then added: "Nothing has been agreed. Nothing has been put forward in formal terms."

    Precisely. The Iranian condition is unacceptable to Washington. But the fact that it was put forward at all suggests that the pressures generated by the U.S. Treasury's campaign to limit finance and export credits to Iran and condemnation by the United Nations are taking a toll on the Iranians -- as these tools did on North Korea.

    Bush seems to have decided to employ strategic patience in seeking a verifiable nuclear deal with North Korea and to have taken a long-range view of regional stability. He should do no less with Iran, however much manufactured outrage or contrived mockery it provokes, in Tehran or in Washington.
     

    Views on Iran

     
     
     
                                                       
     
     
                                                           Views on Iran
                                                          
     
    Amirahmadi, Hooshang
    •“The actions of the Quds Force are not necessarily ordered by Ayatollah Khamenei, and the supreme leader may not even get reports of all its actions, said Hooshang Amirahmadi, director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University. ‘The Iranian government is a very loose grouping of power centers,’ blurring lines of control and authority, he said. There have been past instances of actions by rogue intelligence officers that the Iranian government has disavowed. In 1999, for example, Iran’s Intelligence Ministry blamed rogue officers for the killings of five prominent critics of the government’s conservative wing. But Mr. Amirahmadi said he did not think the Iranian leadership should be allowed to sidestep responsibility for actions by its operatives in Iraq. ‘The Bush administration can’t say, ‘We have a C.I.A., but we don’t control it,’ he said, adding that the same rules should apply to Tehran.”

    Berman, Ilan
    •“Financial pressure by the U.S. and other Western governments in recent weeks is beginning to have a real impact, chilling investment into Iran's energy sector and ratcheting up the costs of the regime's atomic effort. But these gains are in danger of being erased, thanks to the growing economic partnership between Tehran and Beijing…U.S. policy must be geared toward making China and its economic fellow travelers aware of the gravity of the unfolding Iranian nuclear crisis -- and providing them with the political rationale to make the right choices about partnership with Tehran. Raising the costs for China to do business in the Islamic Republic seems like a very good place to start.” Ilan Berman, “A Dangerous Partnership” Wall Street Journal (22 February 2007). Mr. Berman, vice president for policy at the American Foreign Policy Council, is the author of "Tehran Rising: Iran's Challenge to the United States" (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) and editor of the forthcoming "Taking on Tehran" (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007)

    Boston Globe
    •“The Sunni Arab regimes now share with Israel a mounting anxiety about Iran's cresting influence. That's why the Saudis brought Abbas and Hamas leaders to Mecca, why they are reviving the Arab League peace plan that they first proposed in 2002, and why Israeli diplomats no longer criticize the Saudis in public. Rice's mission is to seize upon this confluence of interests and see to it that Israelis and Palestinians do not miss yet another historic opportunity to negotiate a just two-state solution to their conflict.” “Rice's Road to Jerusalem” Boston Globe (18 February 2007)

    Brookes, Peter
    •“…how did Iranian weapons...get into Iraqi hands? Possibility 1: Black market…Possibility 2: Rogue elements…Possibility 3: The Iranian government…So what can be done? First, the president…did put Iran on notice that we know it's involved, leaving Tehran to think the worst. If it's smart, Tehran will move to curtail the arms shipments - whether it's directly behind them or not. But don't hold your breath. Moreover, shedding light on the subject might bring additional international pressure on Iran, which is already wincing from the U.N. sanctions against its banks over its defiance on its nuclear program. Of course, pressing the intelligence offensive is critical, too. Interdicting shipments at the border, seizing arms caches and collapsing sites in Iraq, where such weapons as EFP are sometimes assembled from Iranian kits, are key. And while the smugglers are secondary to stopping the weapons' use, cracking down on Iranian intelligence/security personnel inside Iraq, especially the fanatical Quds forces that are training, funding, directing and arming Shia militias, must also be a priority. The administration has broadly pointed a finger in the direction of Iran but (rightly) has held off on laying the blame at someone's feet until there is more damning information.” Peter Brookes, “Iran's Iraq Meddling” New York Post (21 February 2007). Peter Brookes, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is a senior fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation.

    Burns, Nicholas
    •“We are convinced that sooner or later the cost to Iran of its isolation are going to be so profoundly important to them, destructive to their economic potential, that they are going to have to come to the negotiating table.” Brookings Institution (14 February 2007)

    •“We are convinced that sooner or later the costs will be so high that they [the Iranians] will have to come to the negotiating table,’ said Nicholas Burns, the State Department's point man on Iran. ‘I don't believe a conflict with Iran is inevitable…We've got time.’…‘This is not a monolithic government’ in Iran, Mr. Burns said last week in a speech at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank.” Wall Street
    Journal (20 February 2007)

    •“We, over the last two years, have supported, first, the European effort to negotiate with the Iranians to convince them not to become a nuclear weapons power. When Ahmadinejad unilaterally walked out of those talks with the Europeans in September of 2005, we then put together an alliance of the major European countries, Russia and China. And we have offered them a choice: You can negotiate with us, as Secretary Rice said again today when she was in Berlin -- she would be at the negotiations with the Iranian foreign minister if they accept our terms, the P5 terms -- You can negotiate with us, but if you refuse to negotiate, you're going to be sanctioned and we're going to raise the cost to you of what you're trying to do on the nuclear front, which is exactly what's happening. You've now seen this extraordinary set of moves over the last two or three months, which have put the Iranians on their back foot. The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned two Iranian banks. They no -- can no longer deal in dollar transactions. The European Union has reduced their export credits from 18 billion to a significantly lower number. You've seen three major European banks decide they're not going to do business with Iran at all. I think Iran's worried about the reaction of the financial markets. We've seen the United State deploy two carrier battle groups to the Gulf -- not in the provocative way, not meant to provoke any kind of military conflict with Iran, but to show the Iranians there are limits on what the Iranians will do to flex their muscles in the Middle East. I think the Iranians are now clearly on the defensive. They're clearly isolated. They have four friends in the world: Syria, Belarus, Venezuela, and Cuba. And with friends like that -- and you have countries like Egypt and Brazil and India voting against Iran in the IAEA Board of Governors -- I think we've created the kind of diplomatic pincer movement -- diplomatic construct that is going to drive the Iranian government to the negotiating table. And that's our hope, because we do have a certain faith that this patient, long-term application of diplomacy can succeed, and we do not think a military conflict with Iran is either desirable or inevitable.” Atlantic Council (21 February 2007)

    Byman, Daniel L.
    •“…we can't understand what Iran is up to without an appreciation for its broader Iraq strategy, which goes well beyond Tehran's desire to undermine U.S. policy. Iranian leaders calculate that they will need formidable proxies should the United States leave, and indeed Iran will face many challenges in Iraq if U.S. forces depart. So why would Iran arm Iraqis and perhaps direct attacks on U.S. forces? For most Iranians, Iraq is an emotional issue…They empathize with their fellow Shiites in Iraq…Iran worries about the United States…Iran perceives itself as surrounded. The United States has repeatedly made threats against the Iranian regime, has refused to surrender anti-regime Iranian terrorists found in Iraq, organized international economic pressure on the country, led a diplomatic effort to deny Iran the right to develop nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, and pointedly included military force against Iran as an option after dispatching two aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf region-- hostile steps, in Iranian eyes, that reinforce paranoia. Tehran does not want the secular and pro-Western Iraq that America dreams of, and it wants to ensure that the U.S. doctrine of preventive regime change is dead. So far, developments in Iraq have worked out in Iran's favor -- indeed, Iran appears to be the one state that is winning this war…Iran is less nervous than it was in 2003, but it remains understandably anxious…Instability in Iraq could lead to waves of refugees returning to Iran, as happened during the Iran-Iraq war, and could excite unrest among Iran's Kurdish and Arab populations. Expecting an American withdrawal sooner or later, Iran wants to prepare for a postwar era by maximizing its influence now…Many Iranian leaders, particularly the president and the emerging conservative political elite, are profoundly anti-American. They want the United States to fail in Iraq and elsewhere, and they share an ideological bond with many radical Iraqi groups…Other Iranian elites have more complex feelings about the United States, though none is favorable, and Iranians want to bury the doctrine of regime change…Ironically, Iran's long-term position could weaken when the United States draws down its forces. At first, the U.S. withdrawal will expand the power vacuum and Iran will try to fill it, but the limited chaos Iran foments can easily become uncontrolled. Iran's economic and military power is limited, and Iran's theocratic model of governance has little appeal for most Iraqis. Even many Shiite militants have at times been hostile to Iran, and respected moderates such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani are careful to maintain their distance from Tehran. Sunnis already rage against perceived Iranian dominance. In a postwar environment, Tehran will have lost a lever against U.S. pressure and may find itself both overextended and vulnerable in Iraq -- a weakness that the United States might exploit in years to come.” Daniel L. Byman, “What Tehran Is Really Up To” Washington Post (18 February 2007). Daniel L. Byman is director of Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center.

    Chicago Tribune
    •“Has it already been 60 days since the UN Security Council slapped some weak sanctions on Iran and issued a deadline for it to shut down its nuclear program? How quickly the time passes. That deadline expired Wednesday without any signs that Iran is changing course. Just the opposite. Iran has been busy expanding its nuclear efforts…So now the feckless diplomatic dance resumes…There will be talks on further Security Council sanctions, discussions on new ultimatums and fresh deadlines. But don't look for any serious action. Russia and China are likely to shield Iran, their close trading partner and source of energy, from harsh measures. There is, however, some encouraging evidence that Iran is feeling the squeeze from a U.S.-led campaign of economic, diplomatic and military pressure. The latest blow: India, a longtime ally of Tehran, announced that it has banned the export to Iran of all material, equipment and technology that could contribute to Iran's nuclear program. The U.S. also is adding more Iranian companies to the list of those under sanction. Even with a deluge of oil wealth, Iran's economy is weak…And there are hopeful signs that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's political opposition is coalescing. The price Iran is paying for international defiance is growing. But to stop its nuclear ambitions, that price needs to grow steeper--fast.” “Defying another Deadline” Chicago Tribune (22 February 2007)

    Clawson, Patrick
    • “But by all accounts, the imperfect nature of American intelligence agencies’ reporting on Iran makes certain conclusions difficult to reach. ‘I just don’t think we have a very acute understanding of the internal workings of the regime in Iran,’ said Patrick Clawson, an Iran expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.” New York Times (17 February 2007)

    Cockburn, Andrew
    •“President Bush has now definitively stated that bombs known as explosively formed penetrators — EFPs, which have proved especially deadly for U.S. troops in Iraq — are made in Iran and exported to Iraq. But in November, U.S. troops raiding a Baghdad machine shop came across a pile of copper disks, 5 inches in diameter, stamped out as part of what was clearly an ongoing order. This ominous discovery, unreported until now, makes it clear that Iraqi insurgents have no need to rely on Iran as the source of EFPs.” Andrew Cockburn, “In Iraq, Anyone Can Make a Bomb” Los Angeles Times (16 February 2007). Andrew Cockburn is the author of ‘Rumsfeld, His Rise, Fall and Catastrophic Legacy,’ published this month by Scribner.

    Diehl, Jackson
    •“For 22 years Prince Bandar bin Sultan wheeled and dealed his way through Washington as Saudi Arabia's ambassador…In the past month Bandar has held three meetings with the Iranian national security chief, Ali Larijani…He helped broker this month's Palestinian accord on a unity government as well as a Saudi-Iranian understanding to cool political conflict in Lebanon. And he's been talking with the most senior officials of the Iranian and U.S. governments about whether there's a way out of the standoff over Iran's nuclear weapons. Can Bandar bail the United States out of the multiple crises it has stumbled into in the Middle East? Maybe not, but Washington's old friend may be one of the best bets a desperate Bush administration has going at the moment…In his last visit to Washington he offered a rosy report on his travels. Iran, he assured his American friends, had been taken aback by President Bush's recent shows of strength in the region, by the failure of his administration to collapse after midterm elections and by the unanimous passage of a U.N. resolution imposing sanctions on Tehran for failing to stop its nuclear program. The mullahs, he said, were worried about Shiite-Sunni conflict spreading from Iraq around the region, and about an escalating conflict with the United States; they were interested in tamping both down…If he can find a way to broker a deal that stops the Iranian nuclear program, and kick-starts a strategic dialogue between Tehran and Washington, it will be his greatest feat of all.” Jackson Diehl, “Can a Saudi Dealmaker Rescue Bush?” Washington Post (19 February 2007). Jackson Diehl is deputy editorial page editor of The Post. He is an editorial writer specializing in foreign affairs and writes a biweekly column that appears on Mondays.

    Edwards, John
    •“Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards criticized the Bush administration on Sunday for failing to engage directly with Iran to resolve problems with the Iraq war and Iran’s effort to develop nuclear weapons. ‘It’s a huge strategic mistake not to be dealing directly with Iran,’ Edwards told the Associated Press in an interview before a campaign event in Dubuque. ‘What we should be doing with Iran, both on the Iraq issue and the nuclear issue, is being much smarter than we’re being now. We have tools available to us to engage them.’…Edwards said Bush’s reluctance to open diplomatic lines with Iran and Syria was costing the United States in its efforts to stabilize Iraq. The former North Carolina senator said the U.S. and its European allies have the leverage and resources to enlist Iran’s cooperation. ‘The way for America to engage them on this issue is to use the economic tools available…to make it clear if they are willing to give up their nuclear weapons we are willing to make nuclear fuel available to them,’ he told the AP. Edwards said the United States should offer a serious package of economic incentives and make it public, ‘so the Iranian people, who have not been historically anti-American, know that we’ve made this offer...and hopefully drive a deeper wedge between a radical leader (Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) and his own people.” Associated Press (19 February 2007)

    Gate, Robert M.
    •“We know that the Quds force is involved. We know the Quds force is a paramilitary arm of the [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)], so we assume that the leadership of the IRGC knows about this,’ Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told reporters. ‘Whether or not more senior political leaders in Iran know about it, we don't know,’ he said. ‘And frankly, for me, either way it's a worry. Either they do know and have approved it, or they don't know and the IRGC may be acting on their own in Iraq." Washington Times (16 February 2007)

    Gottemoeller, Rose
    •“From time to time, the Russians get fed up with the Iranians’ and work slows, Rose Gottemoeller, the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, said in a telephone interview. ‘The Russians have been very canny in using the Bushehr project to back up their diplomacy’ by modulating the construction schedule, she said.” New York Times (20 February 2007)

    Greenway, H.D.S.
    •“With carrier battle groups crowding the Persian Gulf, and with the Bush administration beating the battle drum to a degree not heard since the buildup to the Iraq war, one can only conclude that either this is a demonstration of coercive diplomacy par excellence, or that the United States is going to attack Iran…Perhaps the Bush administration still thinks regime change is the answer, that a military strike would topple the rotten Tehran regime like the proverbial house of cards…As Congress debates and considers what to do about Iraq, the shadow of a far greater foreign policy mistake hovers over Iran. Optimists hope that Bush will stick to Winston Churchill's maxim that jaw, jaw is better than war, war. But pessimists fear that the administration's heart is more with Otto von Bismarck who said that ‘the great questions of our time are not decided by speeches and majority decisions…but by iron and blood.” H.D.S. Greenway, “Renunciation of Reality” Boston Globe (20 February 2007). H.D.S. Greenway's column appears regularly in the Globe.

    Hanson, Victor D.
    •“Most international observers agree on two things about this loony theocracy that promises to take the world down with it: We should not yet bomb Iran, and it should not get the bomb. Yet the former forbearance could well ensure the latter reality. What, then, should the United States do other than keep offering meaningless platitudes about ‘dialogue’ and ‘talking’? Imagine Iran is a hardboiled egg with a thin shell. We should tap it lightly wherever we can -- until tiny fissures join and shatter the shell. We can begin to do this by pushing international accords and doggedly ratcheting up the weak United Nations sanctions. Even if they don't do much to Iran in any significant way, the resolutions seem to enrage Mr. Ahmadinejad. And when he rages at the United Nations, he only loses further support, especially in the Third World. We should start another fissure by prodding the European Union, presently Iran's chief trading partner, to be more vocal and resolute in pressuring Iran…Americans should continue to support Iranian dissidents…we should announce in advance that we don't want any bases in Iran, that we don't want its oil, and that we won't send American infantry there. That would pre-empt the tired charges of imperialism and colonialism. The United States also must stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan.…we need to remind the Gulf monarchies that a nuclear Shi'ite theocracy is far more dangerous to them than either the U.S. or Israel -- and that America's efforts to contain Iran depend on their own to rein in Wahhabis in Iraq….We must continue to make clear that Israel is a sovereign nation with a perfect right to protect itself…Americans must conserve energy, gasify coal, diversify fuels, drill more petroleum and invent new energy sources. Only that can collapse the world price of petroleum…when oil is $30 a barrel, Mr. Ahmadinejad will be despised by his own masses, who will become enraged as state-subsidized food and gas skyrocket, and scarce Iranian petrodollars are wasted on Hezbollah and Hamas. None of these taps alone will fracture Iran and stop it from going nuclear. But all of them together might well crack Mr. Ahmadinejad's thin shell before he gets the bomb. So let's start tapping.” Victor Davis Hanson, “Tapping Ahmadinejad's Egg” Washington Times (17 February 2007). Victor Davis Hanson is a nationally syndicated columnist and a classicist and historian at Stanford University's Hoover Institution and author of "A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War."

    Kemp, Geoffrey
    •“The director of regional strategic programs at the Nixon Center, Geoffrey Kemp, said yesterday that he does not think America will win its fight for an additional U.N. Security Council resolution. Mr. Kemp did say, however, that he thinks the pressure from America will continue as it enlists more European and Japanese support for financial isolation and sanctions. ‘I think the report will enhance our determination to go to the Japanese and the Europeans to do more,’ he said. ‘I think they will say there is a lot of evidence that the Iranians are worried about sanctions and are hurting from sanctions, and if you do what we've been doing for the last 10 years, then this will affect their program." New York Sun (21 February 2007)

    Levitt, Matthew
    •“The question of the day is how to avoid military confrontation with Iran while confronting the Islamic Republic over its nuclear program, its support for terrorist groups and its involvement in improvised explosive device (IED) networks in Iraq. U.S. officials are pressing their European counterparts to discourage investment and financial transactions with Iran, to stop export credit guarantee programs for companies doing business in Iran and to work with the private sector to deny Iran access to outside financial services. But while Washington has enjoyed some success reaching out to the public sector -- several banks have ended or restricted dollar transactions with Tehran -- both European governments and the European Union (EU) have demurred, asserting their preference for implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737, passed in December. And therein lies the answer. The most robust and effective non-military tool available to the international community is to apply Resolution 1737 in full…by virtue of listing the overall head of the IRGC (and the head of its air force), the U.N. empowered -- a strict reading suggests it requires -- member states to freeze IRGC funds and financial assets. And while they have been skittish over employing unilateral sanctions, EU leaders have strongly backed the enforcement of UNSCR 1737…the IRGC is precisely the element within Iran that should be targeted…Applying targeted financial measures against the IRGC represents the kind of regime-hostile, people-friendly sanction that punishes those engaged in offensive behavior without harming the average Iranian citizen…As the Feb. 21 deadline nears for Iranian compliance with international demands for a halt to Tehran's uranium enrichment program, European capitals should already be considering not if but how to apply targeted financial measures focused on the IRGC.” Matthew Levitt, “Target Iranian Forces” Washington Times (16 February 2007). Matthew Levitt is a senior fellow and director of the Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

    Luttwak Edward N.
    •“The analysts said unrest in Iran was more likely a reflection of the ethnic nationalism that is creating conflict in multiethnic nations across the globe, including the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia and Spain. ‘We're living in a period in history when multinational states break up. And why should Iran be the exception?’ said Edward N. Luttwak, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. ‘I'd be very surprised if the level of violence by the Kurds and the Baluch doesn't increase, or indeed if the Sunni Arabs in [Khuzestan] stop agitating. It's a natural thing,’ he said.” Los Angeles Times (19 February 2007)

    Lyons, James
    •“The deployment of 21,500 U.S. combat troops to Iraq is not sufficient by itself to accomplish our objectives. That goal can only be achieved through an overarching strategy designed to bring an ultimate stability to the region…we must be multifaceted, flexible, nimble and quick-witted. Capable, in other words, of adapting quickly so as to keep the enemy off-balance…11 members of the elite IRGC -- Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps -- were recently killed in southeastern Iran. The militant Sunni group Jundallah has claimed responsibility. There is palpable unrest in many Iranian cities and home-grown sabotage is damaging Tehran's oil-producing capabilities. Certainly, these are all good efforts. But more needs to done in order to complete an overarching strategy. For example, we now have hard evidence about the origin of many of the sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that have caused heavy casualties to our coalition forces. There is no surprise here: They come from Iran. Reportedly, some of these deadly IEDs are produced at a munitions complex in the Nobonyad neighborhood, in north Tehran's Lavigan district. Within this complex is a company called Sattari that specializes in making IEDs and receives many of its orders from the IRGC's Quds Force. The Sattari Co. needs to be eliminated. There are several viable tactical options available to accomplish this objective without putting any U.S. forces in harm's way. Furthermore, as part of an overarching strategy we should also review our support for opposition groups within Iran. For example, taking the Mujahideen-al Khalq (MEK) off the State Department's terror list would send a definite signal to Tehran, especially if the MEK were suddenly funded and equipped. Make no mistake, the MEK is no friend of America. In the past, they have targeted Americans. However, the MEK and other home-grown Iranian insurgent groups are fully capable of carrying out specific missions that would require the mullahs in Tehran to divert their attention and more importantly their economic and political resources from mischief-making in Iraq, their support for such terrorist groups as Hezbollah, their goal of hegemony in the Persian Gulf region, and their attempts to gain logistical beachheads in South and Central America by allying themselves with anti-U.S. leaders such as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Cuba's Fidel and Raul Castro. Iran's hand has been exposed. We must now be ruthless in pursuing our objectives so an overarching strategy to stabilize the region can be achieved.” James Lyons, “An Overarching Strategy” Washington Times (22 February 2007). James Lyons, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, was commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, senior U.S. military representative to the U.N. and deputy chief of naval operations, where he was principal adviser on all Joint Chiefs of Staff matters.

    Milani, Abbas
    •“The Quds Force ‘is the handpicked elite of an already elite ideological army,’ said Abbas Milani, director of Iranian studies at Stanford University. As part of the Revolutionary Guard, the force officially answers to the supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and not the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad…But the Quds Force is cloaked in secrecy inside Iran and is the subject of considerable guesswork from scholars in the United States, who in interviews this week offered estimates of its size ranging from 3,000 to 50,000 men. The true number, along with details of the strength and budget of the entire Revolutionary Guard, is hidden even from the Iranian Parliament, said Mr. Milani, according to legislators he has spoken with.” New York Times (17 February 2007)

    Nasr, Vali
    •“Some specialists even question whether the Quds Force exists as a formal unit clearly delineated from the rest of the Revolutionary Guard. ‘It could be that anyone with an intelligence role in the Revolutionary Guard is just called Quds,’ said Vali R. Nasr, who studies Iran and political Islam at the Naval Postgraduate School.” New York Times (17 February 2007)

    Pace, Peter
    •“
    Marine Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, qualified earlier comments that he doubted high-level Iranian government linkage to special armor-piercing bombs and rockets found in Iraq. ‘What I tried to say when I said I didn't know about the Iranian government, I'm talking about the top two or three people in the government,’ Gen. Pace said, noting that ‘we do not have proof that the senior leadership in Iran is directing these activities in Iraq.’ The level of Iranian government involvement is secondary to the danger the arms pose to U.S. and coalition forces, he said. ‘We know that there are explosives and weapons being used inside of Iraq that were manufactured in Iran,’ Gen. Pace said. Also, on two occasions during operations to attack networks supplying improvised bombs, ‘we had policed up Iranians,’ he said. ‘We know that those Iranians are Quds force members. Those are facts." Washington Times (16 February 2007)

    Pelosi, Nancy
    •“In an interview on Thursday, the speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, said the United States could not invade Iran without specific Congressional authority. ‘The president has said that he supports a diplomatic solution of the situation in Iran,’ Ms. Pelosi said, speaking to six reporters in her office. ‘I would take him at his word. I do believe that Congress should assert itself, though, and make it very clear that there is no previous authority for any president to go into Iran.” New York Times (16 February 2007)

    Rice, Condoleezza
    •“In May of last year we offered, the Bush Administration offered, to reverse 27 years of American policy to engage in the context of the six with our Iranian counterparts,’ she told reporters. ‘I've said I would meet my Iranian counterpart anyplace, anywhere, anytime should the Iranians decide to suspend their activities. And so that and the fact that there is a very positive package that the six countries have put together that should incent Iran to engage in a positive way with the international community. I think we're all still hopeful that the day is going to come when the Iranians decide to pursue that course, rather than one of confrontation.”
    Time (21 February 2007)
    •“In Berlin, Rice said that the United States is considering seeking another U.N. resolution, but no decision has been made. The United States remains hopeful, she said, that Iran will take up the EU offer to negotiate and accept the package of economic incentives offered in June 2006.‘The point of Security Council action has always been to try to get to a negotiating track,’ the secretary said. ‘The idea is not that somehow the sanctions will...produce the desired result. We would like to do that in negotiations. The hope is that the sanctions show the Iranians the isolation that they are enduring, that isolation is likely to increase over time and that it's time to take a different course,’ she said. ‘The Iranian regime often talks about its right to a civil nuclear program,’ Rice said. ‘In fact, the United States has supported the idea that the Russians have of a consortium...so the notion that we would deny Iran a civil nuclear program is just not true." usinfo.state.gov (22 February 2007)

    Rubin, Michael and Pletka, Danielle
    •“Iran faces a deadline today to suspend its enrichment of uranium or, according to the terms of a U.N. Security Council resolution unanimously adopted last December, face further sanctions…Why not talk? The logic of engagement sounds good. But experience shows that engagement means something different in Iran than in the West…Iran's exploitation of engagement to advance its agenda is the rule rather than the exception…Western efforts to game the Iranian system…misunderstand the nature of politics in the Islamic Republic. Politicians rise and fall, but the supreme leader's authority remains supreme…Still, the Iranian government is not monolithic, and many academics argue that outreach to more pragmatic factions might encourage them at the hardliners' expense…On key issues relating to nuclear enrichment and terror sponsorship, their differences are rhetorical, not substantive…Despite the Iranian government's unified commitment to forge ahead with the nuclear program, some Western observers persist in their belief that the Islamic Republic is searching for a graceful way back from the brink. They point to mounting economic hardship inside Iran and a backlash against President Ahmadinejad's demagoguery. Couldn't engagement empower his critics? This makes no sense. Dialogue and the attendant relaxation of U.N. sanctions will strengthen and validate the Ahmadinejad regime. Far from being susceptible to Western machinations, the Iranians have proven adept at manipulating us…Proposals for renewed engagement may be well-intentioned, but they are naïve and dangerous, and indeed will undercut any possibility of a diplomatic solution…The 60-day deadline to comply with U.N. demands is up, so what next?...The Security Council has spoken. To change course now would signal the impotence of international institutions and multilateral diplomacy. History shows that when the supreme leader believes Western resolve is faltering, Iran will be more defiant and dangerous. Now is not the time to talk. If Washington and Europe truly believe in the primacy of multilateralism and diplomacy, now is the time to ratchet up the pressure.” Michael Rubin and Danielle Pletka, “Table Talk” Wall Street Journal (21 February 2007). Ms. Pletka and Mr. Rubin are, respectively, vice president for foreign policy and defense studies and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

    Shatz, Adam
    •“Eager to redeem themselves for the generally obsequious reporting about Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction and ties to Al Qaeda, journalists don't want to get fooled again as the administration lays the groundwork for a possible war against Iran. But even though journalists have quite rightly raised questions about the credibility of the intelligence and the motives behind its release, they have failed to take the next step and examine the fundamental underlying premise behind the administration's accusations: that Iran's role in Iraq is inappropriate…The liberal mainstream has come to view the Iraq war as the greatest foreign policy disaster since Vietnam, but its faith in American virtue — its belief in American exceptionalism — remains as unshaken as the Bush administration's. In the narrow parameters of American politics, you can ask whether Bush is telling the truth about Iranian designed bombs, but you may not ask whether the United States would accept the presence of 130,000 Iranian troops on our border. Nor may you ask who exactly is ‘meddling’ in Mesopotamia.” Adam Shatz, “Why Iran ‘Meddles’ in Iraq” Los Angele Times (18 February 2007). Adam Shatz is literary editor of the Nation.

    Wall Street Journal
    •“On the record, Europe claims to be as concerned as America about a nuclear-armed Iran. The record also shows, however, that Europe's biggest countries do a booming business with the Islamic Republic. And so far for the Continentals, manna trumps security…In the absence of an official embargo against Tehran, private EU companies have sought commercial opportunities in Iran. But the real story here is that these businesses are subsidized by European taxpayers. Government-backed export guarantees have fueled the expansion in trade. That, in turn, has boosted Iran's economy and -- indirectly by filling government coffers with revenues -- its nuclear program…The Europeans aren't simply facilitating business between private companies. The vast majority of Iranian industry is state-controlled, while even private companies have been known to act as fronts for the country's nuclear program. EU taxpayers underwrite trade and investment that would otherwise be deterred by the risks of doing business with a rogue regime. It's also hard not to see a connection between Europe's commercial interests and its lenient diplomacy…Europe's governments continue to resist U.S. calls for financial sanctions, and the German Chamber of Commerce recently estimated that tougher economic sanctions would cost 10,000 German jobs…The EU continues to provide a shield for its business interests in Iran, and thus a lifeline to a regime that is unpopular at home and sponsors terror abroad.” “Europe and the Mullahs” Wall Street Journal (20 February 2007)

    Washington Post
    •“President Bush’s actions toward Iran are consistent with two very different underlying strategies. Both start with a correct reading of Iran's behavior at home and in the region as dangerous to U.S. interests and to the prospects for peace and democracy in the Middle East. Both mix pressure -- economic, rhetorical, military -- with diplomatic overtures. In one scenario, these are employed with the hope of success. In the other they are employed with the hope of success but an expectation of failure, in which case military force would be brought to bear with a justification that every other reasonable approach had been tried. We have seen no evidence that the administration has Option B in mind, but it's plausible enough to merit stating that such a course for this president would be folly…The international coalition the administration has painstakingly assembled to pressure Iran seems to be having some effect on the mullahs; it should be maintained and strengthened. U.S. financial pressure and assurances of support to Iran's neighbors also are appropriate. All of these might have a greater chance of working…if the administration also remained open to diplomatic overtures, at least in a regional context. That, and not secret military plans, is the missing component of U.S. strategy right now.” “The Iran Options” Washington Post (18 February 2007)

    Washington Times
    •“In recent weeks, Iran has defied coherent discussion in Washington, particularly as it relates to Tehran's efforts to subvert the elected government in Iraq, where the lives of nearly 140,000 American troops are on the line. The Bush administration has botched its handling of the issue, first promising to release information documenting in detail Tehran's malevolent role in Iraq, and then it didn't…Prominent Democratic politicians have behaved shamefully…party leaders including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and presidential candidates Hillary Clinton, Joseph Biden and John Edwards, have faulted the administration for failing to negotiate with Tehran (as if that hadn't been tried time and again) and warning of dire consequences if it attacked Iran without congressional approval…While the degree to which the most senior officials in Tehran are directly involved in the killing and maiming of American soldiers in Iraq remains a reasonable subject of debate, the evidence suggests that Iran's hands are anything but clean…The most benign interpretation of what is currently taking place is that some people affiliated with Iran's security establishment have been powerful enough to send weapons and people across the border to foment violence -- regardless of whether they have been directly ordered to do so by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. None of this occurs in a vacuum; Iraq is one of many places where Iran is working to destabilize the Middle East and damage U.S. interests. In Lebanon the Iranian-backed terrorist organization Hezbollah, which last summer plunged Lebanon into war with Israel, put its cadres in the streets of Beirut to bring down the Lebanese government. Along with its ally Syria, Iran has funnelled assistance to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and an amalgamation of terrorist groups called the Popular Resistance Committees, who are using the West Bank and Gaza to attack Israel. Jordan accuses Hamas operatives of planning to carry out operations there. Iran's subversion of Iraq is but one part of a much darker picture.” “Time to Take Iran Seriously” Washington Times (19 February 2007)
     
     
     

    US Senator Hagel Speech On U.S.-Iran Relations

     
     
     
     
     
    US Senator Hagel Speech On U.S.-Iran Relations
    HAGEL SPEECH ON U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
    NEBRASKA AT KEARNEY'S CONFERENCE ON WORLD AFFAIRS


    February 22, 2007

    KEARNEY, NE - Below is the text of the speech United States Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) delivered today on U.S. - Iran relations at the University of Nebraska at Kearney's James E. Smith Conference on World Affairs.

    It is an honor for me to be here today at one of Nebraska's most important and prestigious institutions. For over 100 years, UNK has provided opportunities for Nebraska's young people and prepared them to be successful and productive citizens. I attended Kearney State in 1965 and my nephew, Josh Hagel, is currently a student at UNK, although Josh's grade point average is much better than mine.

    In my eleven years in the Senate, I've had several UNK graduates on my staff and serve as interns in my offices. In fact, my State Director, Todd Wiltgen...the Director of my Kearney office, Julie Brooker...and Jared Blanton in my press office in Washington, DC...are all Kearney natives and UNK graduates. All have served Nebraska with commitment and distinction and I am grateful for their good work.
    Thank you for inviting me to the James E. Smith Conference on World Affairs. This Conference has been a source of pride for UNK and Nebraska since it was initiated in 1964. The three goals of the Conference: to introduce important global issues to the students and local community; to expose conference participants to a variety of viewpoints from other countries; and to promote international education...are more important today than at any time in our history. When I attended Kearney State in 1965, the world was far less complicated than it is today. But the world's new challenges offer us historic new opportunities. If the world is to successfully meet these new challenges, it will require a deep and clear understanding of the world in which we are all competing. That is the value of this conference. Information and shared understanding enhance our understanding and prepare us to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.

    I want to speak today about a subject that I know is very much on the minds of Americans...and the world...America's relationship with the Middle East and in particular Iran. This relationship is at the center of some of the most important strategic challenges that America faces today and in the future...energy security...America's relationship with the Islamic world...and the future of the greater Middle East. Many of the world's historic and vital interests intersect in the Middle East.

    Today, the Middle East is more combustible and dangerous than any time in modern history. It is experiencing political upheaval driven by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, religious and ethnic differences, radical Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, despair and the war in Iraq.

    Forces and events in the Middle East cannot be neatly categorized. The swirl of Middle East history creates layers upon layers of complexity. There is little transparency in the Middle East. That is a reality that is inescapable and cannot be assumed away. To ignore this reality is to risk being trapped by false choices....false choices such as the question, which is worse -Iran with nuclear weapons or war with Iran?

    These are not our only choices in dealing with the Middle East and Iran. Diplomatic initiatives, UN mandates, regional cooperation, security frameworks, and economic incentives are part of the mix of international possibilities that must be employed to comprehensively address the challenges of the Middle East.

    We will fail to protect and advance America's interests - in the Middle East and around the world - if we allow ourselves to be trapped in a self-constructed world based not on reality but on flawed assumptions and flawed judgment leading to flawed policy and dangerous miscalculations.

    The United States must approach the Middle East with a clear understanding of the complexities of the region. Our strategic policies must be regional in scope...integrating Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, violent Islamic extremism, access to energy supplies, and political reform into a comprehensive policy equation. This should be developed through consultation, cooperation, and coordination with our regional allies Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Israel. This will require a new regional diplomatic and economic framework to work within...a new Middle East frame of reference.

    Secretary Rice's recent trip to the Middle East...her fourth trip in five months...is encouraging. However, the focus of the United States on the Middle East must be comprehensive, sustained, and at the highest levels of all the governments involved. This will require a new disciplined follow-through from the Bush Administration that we have not yet seen. I have suggested a Presidential Envoy be appointed to represent the President in the day-to-day bolting together of a Middle East peace process that can win the support of all parties involved.

    In the Middle East of the 21st Century, Iran will be a key center of gravity...a significant regional power. The United States cannot change that reality. America's strategic 21st century regional policy for the Middle East must acknowledge the role of Iran today and over the next 25 years.

    To acknowledge that reality in no way confuses Iran's dangerous, destabilizing and threatening behavior in the region. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism and provides material support to Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist groups. Iran publicly threatens Israel and is developing the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Iran has not helped stabilize the current chaos in Iraq and is responsible for weapons and explosives being used against U.S. and Iraqi military forces in Iraq.

    Iran must be held accountable for its actions. These actions by Iran are one part of a complicated picture of a country with a three thousand year history, governed by a complex and opaque political structure, burdened by a stagnating economy, and located in a geostrategically unstable region.

    As Tom Friedman described in his New York Times column last month, Iran is a country that regularly holds sort-of-free elections ...where women vote, hold office, are the majority of its university students, and are fully integrated in the work force ...and whose residents were among the very few in the Muslim world to hold spontaneous pro-U.S. demonstrations on September 11, 2001. Friedman is correct in his observation that,

    the hostility between Iran and the United States since the overthrow of the shah in 1979 is not organic. By dint of culture, history and geography, we actually have a lot of interests in common with Iran's people.

    Iran has cooperated with the United States on Afghanistan to help the Afghans establish a new government after the Taliban was ousted. Iran continues to invest heavily in the reconstruction of western Afghanistan.

    On Afghanistan, the United States and Iran found common interests - defeating the Taliban and Islamic radicals, stabilizing Afghanistan, stopping the opium production and flow of opium coming into Iran. From these common interests emerged common actions working toward a common purpose. It was in the interests of Iran to work with the U.S. in Afghanistan. It was not a matter of helping America or strengthening America's presence in Central Asia. It was a clear-eyed and self-serving action for Iran.

    Complex sets of factors drive the dynamics inside Iran as well as Iran's actions in the Middle East.

    Iran is not monolithic. Iran is governed by competing centers of power. The President and the parliament - known as the Majles - are elected. But it is the Supreme Council, lead by the Supreme Leader...currently Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei...who serves as the Commander in Chief and has formal authority over Iran's armed forces and foreign policy. Ayatollah Khamenei has the power to dismiss Iran's President. A separate elected body - the Assembly of Experts - selects...and has the power to dismiss...the Supreme Leader. Yet another body - the Council of Guardians - screens presidential and parliamentary candidates, and reviews laws passed by the Majles. A third body - the Expediency Council - arbitrates disputes between the Council of Guardians and the Majles. Finally, the principal government and clerical officials from all of these entities have a seat on the Supreme National Security Council.

    Power and influence in Iran evolve and shift...and are difficult to understand. Supreme Leader Khamenei did not support President Ahmadinejad's presidential bid. In December 2006, Ahmadinejad's supporters suffered major defeats in elections for municipal councils and the Assembly of Experts. Last month, an Iranian newspaper owned by Ayatollah Khamenei admonished Ahmadinejad to remove himself from the nuclear issue.

    Two-thirds of Iran's population is under the age of 30. Iran is undergoing a generational shift that will shape Iran's outlook...and its opinions of the United States...for decades to come. Iran's young people use the internet in large numbers, wear American jeans, listen to American music and are positive about America and the West. We do not want to lose this pro-American generation by turning them away from us. They are the hope of Iran. They bristle under the heavy yoke of the Ayatollahs' strident limitations of personal freedom.

    Our understanding of Iran is limited and incomplete. We have not had formal diplomatic relations with Iran for nearly three decades. Diplomatic contact at all levels is severely limited. We have no constructive military contact. Economic ties remain essentially severed as well. There is deep distrust and suspicion on both sides regarding intentions and motivations.

    Put simply, the United States and Iran do not know one another. This unfamiliarity, distrust, and lack of engagement risks producing disastrous consequences. When countries do not engage, the risk of misperception based on faulty judgments spawns uninformed and dangerous decisions.

    The United States needs to weigh very carefully its actions regarding Iran. In a hazy, hair-triggered environment, careless rhetoric and military movements that one side may believe are required to demonstrate resolve and strength...can be misinterpreted as preparations for military options. The risk of inadvertent conflict because of miscalculation is great.

    The United States must be cautious and wise not to follow the same destructive path on Iran as we did on Iraq. We blundered into Iraq because of flawed intelligence, flawed assumptions, flawed judgments, and questionable intentions.
    The United States must find a new regional diplomatic strategy to deal with Iran that integrates our regional allies, military power and economic leverage.
    As Ambassador Ryan Crocker, the President's nominee to be the next U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, responded last week to my question regarding Iran before the Senator Foreign Relations Committee,

    Iran should be engaged. He then went on to condition that engagement.
    As the 2006 Baker-Hamilton report on Iraq concluded, The United States should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues.

    As the 2004 Council on Foreign Relations report on Iran co-chaired by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski concluded, It is in the interests of the United States to engage selectively with Iran to promote regional stability, dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons, preserve reliable energy supplies, reduce the threat of terror, and address the 'democracy deficit' that pervades the Middle East as a whole.

    Our differences with Iran are very real. However, by refusing to engage Iran, we are perpetuating dangerous geo-political unpredictabilities. Our refusal to recognize Iran's influence does not decrease its influence, but rather increases it. Engagement creates dialogue and opportunities to identify common interests, demonstrate America's strengths, as well as make clear disagreements. Diplomacy is an essential tool in world affairs using it where possible to ratchet down the pressure of conflict and increase the leverage of strength.

    Last December, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki announced that his government would convene a regional conference to strengthen regional support for the stability and security of Iraq. All of Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria, as well as other key regional and international states and organizations should be encouraged to actively and constructively participate.

    A regional conference led by Iraq would be an opportunity for the United States to engage Iran, with an agenda that is open to all areas of agreement and disagreement.

    Last month, Dr. Abbas Milani, the co-Director of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institute, testified before the House Foreign Relations Committee, saying:
    The US should offer to negotiate with Iran on all the outstanding issues.

    Comprehensive negotiations are not a grand bargain. Instead such negotiations can offer Iran's leaders powerful inducements, such as a lifting the economic embargo and even establishing diplomatic ties. But contrary to the grand bargain suggestion, central to such negotiations must be the issue of the human rights of the Iranian people. Contrary to the masses of nearly all other Muslim nations, and contrary to the declining popularity of the US in the world, Iranian people are favorably disposed towards the United States. An offer of serious, frank discussions with the regime on all of these issues will, regardless of whether the regime accepts or rejects the offer, be a win-win situation for the United States, for the Iranian democrats and for the existing UN coalition against the regime's adventurism.

    There will be no stability in the Middle East until the broader interests of Iran, the region and the world are addressed.

    The United States must be resolute and clear-headed in our dealings with Iran....just as the Administration has been in the latest round of the Six Party Talks regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons. The agreement that Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill reached on February 13 with his colleagues from China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia reflects the power of adept diplomacy, supported through regional coordination, strengthened by financial pressure, and our military presence in South Korea, Japan and across the Asia-Pacific region.

    The United States must employ similar, wise statecraft to redirect deepening Middle East tensions toward a higher ground of resolution. We must be clear that the United States does not seek regime change in Iran. We must be clear that our objections are to the actions of the Iranian government...not the Iranian people. Our decisions to deploy a second carrier battlegroup and other military assets into the Persian Gulf as well as the decision to target Iranian military assistance flowing into Iraq should be coupled with a clear and credible commitment to diplomatically engage Iran. America must have a strategic and comprehensive Middle East framework of resolution using all the levers of influence available to the U.S. and its allies.

    The United States must be prepared to act boldly and exploit opportunities to re-frame our relationship with Iran. Engagement should not be limited to government-to-government contact...but rather find new and imaginative ways to reach out to the Iranian people. Part of that initiative could be offering to re-open a consulate in Tehran...not formal diplomatic relations...but a Consulate...to help encourage and facilitate people-to-people exchange. All nations of Europe and most of our allies in the Middle East and Asia have diplomatic relations with Iran.

    The failure of Iran to comply with yesterday's UN Security Council deadline to halt its uranium enrichment activities should be an opportunity for the United States to reaffirm and expand the international consensus to address Iran's nuclear program. The will of the international community gives credibility to its demands of Iran.
    As Dr. Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, wrote in the Washington Post last November:

    A diplomacy that excludes adversaries is a contradiction in terms...Diplomacy - especially with an adversary - can succeed only if it brings about a balance of interests...To evoke a more balanced view should be an important goal for U.S. diplomacy. Iran may come to understand sooner or later that, for the foreseeable future, it is a relatively poor developing country in no position to challenge all the industrialized nations. But such an evolution presupposes the development of a precise and concrete strategic and negotiating program by the United States and its associates.

    Without a wise and integrated strategy, we risk drifting into conflict with Iran.
    America's military might alone will not bring stability and security...to the Middle East. That is an enduring fact of international relations that the late President Ronald Reagan understood well.

    Throughout his eight years as President, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a global struggle, the Cold War. It was a war fought using containment, alliances, and political, diplomatic, economic and military power. Yet, nuclear war was averted and no shot was ever fired between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

    President Reagan was always clear and resolute that the Soviet Union was our foe....that deep, fundamental differences divided the United States and the Soviet Union. He referred to the Soviet Union as the evil empire.
    In a speech before the National Association of Evangelicals on March 8, 1983, President Reagan said:
    I urge you to beware the temptation of pride - the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault - to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.

    Yet it was President Reagan who, in 1986, almost reached an agreement with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to abolish nuclear weapons. President Reagan understood the need for America to engage...to understand our friends and our adversaries...to explore our options...to identify common interests. President Reagan understood that great powers engage because they are secure in their beliefs and purpose but humble and wise in their policies and actions.

    The United States must have a policy on Iran...on Iraq...on the broader Middle East...that the American people understand, and will trust and support. Our words and our actions must seek to make America more secure, and the world more peaceful and prosperous. The world must know that, like all sovereign nations, the United States will defend itself and its interests, but that military conflict will always be the last resort.

    The American people are deeply concerned about our direction in the Middle East. The American people expect and deserve a strategy that shows prospects for resolution. A U.S. military conflict with Iran would inflame the Middle East and global Muslim populations, crippling U.S. security, political, economic and strategic interests worldwide. I do not believe that the American people will believe that such an outcome improves America's security, stability and prosperity.

    America cannot sustain political, diplomatic, economic or military engagement in the Middle East without the support of the American people. The rising tensions with Iran, the chaos in Iraq, the enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict present a deepening crisis in the Middle East. America's policies must help lead the region out of the crisis. The American people increasingly understand this present and future danger.

    Today, some of America's own actions are undermining the very interests that we must protect and advance in the Middle East. A recent poll conducted by Zogby International in the countries of Arab allies...Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates...found that only twelve percent expressed favorable attitudes toward the United States. As David Ignatius wrote earlier this week in the Washington Post from a conference in Doha, Qatar, It isn't a tiny handful of people in the Arab world who oppose what America is doing. It's nearly everyone.

    If we lose our ability to influence outcomes in the Middle East, the consequences and implications for America and the world will be severe. We risk unstable energy supplies...growth in radical Islamic terrorism...increasing threats to Israel...and nuclear proliferation.

    We are living today at an historic transformational time in history. The great challenges of the 21st century will require U.S. leadership that is trusted and respected, not feared nor resented. America cannot project only military power. Inspirational leadership and confidence in America's purpose, not imposed power, will be essential for world peace. If we fail, we will lose the next generation in Iran and around the world. This would result in a far more dangerous world than any we have ever known.

    For the 21st Century, the U.S.-Iran relationship will frame the structure and dynamics of the Middle East. We must be sure of our actions and wise with our words. The prospects for peace that have eluded all nations of the Middle East for so long may be on the edge of a convergence of historic intersects. America can help shape the outcome with active and focused diplomacy...worthy of our heritage.
     

    Leaving the Options Open With Iran

     
     
     
     
     
                                       Leaving the Options Open With Iran - NY Times

    Feb. 24, 2007
    By DAVID E. SANGER

    WASHINGTON — As the Bush administration tries to rally allies to tighten sanctions on Iran yet again, it is sending mixed messages to Tehran about its commitment to a diplomatic solution, trying to create new openings for negotiations even while holding open, ever so vaguely, the possibility that the United States might some day resort to force.

    In Australia on Friday, Vice President Dick Cheney, one of the strongest advocates of pressing for a “regime change” in Iran, reiterated his belief that a diplomatic solution was possible. But Mr. Cheney noted that “the president has also made it clear that we haven’t taken any options off the table,” a phrase that President Bush frequently uses but has conspicuously avoided in recent weeks while discussing the issue.

    At the same time, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice restated her willingness to meet the Iranians anyplace to talk about anything as long as they first agree to stop producing nuclear fuel, even temporarily.

    White House officials insist that there is no contradiction.

    “The idea that we are ginning up another war — there is no evidence for that,” one senior administration official said Friday. The official added that Iran needed to know that it could not let negotiations drag on forever, and that any talk of military options was a signal that Washington would not negotiate endlessly while Tehran used the time to continue its work on uranium enrichment.

    But, so far, the White House has declined to say at what point the Iranians will have pushed the United States too far — in other words, how many working centrifuges in Iran would be too many, or at what point it would be impossible to guarantee that Iran could not achieve a “nuclear option,” the ability to turn ostensibly civilian nuclear facilities into bomb-making ones.

    For now, administration officials say, Mr. Bush is happy to leave the Iranians guessing. He ordered an additional aircraft carrier into waters within striking distance of Iran and its nuclear facilities last month, a step that senior officials say they believe took the Iranian leadership by surprise. He has issued warnings to the Iranians not to meddle in Iraq and has focused on intelligence findings that the most deadly bombs used against Americans in Iraq bear marks of Iranian origins.

    But Mr. Bush has denied that he is trying to provoke Iran into a response that would provide a pretext for direct confrontation. “To say it is provoking Iran is just a wrong way to characterize the commander in chief’s decision to do what is necessary to protect our soldiers in harm’s way,” Mr. Bush said at a news conference on Feb. 15, shortly after accusing Iranian forces, but not necessarily the country’s leadership, of worsening the violence in Iraq.

    In interviews in recent days, three administration officials, all of whom insisted on anonymity because they were speaking about a strategy still being developed, said the carrier movements, the accusations about weapons in Iraq and the use of sanctions against the government were all intended to provide Mr. Bush with some leverage in dealing with Iran.

    The officials have made little secret of their desire to fuel dissatisfaction inside Iran with the country’s fiery president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who on Friday vowed anew to continue enriching uranium, saying, “If we show weakness in front of the enemies, they will increase their expectations.”

    R. Nicholas Burns, the under secretary of state for policy and the lead negotiator on Iran, said Thursday that the multipronged approach was showing an effect. “We’ve roiled their government, and I think we’ve shocked them a bit,” he said.

    Mr. Burns is headed to London for a meeting on Monday with France, Germany, Britain, Russia and China about devising a new, tighter set of sanctions against the Iranian government — one that might include a further crackdown on export credits or conventional arms sales.

    Mr. Burns will undoubtedly run into more resistance from the Russians and the Chinese, who told American officials flatly in December that they would not put additional economic pressure on the Iranians. But Mr. Burns said he was not looking for a major escalation of sanctions, and other administration officials say that modest steps would be fine for now.

    “The most important thing about the last resolution was that we achieved a consensus, we kept the Russians and Chinese on board,” one senior administration official said. “And in the end, that’s what has serious impact in Iran.”

    Administration officials say that the need to hold that consensus together is overriding the differences on Iran that roiled the administration in its first term. Back in 2002 and 2003, when the prospect of a nuclear-capable Iran was more distant, the administration decided not to explore several offers through intermediaries to open discussions. Mr. Cheney and others argued that the success they anticipated in Iraq would chasten the Iranians, bringing them to the table on more favorable terms.

    Mr. Cheney, however, appears increasingly isolated now that many of his protégés have departed the Defense Department, the State Department and other corners of the administration. He was described by several top officials as only a minor player in the president’s decision in May to offer incentives to Iran if it agreed to suspend its fuel production.

    But the Iranians did not accept last year’s offer, and if the administration and the Europeans are unable to find a formula that works for all sides, the talk of military options is bound to persist.

    “No one has defined where the red line is that we can’t let the Iranians step over,” one senior official said. But Mr. Bush, the official said, is determined “not to let them get one lugnut turn away from having a bomb.”

    Some diplomats who are trying to bridge the differences between Washington and Tehran insist that Mr. Bush is going to have to give some ground. “To focus only on suspension in my view is not the right approach,” Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said early this week to The Financial Times.

    In Vienna on Friday, Dr. ElBaradei repeated his idea of a “time out” to allow talks, with Tehran halting uranium enrichment and the United Nations suspending sanctions. And he has consistently preferred to allow a modest amount of face-saving “research and development” in Iran, and focus instead on preventing the country from having an industrial capacity to produce nuclear fuel.

    So far, though, Mr. Bush has said that even that much nuclear knowledge cannot be allowed in a country he does not trust.


    Nazila Fathi contributed reporting from Tehran.
     

    US financial squeeze on Iran yields results

     

                                                     US financial squeeze on Iran yields results



    Simon Tisdall
    Tuesday February 13, 2007

                                                           ***********************************************
    Iran's weekend offer to resume nuclear negotiations, coupled with new flexibility over how and where future uranium enrichment trials may be conducted, represents the first clear evidence that domestic and international pressure on Tehran's hardliners is beginning to bear fruit.

    But the US military build-up in the Gulf, UN sanctions, or even Washington's latest Iraq "dossier", are not primarily responsible for this apparent shift: American meddling with the mullahs' money has been much more effective.

    Since imposing penalties last autumn on Iran's largest commercial bank, Bank Saderat, for allegedly transferring funds to Hizbullah and other "terrorist organisations", the US treasury and associated agencies have been spinning an expanding, entangling web of unilateral sanctions and other punitive measures around Iran's financial institutions and commercial enterprises.

    Where direct US regulatory enforcement is impossible, as with European businesses trading with Iran, American political, diplomatic and other pressures are proving to be almost equally effective.

    The unexpected success of similar action last year against a Macao bank used by North Korea's government appears to have provided a template for the US drive. Another big Iranian state-controlled bank, Bank Sepah, and its wholly owned UK subsidiary, was targeted last month. Washington accused the bank of being "the financial linchpin of Iran's missile procurement network", and off having links to a North Korean missile technology exporter.

    As in other cases, US entities and citizens were barred from dealing with the bank while assets under US jurisdiction were frozen. Officials said the US had also "shared information" with European and other allies and private sector businesses. There is speculation meanwhile that three other leading Iranian banks, Bank Melli, Bank Mellat and Bank Tejarat, may be targeted.

    Despite legal worries and concerns about "extra-territoriality" - attempts to apply US laws beyond US shores - European governments are being urged to curtail all types of business with Iran, including commodities and manufacturing. This goes far beyond the measures agreed in December by the UN security council and approved by EU foreign ministers yesterday.

    Further limited UN sanctions will follow if Iran misses the next UN compliance deadline later this month - but again, the scope of Washington's action remains far greater.

    Unlike the US, which has almost no bilateral trade, the EU is Iran's top trading partner, with business worth $25bn (£12.8bn) last year. EU countries provided $18bn in loan guarantees in 2005 to companies doing business in Iran. All this must stop, the Americans insist, if Iran's proliferation and terrorism-related activities are to be effectively discouraged.

    Latest figures suggest the strategy is working. Exports from Germany, which with Italy is Iran's leading European trade partner, dropped by an estimated 20% last year. "Business dealings are going backwards, de facto," a Berlin official said. "A lot of German companies do business with the US. We don't have to say anything. They've got the message."

    Private western banks are also under pressure to comply with what is rapidly becoming a "Cuba-plus" US-led international embargo, by withholding letters of credit, loans, loan insurance and transfer facilities. Barclays plc and HSBC holdings are among those that have curbed their Iranian dealings.

    Iran's oil industry, providing 70% of state revenues and crucial funding for an extensive welfare state, is a particular US target. The industry has suffered years of underinvestment and has never entirely recovered from the Iran-Iraq war. US pressure on western oil companies and energy-hungry governments such as Japan not to put money and technology into a country with the world's third largest oil reserves is intense.

    As a result, some estimates suggest Iran's oil exports are falling by 10% annually. All this hardly helps plans by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for a 20% increase in budget spending to quell growing public anger over rising prices and unemployment while maintaining domestic energy subsidies amounting to a massive 15% of GDP.

    Iran's fragile, mismanaged economy, 80% state owned or controlled and plagued by corruption and inefficiency, is the weak link in its defences, and Tehran's leaders know it - hence, perhaps, their new nuclear flexibility. Yet according to Roger Stern of Johns Hopkins University, Washington's financial squeeze may be unnecessary.

    "The mullahs are doing a good job of destroying Iran's economy. They should be left alone to complete their work," he wrote recently. "Attacking Iran would allow the regime to escape responsibility for the economic disaster it created. Worse, an attack could unite Iran behind the clerical terror sponsors whose grasp on power may be slipping. For these reasons, the best policy towards Iran may be to do nothing at all."

    http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldbriefing/story/0,,2011594,00.html#article_continue

     

    The Iran Option That Isn't on the Table

     

    Læs også:

    http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,2008073,00.html 

     

     

                

                                    

     

                              The Iran Option That Isn't on the Table

    By Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh
    Thursday, February 8, 2007; Page A21

    As Iran crosses successive nuclear demarcations and mischievously intervenes in Iraq, the question of how to address the Islamic republic is once more preoccupying Washington. Economic sanctions, international ostracism, military strikes and even support for hopeless exiles are all contemplated with vigor and seriousness. One option, however, is rarely assessed: engagement as a means of achieving a more pluralistic and responsible government in Tehran.

    The all-encompassing nuclear debate comes as Iran's political landscape is changing once again. As America became reconciled to a monolithic Iran, represented by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his brand of rambunctious politics, the results from December's local elections suggest Iranians were doing otherwise. Ahmadinejad's defiant rhetoric and populist posturing did not impress the Iranians who turned out in large numbers to elect city councils and members of the Assembly of Experts. Voters favored pragmatic conservatives and reformers who oppose their president's policies abroad and his economic programs at home. Despite this show of dissent, though, it would be a mistake to assume that Iran's regime is about to fall or that a democratic spring is looming.


     

    Iran has long appeared ready for democracy. It has a literate, youthful population that is immersed in world culture, is at home on the Internet, is keen to engage the West and is above the anti-American anger that dominates the Arab street. No other Middle Eastern country has as much civic activism or a population that has voted as often in elections at various levels. But positive social and cultural indices have so far not translated into a political opening. Iranian society may be ready to embrace democracy, but Iranian politics is not ready to accommodate it.

    Iran does not have an organized pro-democracy movement. The reformers who were swept to power in 1997 never coalesced around a coherent platform, nor did they produce a political party. Their movement inspired activism and student protests, and it changed the style and language of politics, but its lack of organization ultimately cost it the presidency in 2005. Reformism was popular but politically ineffective.

    The clerical regime has also proved to be enterprising in facing demands for reform, particularly by using elections to manage opposition within the bounds of the Islamic republic. Economic isolation, supported by international sanctions, has kept the private sector weak, which has in turn denied supporters of change levers they could use to pry open the regime. The public sector accounts for more than 80 percent of the Iranian economy, and the constitution gives the clerical leadership most of the power. The problem facing democracy is not so much the state's theocratic nature as it is the enormous domination it enjoys over the economy, society and politics. For democracy to succeed, the state's domination of the economy and society must be reduced.

    For too long, Washington has thought that a policy of coercion and sanctions applied to Iran would eventually yield a responsible and representative regime. Events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suggest that containment eventually generates sufficient pressure to force autocratic elites to accommodate both international mandates and the aspirations of their restless constituents. Ironically, though, U.S. policy has buttressed the Iranian regime, which has justified its monopoly of power as a means of fending off external enemies and managing an economy under international duress.

    More than sanctions or threats of military retribution, Iran's integration into the global economy would impose standards and discipline on the recalcitrant theocracy. International investors and institutions such as the World Trade Organization are far more subversive, as they would demand the prerequisites of a democratic society -- transparency, the rule of law and decentralization -- as a price for their commerce.

    Paradoxically, to liberalize the theocratic state, the United States would do better to shelve its containment strategy and embark on a policy of unconditional dialogue and sanctions relief. A reduced American threat would deprive the hard-liners of the conflict they need to justify their concentration of power. In the meantime, as Iran became assimilated into the global economy, the regime's influence would inevitably yield to the private sector, with its demands for accountability and reform.

    It is important to appreciate that Iran has a political system without precedent or parallel in modern history. The struggle there is not just between reactionaries and reformers, conservatives and liberals, but fundamentally between the state and society. A subtle means of diminishing the state and empowering the society is, in the end, the best manner of promoting not only democracy but also nuclear disarmament.

    Vali Nasr is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and the author of "The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future." Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic."

    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/07/AR2007020702136.html

     

                   Iran's economic conditions deteriorate

    Posted 2/6/2007 9:53 PM ET

    By Barbara Slavin, USA TODAY

     
     
    WASHINGTON — U.S. and Western pressure on Iran is squeezing its economy, feeding the inflation and joblessness that have swelled under its controversial president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

    Trade figures and other data have begun to reflect deepening economic isolation taking place as a result of U.S.-led efforts to penalize Tehran for what the United States alleges is the pursuit of nuclear weapons and sponsorship of terrorist groups.

    For example, Iran's imports from Germany fell 14% in the first eight months of 2006, the German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce says. European Union countries account for 40% of Iran's imports, and Germany is Iran's largest European supplier, providing machinery, steel and electrical equipment, along with other goods.

    German government export credits, used to finance trade, also fell by a third last year and are expected to drop again this year, said Ulrich Sante, a spokesman at the German Embassy in Washington.

    "People who want to pursue legitimate commerce with the West will see that the policies Ahmadinejad is pursuing are leading to isolation and painting a more bleak economic future for the country," said Stuart Levey, U.S. Treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence.

    The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran in December after Tehran failed to suspend uranium enrichment. The sanctions block exports that can be used in Iran's nuclear and missile programs and freeze assets of officials linked to those programs.

    Separately, the Bush administration has cut off two Iranian banks from access to the U.S. financial system and dollar-based transactions on grounds that terrorists and weapons programs used accounts at those banks.

    The United States has had no diplomatic relations with Iran and has restricted trade with Tehran since 1980, when Iran took U.S. Embassy personnel hostage.

    Iran's economic challenges include:

    Banking restrictions. A half-dozen European banks have ended or restricted dollar dealings with Tehran to avoid jeopardizing business with the United States. Mohammad Jafar Mojarrad, vice governor of Iran's Central Bank, said most of the lenders continue dealing with Iran in other currencies.

    Peter Pietsch, spokesman for giant German bank Commerzbank, said the institution halted dollar transactions with Iran on Jan. 31 but still conducts transactions with Iranians in euros.

    Credit Suisse, a major Swiss-based financial services firm, stopped taking new clients in Iran in late 2005 "in light of the developments in the country … as well as to safeguard our reputation," spokeswoman Esther Gerster said.

    Rising import costs. Saeed Laylaz, a Tehran business consultant, said exporters require Iranian buyers to deposit the full amount of a transaction to obtain letters of credit, and that has added 8% to 12% to the cost of imports.

    Declining oil production. Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh told the Iranian Student News Agency last year that Iran's annual oil output had declined by half a million barrels per day as the country struggled to pump from aging fields. Iran produces 3.9 million barrels per day and exports 2.4 million. Roger Stern, an economist at Johns Hopkins University, has predicted that Iranian oil exports could decline to zero by 2015 without a significant increase in investment or a decline in domestic consumption.

    Mojarrad said Iran was taking steps to encourage new investment. He cited a $10 billion deal signed last month by Spain's Repsol and Royal Dutch Shell to develop an offshore Iranian field.

    The Iranian economy continues to grow at a rate of more than 5% a year in inflation-adjusted figures, Mojarrad said. He said sanctions will hurt Americans more than Iranians by undermining the use of the dollar as a reserve currency, depressing its value and making U.S. imports more expensive.

    Even before the latest sanctions, the Iranian president's rhetoric — calling for Israel to be destroyed — and defiance on the nuclear issue appeared to have a chilling effect on investment and trade.

    Iran faced "a cooling off of the business environment in the last year because of the nuclear issue and the rhetoric" of Ahmadinejad, said Adam Pener of the Conflict Securities Advisory Group, a Washington-based consulting firm.

    Laylaz said the sanctions have added to problems caused by Ahmadinejad's free-spending policies. Inflation — officially 12%, according to Iran's Central Bank — is likely to rise to 15% this year, Laylaz said.

    Unemployment was 11.5% in the year ending in March, 1.2% higher than the previous year, according to the Iran Statistical Center. Food prices rose by a third from March to August, the cost of housing went up 14%, and the cost of medical care increased more than 18%, said Iran's Karafarin Bank, which provides overviews of the Iranian economy to the International Monetary Fund.

    Joblessness rose in spite of a 37% increase in Iran's hard currency earnings, derived mainly from oil. Iran's oil revenue was $50 billion last year. Oil revenue, taxes on oil and other oil-related income financed more than 70% of Iran's government spending, according to Karafarin Bank.

    http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-02-06-iran-economy_x.htm?csp=34

    Lend to poor women, reduce extremism

     

     

                                                    

     

                                                        

    "The more women are empowered, the more fundamentalism is weakened"

                                             

                                                  

     
    Lend to poor women, reduce extremism, says Yunus
    Tripti Lahiri
    AFP

    January 30, 2007


    NEW DELHI --  Loans to poor women in Islamic countries can reduce the hold of religious extremism and win the cooperation of Muslim leaders, Bangladesh's Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus said Tuesday.

    "The more women are empowered, the more fundamentalism is weakened," Yunus, who won the 2006 prize for his pioneering work in providing low or no-interest banking services to the poor, told a gathering in New Delhi.

    "Religious fundamentalism and women can't work together."

    The economics professor began fighting poverty during a devastating famine in Muslim-majority Bangladesh, setting up the tiny Grameen Bank in 1976 to provide access to credit to people too poor qualify for traditional bank loans.

    The Grameen Bank now has more than 6.5 million borrowers, 96 percent of whom are women.

    "When we began one of the biggest problems we faced 30 years back was from the religious people. They said, 'Oh, you are destroying the religion,'" since Islam prohibits paying or receiving interest, said Yunus.

    "And we tried to explain there's nothing wrong with our work."

    Many banks in Bangladesh charged interest, which Grameen workers pointed out to their critics.

    The "microcredit" scheme gave entrepreneurs very small sums to start up their own enterprises. It reversed conventional banking by not obliging borrowers to offer collateral for a loan.

    But women were still loath to take the loans.

    "The women were terrified in the beginning because of the screaming and shouting by their mullahs in Bangladesh," said Yunus, who was keen from the start that at least half the borrowers were women.

    By giving small loans to women to start little businesses, it aimed to break the exploitation of the poor by money lenders and lift entire families out of poverty.

    Borrowers used the loans to buy their own tools and raw materials, transforming their lives through self-employment. They then repaid the loans in bits and pieces.

    "What happens ultimately, if something works for people, no matter who says what, it has to die down because people's interests finally get the upper hand," said the man known widely as the "banker to the poor."

    Muslim clerics themselves have joined the banks in their villages, he added.

    "Many mullahs come to us today to say very shyly, very timidly, 'Would you please accept my wife into your group?' After all these years seeing what is happening in the rest of the village he feels that he is left out," said Yunus. "He is worried about her complaining 'For you I couldn't go in so now you better find out if I can go in or not.' So this is the way."

    Grameen's lending activities now contribute more than 1 percent of Bangladesh's GDP, and its loan recovery rate is 98.85 percent. Its success has now been emulated in more than 40 countries.

    Some of the Grameen's warmest praise now comes from the strict Muslims who once criticized it.

    "People come and say, 'At the beginning we didn't understand what you are. We made accusations. You are a truly Islamic bank because you are helping poor people and poor women,'" said Yunus.

    DR1 Dokumentaren - Muhammed-krisen under huden

                                                      
     
     
     
                                                                      DR1 Dokumentaren - Muhammed-krisen under huden

    DR1 Dokumentaren - Muhammed-krisen under huden

    07.02.07 kl. 20:00 på DR1AFSPILLER

    Naser Khader og Ahmed Akkari blev under Muhammed-krisen repræsentanter for to meget forskellige grupper af danske muslimer.

      se program (0:58:12)

    http://dr.dk/odp/player.aspx?http://dr.dk/odp/ActivateLink.html?uniqueid=0FBCADDD-E7C5-41AE-A283-3482622577FF&mt=programstab&st=frontpageTab_0&furl=http%3A//dr.dk/odp/default.aspx%3Ftemplate%3Dprogramserie%26guid%3DBE0F3874-4C31-4188-8392-EB6BDC1AB877%26back%3D%252fodp%252fdefault.aspx%253ftemplate%253dprogrammer%2526%23c0&surl=http%3A//www.dr.dk/Forms/Published/PlaylistGen.aspx%3Fqid%3D355782%26odp%3Dtrue

     

     

     

                                                                    Mit Danmark

     

     

     

                                          Mit Danmark

    04.02.07 kl. 21:55 på DR1AFSPILLER

    Hvordan ser Danmark ud med dansk-arabiske øjne? 10 danske filminstruktører tegner i samarbejde med 10 dansk-arabere et portræt af Danmark efter karikatur-krisen.

       se program (0:54:24)

      http://dr.dk/odp/player.aspx?http://dr.dk/odp/ActivateLink.html?uniqueid=0FBCADDD-E7C5-41AE-A283-3482622577FF&mt=programstab&st=frontpageTab_0&furl=http://dr.dk/odp/default.aspx%3Ftemplate%3Dprogramserie%26guid%3DBE0F3874-4C31-4188-8392-EB6BDC1AB877%26back%3D%252fodp%252fdefault.aspx%253ftemplate%253dprogrammer%2526%23c0&surl=http://www.dr.dk/Forms/Published/PlaylistGen.aspx%3Fqid%3D355782%26odp%3Dtrue

     

    Laureates Call for Constructive US-Iran Engagement

     

    Læs også mine blogs om shirin Ebadi:

    http://shahrezad.spaces.live.com/blog/cns!72073E5B4E136E3B!3345.entry

     

     

     

                                

                                Laureates Call for Constructive US-Iran Engagement

    (10 January 2007 – Washington DC) During a press conference organized by the Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, Dr. Shirin Ebadi and Prof. Jody Williams offered their views on what can be done to improve relations between the U.S. and Iran. Taking place two days before President Bush was scheduled to announce his new plan for Iraq; the Laureates urged the Bush administration to develop a peaceful, strategic dialogue with Iran.

    Later that evening both
    Dr. Ebadi and Prof. Williams spoke about their hope for a new course in US-Iran relations at an event hosted by University of California, the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, the National Iranian American Council and the Nobel Women’s Initiative. Titled, “Rebuilding US-Iran Relations,” Dr. Ebadi and Prof. Williams addressed creative initiatives that could improve relations between the United States and Iran and actions of support in which individuals can take part.

    For more information click
    here.

    *** Media links

    Nobel Peace Prize Winners Urge Talks Between US and Iran - Voice of America, 8 January 2007

    Women Nobel Laureates Call for New U.S.-Iran Engagement - OneWorld.net, 10 January 2007

     

    ***Media Release

    (8 January 2007 - Washington DC) Two days before President Bush will deliver a speech announcing a new course in Iraq which will exclude the Iraq Study group’s recommendation to engage Iran, women Nobel Peace Prize winners
    Dr. Shirin Ebadi and Professor Jody Williams will be in Washington, D.C. to call for constructive US-Iran dialogue and engagement.

    During a press conference on Monday, January 8, 2007, Dr. Ebadi and Prof. Williams will offer their views on what can be done to improve relations between the U.S. and Iran. Their ongoing calls for non-violent solutions to the stalemate are particularly relevant given the recent revelations in the
    media that the Iran Syria Policy and Operations Group (ISOG) is intensifying its secretive planning on Iran.

    Even in the face of Iranian government discrimination, 2003 Nobel Peace Laureate and Iranian human rights activist Shirin Ebadi underscores the dangers of international punishment or military interference in Iran. According to Dr. Ebadi, “It's the people of Iran that have to gain their own freedom and human rights improvements. Military action or other punishments against Iran will make the situation for political reformists and human rights advocates in Iran a lot more difficult. I don't think that Iranian human rights advocates need help of that sort from the governments of the West. But I expect people in the West to support freedom-seekers in Iran.”

    “What we are calling for is quite simple: a nonviolent resolution of the standoff between the U.S. and Iran,” says Jody Williams. “We do not want to see another Iraq and more disruption in the volatile and fragile Middle East. We do not want to see more suffering among women and children in another Middle Eastern country. No more military action. We demand a negotiated resolution of the standoff.”

    Also on Monday, January 8, the University of California, the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, the
    National Iranian American Council and the Nobel Women’s Initiative will host “Rebuilding US-Iran Relations,” a public event with Ebadi and Williams at the University of California Washington Center. The event will be from 6:30 pm to 8:00 pm.

    Ebadi and Williams will discuss creative initiatives that could improve relations between the United States and Iran. In addition, Ebadi and Williams will explore what individuals can do to ensure that the current tensions do not escalate into armed conflict. Dr. Ebadi will speak about the political and social landscape in Iran today, including the human rights and women's rights campaigns, and the Iranian reform movement. Professor Williams will speak about the
    Nobel Women’s Initiative’s efforts to promote direct engagement between the US and Iran.

    http://www.nobelwomensinitiative.org/news.php?WEBYEP_DI=76

     

    Nej til at være syndebukken

     
     
                                 Frankrigs jøder: Nej til at være syndebukke
    Med få undtagelser lader det officielle Frankrig stå til, mens jøderne jages af rabiate muslimer. Det er ikke gået op for de politiske magthavere, at når jøderne forfølges, er det republikken, der dør

    Af Helle Merete Brix

    Da en bølge af antisemitiske angreb fejede hen over Frankrig i de første år i det nye årtusinde, var det ikke i det jødiske kvarter i Paris' centrum, Marais-kvarteret, der også er Paris' ældste, at de fandt sted. Det var for eksempel synagogen i Villepinte, ikke langt fra Charles de Gaulle lufthavnen uden for Paris, der i 2000 blev sat i brand med seks molotovcocktails; ikke synagogen i rue Pavée, der går på tværs af Marais-kvarterets velkendte hovedgade rue des Rosiers. De skoler, hvor lærerne i dag har store problemer med antisemitismen og med at undervise i 2. Verdenskrig uden at blive mødt af muslimske elevers hurraråb over Hitler, ligger især i de belastede områder uden for Frankrigs større byer.

                                        
    Tyske tropper og fransk politi indfanger Marais' jøder under den tyske besættelse. Nu tiljubles Hitler atter i de franske skoler
     Distrikt 93, ”det røde bælte”, som de belastede områder uden for Paris kaldes, tæller byer og forstæder som for eksempel Drancy, Seine-Saint-Denis og også Le Blanc-Mesnil, som man passerer med toget fra lufthavnen mod centrum. Særligt siden 1980erne er muslimske befolkningsgrupper flyttet ind i disse områder, der igennem en årrække har været hjemsted for mange af Frankrigs sefardiske jøder, der stammer fra Algeriet, Marokko og Tunesien. De sefardiske jøder udgør omkring 70 pct. af Frankrigs jødiske befolkning.

    Typisk bor ashkenazi-jøderne, der stammer fra Østeuropa, og som udgør de sidste 30 pct. af Frankrigs jødiske befolkning, i centrum af de store byer som Paris. Den jødiske befolkning i Frankrig tæller 650.000 og er således den tredjestørste i verden efter Israel og USA.

    Den amerikanske journalist Marie Brenner har rapporteret om antisemitismen i Frankrig i Ron Rosenbaums værdifulde antologi Those who Forget the Past: The Question of Anti-Semitism. Ifølge Brenner blev der igennem ti dage i år 2000 brændt fem synagoger og rapporteret om 19 brandattentater mod synagoger, jødiske hjem og forretninger.

    Men antisemitismen har bredt sig helt ind i Paris' centrum. Overfald på jøder, der skilter med deres identitet i form af en kalot, har fundet sted selv på Champs-Elysées. Da tilhængere af Hizbollah og Hamas i 2000 gik sammen med repræsentanter for den ekstreme venstrefløj i en demonstration vendt mod Israel, lød råbet ”Død over jøderne” på Place de la République, ikke langt fra det jødiske kvarter. 

                                                 
                                                Medlemmer af La Tribu Ka på jagt efter jøder på Rue des Rosiers 28. maj 2006
     
    På jagt efter jøder
    Tidligere i år, en solskinssøndag i maj, nåede antisemitismen til Marais-kvarteret. Omkring 30 muskuløse medlemmer af den racistiske gruppe af sorte nordafrikanere La Tribu Ka marcherede gennem rue des Rosiers, hvor de gjorde nazi-hilsen og intimiderede forbipasserende jøder. La Tribu Ka går ind for raceadskillelse og er en udbryder af en gruppe af sorte franskmænd, der har holdt til på ”Théâtre de la Main d'Or” i Paris.

    Teatret ejes af den kendte afrikansk-franske komiker Dieudonné, der selv med mellemrum anklages for antisemitisme og vækker opsigt med sine udtalelser. I 2005 betegnede han således en mindehøjtidelighed for de befriede fra Auschwitz-Birkenau koncentrationslejrene som ”pornografisk”. Dieudonnés kontakter spænder vidt. På en rejse i august i år til Libanon og Syrien blev han modtaget af den syriske viceudenrigsminister og kom i audiens hos Venezuelas præsident Hugo Chávez, der befandt sig i Syrien. På rejsen var Dieudonné bl.a. ledsaget af sin kampagnechef, der er tidligere medlem af Front National og af Thierry Meyssan, der er præsident for organisationen ”Réseau Voltaire” (Voltaires netværk). Meyssan er også forfatter til en storsælgende bog om Bush-regeringens ”løgne” om 11. september. Ifølge Meyssan var der for eksempel intet fly, der ramte ind i Pentagon den dag.

    Ifølge egne oplysninger var Tribu Ka den pågældende søndag på jagt efter unge, jødiske aktivister, som de påstod havde generet dem ved en tidligere lejlighed. Ankomsten af seks politibiler fik sat en stopper for ballademagerne. Kvarteret har ellers været forskånet for antisemitiske angreb og overfald siden Jo Goldenbergs berømte restaurant i gaden blev udsat for et bombeattentat i 1982.

    Sikkerhedsforanstaltningerne i Marais-kvarteret er dog i top, og besøger man de jødiske museer i bydelen, skal man omtrent igennem samme procedure som i en europæisk lufthavn. På søndage, et populært tidspunkt for spadsereture for kvarterets beboere, er der altid patruljerende betjente på gaden.

    Men man kan frit besøge de jødiske specialforretninger, restauranter og boghandler uden at skulle tjekkes. Kvarteret er ligeledes et eksempel på to minoriteter, der lever fredeligt ved siden af hinanden: Den jødiske og den homoseksuelle. Marais, med sine pragtlejligheder og gamle huse i de snævre gader, er inden for de senere år blevet et mondænt kvarter med dyre designerbutikker og andre specialforretninger. I dag er kvarteret også hjemsted for en del af Paris' bøssemiljø. Bøssebarer ligger ikke langt fra kosherforretninger, og i gadebilledet er det helt almindeligt at se ortodokse jødiske mænd med hatte og slangekrøller ved siden af små, fikse herrer i stramme læderbukser med lige så fikse, små hunde.

    Arabernes konge
    Da antisemitismen tog til i det nye årtusinde, varede det længe før franske toppolitikere reagerede. Det gælder også præsident Jacques Chirac. Måske fordi Chirac har en muslimsk befolkning på i hvert fald 6 mio. blandt sit vælgerpotentiale, og fordi Chirac, afhængigt af øjnene der ser, har været optaget af eller besat af at skabe venskabelige forbindelser med den arabiske verden. Ondskabsfulde tunger har således for længst viderebragt, at Chirac i de belastede forstæder, ”Les Banlieus”, lyder tilnavnet ”arabernes konge”.

    En undtagelse fra denne vage kurs var dog Frankrigs indenrigsminister Nicolas Sarkozy fra UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire). Sarkozy er i dag kendt for at ville lægge en hård linie over for ballademagerne i ”Les Banlieus” og for at ville korrigere den antiamerikanske holdning, der præger fransk udenrigspolitik og store dele af det politiske og intellektuelle miljø. Sarkozy er også et borgerligt bud på Frankrigs kommende præsident. 


                                                   
    Mens præsident Jacques Chirac lader sig hylde som "arabernes konge", har den borgerlige præsidentkandidat Nicolas Sarkozy lagt vægt på venskabelige forbindelser til de franske jøder og Israel
     
     Uden særlig pressebevågenhed tog Sarkozy i 2002 på jødiske helligdage rundt og besøgte synagoger og talte med jødiske ledere i de små forsamlingshuse i området nær Neuilly uden for Paris. Det var nok tiltrængt. Et tidligere møde i distrikt 93 mellem lokale jødiske ledere og en politidirektør var forløbet i en spændt atmosfære. Politichefen havde mere eller mindre afvist problemet med antisemitismen med den forklaring, at i Frankrig var alle lige, kirker, moskéer og synagoger. Hvorpå en jødisk leder havde påpeget, at det ikke var moskéerne, der blev angrebet.

    Blandt de jødiske organisationer var der heller ikke enighed om, hvordan man skulle gribe den nye antisemitiske bølge an. Sammy Ghozlan, en pensioneret politimand med algerisk-jødisk baggrund, tøvede dog ikke og startede sin egen sikkerhedstjeneste i Blanc-Mesnil uden for Paris. De hundredvis af indberetninger og henvendelser, som Ghozlan fik og får, bliver langtfra alle rapporteret i den officielle presse. Jøder, der bliver overfaldet, er bange for at anmelde det af frygt for repressalier.

    En vigtig mediekanal, hvis man vil følge med i antisemitismen i Frankrig, er den jødiske radiostation Judaiques FM, der har lokaler på venstre Seinebred nær Sorbonne. Et anden vigtig kilde var internet-avisen Proche-Orient.info, stiftet i protest mod den pro-palæstinensiske dækning af Mellemøstkonflikten i fransk presse. Også Sappho har leveret artikler til Proche-Orien, der måtte lukke tidligere i år på grund af manglende finansiel støtte.

    At rokke båden

    Abraham Foxman, direktør for the Anti-Defamation League i USA, gav i 2002 den jødiske paraplyorganisation CRIF (Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France) og de franske jøder dette råd: ”Mobilisér!”. De amerikansk-jødiske organisationer har aldrig, skriver Marie Brenner i Ron Rosenbaums antologi, været bange for at ”rock the boat”. Foxmans medarbejdere verden over deler information med den amerikanske regering, lægger pres på Kongressen og har adgang til kommentarer på ledersiderne i aviser over hele USA.

    Da CRIFs præsident Roger Cukierman vendte hjem fra et besøg hos Foxman og de jødiske organisationer i USA, tredoblede han omtrent CRIFs budget. Det er i øvrigt ikke almindeligt kendt, hvor få penge de fransk-jødiske organisationer har. Ifølge Marie Brenner er det i høj grad betydelige årlige pengebeløb fra den berømte og velhavende Rothschild-familie, der finansierer udgifter til jødiske sikkerhedsfolk, lønninger til ansatte m.m.

    Allerede i februar 2002 havde Cukierman dog publiceret et åbent brev til præsident Chirac i Le Monde. Han indledte med at skrive, at ”Landets ledere ynder at bagatellisere anti-jødiske handlinger. De foretrækker at se dem som almindelige voldshandlinger.” Cukierman påpegede blandt andet, at et angreb på en jødisk helligdom kan takseres til kun tre måneders betinget fængsel. Og hvorfor? Fordi, skrev Cukierman, at volden, der i øvrigt kun udføres fra én side, knyttes til konflikten i Mellemøsten, og fordi den muslimske befolkning er den eneste, der tæller i dette spørgsmål. Endnu engang er jøderne syndebukken. Cukierman sluttede brevet med at skrive, at ”Det er en rolle, vi ikke længere er indstillet på at spille.

                                                
                                                                 Bogen der rystede det franske skolesystem
     
    De tabte territorier
     Samme efterår, september 2002, udkom bogen Les territoires perdus de la république: Antisemitisme, racisme et sexisme en milieu scolaire (Republikkens tabte territorier: Antisemitisme, racisme og sexisme i skolerne), den var redigeret af pseudonymet Emmanuel Brenner. Den indeholder en lang række beretninger fra franske skolelærere om de problemer, de møder i den daglige omgang med muslimske elever. To år senere, i 2004, kom Emmanuel Brenners bog i ny udgave. Samtidig offentliggjorde det franske undervisningsministerium en chokerende rapport om problemer med religiøs fundamentalisme, særligt inden for islam, på en række udvalgte skoler. Den såkaldte Obin-rapport, der blev til under topembedsmanden Jean-Pierre Obins ledelse, og hvis indhold undervisningsministeriet desværre ikke har gjort noget særligt for at udbrede kendskabet til, bekræfter konklusionerne i Emmanuel Brenners bog. Det gælder ikke mindst med hensyn til lærernes vanskeligheder på udvalgte skoler med at undervise i Holocaust, kristendommen og Israels historie. Rapporten og Emmanuel Brenners bog er også omtalt i Sappho oktober 2005.

    I årene siden den nye bølge af antisemitisme ramte Frankrig, er der udgivet en lang række bøger om dette problem. I de jødiske boghandler i Marais-kvarteret kan man finde stort set alle disse bøger. Det gælder, hvad enten forfatteren er den mindre kendte rabbiner Philippe Haddad, der skriver med udgangspunkt i attentatet i år 2000 på hans synagoge i Ulis, eller den verdensberømte filosof Alain Finkielkraut, der påpeger, at zionismen gøres til en kriminel ideologi af dagens intellektuelle. Eller måske historikeren Benjamin Stora, der i oktober trak fulde huse på det jødiske museum i rue Vieille de temple med sin aktuelle bog om de algeriske jøders og hans egen families uddrivelse fra Algeriet, Les trois exiles: Juifs d`Algérie. (Tre former for eksil: Algeriets jøder). God information om forholdene finder man også i bl.a. månedsmagasinet l`Arche (arken) og Information juive (Jødisk information).

    Støtte til Redeker

    CRIF synes at have fortsat sin nye kurs. Dette efterår kunne man således på organisationens hjemmeside finde en utvetydig støtteerklæring til filosofilæreren Robert Redeker. Redeker måtte gå under jorden efter at have modtaget dødstrusler på grund af sin lidet smigrende karakteristik af Muhammed og islam i en kommentar i Le Figaro. Som en repræsentant for CRIF forklarede det for Sappho: ”Vi accepterer ikke dødstrusler, og vi accepterer ikke, at religionen ikke må kritiseres.

    CRIF har til huse i rue Brocca i det fredelige 5. arrondissement. På adressen befinder sig en lang række institutioner inden for det jødiske samfund, og der er derfor altid to bevæbnede betjente på vagt foran bygningen i dagtimerne. Udover det almindelige grundige sikkerhedstjek, man skal gennemgå, beder de tre repræsentanter for CRIF, som Sappho taler med denne dag, om at de ikke citeres med navn. Men så vil de gerne tale åbent om, hvad de mener om for eksempel dialog med de islamiske organisationer: En enkelt af de tre repræsentanter mener, det er muligt at have en sådan dialog, men de øvrige afviser det. En prædikant som den internationalt kendte Tariq Ramadan, der er blevet beskyldt for antisemitisme, er der ingen tillid til. Den CRIF-repræsentant, der overvåger de muslimske hjemmesider, mener, som andre af Ramadans kritikere, at han siger ét på arabisk til muslimer og noget andet på fransk til ikke-muslimer
    .
                                                      


                                                     Dalil Boubakeur – en af Frankrigs få moderate imamer
     Der er også utilfredshed med, at en organisation som den store paraplyorganisation UIOF (Unionen af Frankrigs Islamiske Organisationer) ikke tager skarpt afstand fra imamer, der fremkommer med antisemitiske udtalelser. Den dialog, der gennem årene har været forsøgt med, hvad en CRIF-repræsentant betegner som ”den mere moderate dele af UIOF”, har ikke været nogen succés: ”Man foreslår, man lytter, men der er intet den anden vej”.

    En undtagelse er rektoren for den store moské i Paris, Dalil Boubakeur, som CRIF gennem årene har haft et fint samarbejde med. Boubakeur er kendt for en liberal linie sammenlignet med andre af Frankrigs imamer.

    Religionskritikken og adskillelsen af religion og stat er fundamentale værdier for Frankrig, mener man i CRIF. Derfor er disse værdier også fundamentale i spørgsmålet om integrationen af muslimerne i Europa. Det er der andre end CRIF, der har forstået.

    Den jødiske forfatter Olivier Rolin påpeger således i et aktuelt essay i tidsskriftet Le meilleur des mondes, at der i dag i Frankrig findes grupper og lobbyer, der i islams navn igen ønsker at gøre Frankrig ”judenfrei”. At modarbejde det, at forhindre det, er naturligvis også et anliggende for republikken. For: ”Når jøderne angribes, er det Republikken, der er i fare, når de jages, er det Republikken, der slås ihjel.

    http://www.sappho.dk/Nr.%205%20december%202006/frankrigsjoeder.html



    svenske efterretningstjenestes Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstols dom

     

                       Dokumentation: Dom over Sverige 1

    Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstols dom over Sverige i forbindelse med den svenske efterretningstjenestes opbevaring af op til 40 år gamle oplysninger om svenskere. Politiets Efterretningstjenste, PET, og Justitsministeriet vurderer i øjeblikket konsekvenserne af dommen for PET.


    Læs mere i del 2

    http://www.jp.dk/dokumentation/artikel:aid=4218526/

    Læs om tilsvarende overvejelser angående PET:

    http://www.jp.dk/indland/artikel:aid=4219264/

    Her på spacet under kategori nyheder og politik, kan du finde flere artikler om PETs arkiver


    SECOND SECTION

    CASE OF SEGERSTEDT-WIBERG AND OTHERS v. SWEDEN

    (Application no. 62332/00)

    JUDGMENT

    STRASBOURG

    6 June 2006

    FINAL

    06/09/2006

    This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.



    In the case of Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden,

    The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

    Mr J.-P. Costa, President,

    Mr A.B. Baka,
    Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
    Mrs A. Mularoni,
    Mrs E. Fura-Sandström,
    Ms D. Jociene,
    Mr D. Popovic, judges,
    and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,

    Having deliberated in private on 20 September 2005 and 16 May 2006,

    Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

    PROCEDURE

    1. The case originated in an application (no. 62332/00) against the Kingdom of Sweden lodged on 7 October 2000 with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") by five Swedish nationals: (1) Ms Ingrid Segerstedt-Wiberg (born in 1911), (2) Mr Per Nygren (1948), (3) Mr Staffan Ehnebom (1952), (4) Mr Bengt Frejd (1948) and (5) Mr Herman Schmid (1939) ("the applicants").

    2. The applicants were represented by Mr D. Töllborg, Professor of Law, practising as a lawyer in Västra Frölunda. The Swedish Government ("the Government") were represented by their Agent Mr C.H. Ehrenkrona, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

    3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that the storage in the Security Police files of certain information that had been released to them constituted unjustified interference with their right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention. Under this Article they further complained of the refusal to impart to them the full extent to which information concerning them was kept on the Security Police register. The applicants also relied on Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. Moreover, they complained under Article 13 that no effective remedy existed under Swedish law with respect to the above violations.

    4. The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

    5. On 1 November 2004 the Court changed the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly composed Second Section (Rule 52 § 1).

    6. By a decision of 20 September 2005, the Court declared the application partly admissible.

    7. The Chamber having decided, after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule 59 § 3 in fine), the parties replied in writing to each other's observations.

    THE FACTS

    I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

    8. The present application has been brought by five applicants, all of whom are Swedish nationals: (1) Ms Ingrid Segerstedt-Wiberg (born in 1911), (2) Mr Per Nygren (1948), (3) Mr Staffan Ehnebom (1952), (4) Mr Bengt Frejd (1948) and (5) Mr Herman Schmid (1939). The first applicant lives in Gothenburg, the second applicant lives in Kungsbacka and the third and fourth applicants live in Västra Frölunda, Sweden. The fifth applicant lives in Copenhagen, Denmark.

    A. The first applicant, Ms Ingrid Segerstedt-Wiberg

    9. The first applicant, Ms Ingrid Segerstedt-Wiberg, is the daughter of a well-known publisher and anti-Nazi activist, Mr Torgny Segerstedt. From 1958 to 1970 she was a Liberal Member of Parliament. During that period she was a member of the Standing Committee on the Constitution (konstitutionsutskottet). She has also been the Chairperson of the United Nations Association of Sweden. She is a prominent figure in Swedish political and cultural life.

    10. On 22 April 1998 the first applicant, relying on section 9A of the Police Register Act (lag om polisregister m.m., 1965:94), made a request to the Minister of Justice for access to her Security Police records. She said that she had become aware of certain material held by the foreign service of the United States of America from which it appeared that since the Second World War she and others had been under continuous surveillance, particularly because of her work for the United Nations Association of Western Sweden. That information had originated from Sweden and had apparently been communicated by the USA to other countries in order to damage her and her work for the protection of refugees. She further referred to the spreading of rumours that she was "unreliable" in respect of the Soviet Union. Those rumours had started during the 1956 parliamentary elections but had not prevented her, a couple of years later, from being returned to Parliament or from sitting on its Standing Committee on the Constitution.

    By a decision of 17 June 1998 the Ministry of Justice refused her request. It reiterated that absolute secrecy applied not only to the content of the police register but also to whether or not a person was mentioned in the register. The Government did not find that the reasons relied on by the first applicant, with reference to section 9A of the Police Register Act, could constitute special grounds for derogation from the rule of absolute secrecy.

    Appended to the refusal was a letter signed by the Minister of Justice, pointing out that neither the first applicant's previous access to material indicating that she had been the subject of secret surveillance nor the age of any such information (40 to 50 years old) could constitute a special reason for making a derogation under section 9A of the Act. Moreover, the Minister stated:

    "As you may be aware, the Government some time ago submitted a proposal to Parliament as to the manner in which the Security Police register should be made more accessible to the public. It may be of interest to you to know that a few weeks ago Parliament passed the bill, which means that absolute secrecy will be abolished. The bill provides that the Security Police must make an assessment of the need for secrecy on a case-by-case basis, which opens up new possibilities for individuals to see records that are today covered by absolute secrecy. It is first of all historical material that will be made accessible."

    11. On 28 April 1999, following an amendment on 1 April 1999 to Chapter 5, section 1, sub-section 2 of the Secrecy Act 1980 (sekretesslagen, 1980:100), the first applicant submitted a new request to the Security Police to inform her whether or not her name was on the Security Police register.

    On 17 September 1999 the Security Police decided to grant the first applicant authorisation to view "17 pages from the Security Police records with the exception of information about Security Police staff and information concerning the Security Police's internal [classifications]". Beyond that, her request was rejected, pursuant to Chapter 5, section 1, sub-section 2 of the Secrecy Act 1980 on the ground that further "information could not be disclosed without jeopardising the purpose of measures taken or anticipated or without harming future operations".

    On 4 October 1999 the first applicant visited the headquarters of the Security Police in Stockholm to view the records in question. They concerned three letter bombs which had been sent in 1990 to Sveriges Radio (the National Radio Corporation of Sweden), to her and another well-known writer (Hagge Geigert), because of their stand against Nazism and xenophobia and in favour of the humanitarian treatment of refugees in conformity with international treaties ratified by Sweden. The Security Police had gathered some police reports, photographs and newspaper cuttings, and had reached the conclusion that there was nothing to confirm the suspicion that there was an organisation behind the letter bombs. That was all the information the first applicant was allowed to view.

    12. On 8 October 1999 the first applicant instituted proceedings before the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm requesting authorisation to view the entire file on her and other entries concerning her that had been made in the register. In a judgment of 11 February 2000 the Court rejected her request. Its reasoning included the following:

    "The Administrative Court of Appeal considers that, beyond what emerges from the documents already released, it is not clear that information about whether or not [the first applicant] is on file in the Security Police records regarding such activities as are referred to in Chapter 5, section 1 (2), could be disclosed without jeopardising the purpose of measures taken or anticipated or without harming future operations."

    13. On 28 February 2000 the first applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten). She submitted that the rejection of her request had left her with the impression of being accused of involvement in criminal activities. In order to counter these accusations, she requested permission to see all files concerning her.

    On 10 May 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the first applicant leave to appeal.

    14. During the proceedings before the Court, the Government provided the following additional information.

    The first applicant was registered for the first time in 1940. The Security Police were interested in her because of her milieu which, during the war in Europe, was legitimately targeted by the Security Service. In accordance with the legislation in force at the relevant time, additional entries were made in her file until 1976, in part on independent grounds and in part to supplement records entered previously.

    Between 1940 and 1976, information and documents regarding the first applicant had been collected in the filing system that existed at the time. While those documents were microfilmed, no documents concerning her had been microfilmed since 1976. The documents contained in the file were probably weeded some time before 1999. However, while backup copies on microfiche had been retained, they were not accessible in practice without the notation that they had already been "deactivated".

    A new filing system was introduced in 1980-1982. As the first applicant became the object of a bomb threat in 1990, a new file on her was opened under the new system. It included a reference to the previous file under the old system and the microfilm number required to retrieve the microfiche. The Security Service's register was also updated with the new information regarding the first applicant. The 1990 file had also been weeded. It was not destroyed but transferred to the National Archives.

    Again in 2001 the first applicant was registered by the Security Service because of a new incident that could have been interpreted as a threat against her.

    On 13 December 2002 the Security Service decided of its own accord to release all stored information that had been kept about the applicant until 1976, representing 51 pages. No copy of these documents or particulars of their specific contents were submitted to the Court.

    B. The second applicant, Mr Per Nygren

    15. The second applicant, Mr Per Nygren, is an established journalist at Göteborgs-Posten, one of the largest daily newspapers in Sweden. He is the author of a number of reports published by that paper on Nazism and on the Security Police that attracted wide public attention.

    16. On 27 April 1998 the Security Police rejected a request by the applicant for access to their quarterly reports on Communist and Nazi activities for the years 1969 to 1998, and for information on which authorities had received those reports.

    17. By a letter of 7 June 1999 addressed to the Security Police, the second applicant stated that, having received one of the quarterly reports from the police in Karlskrona, he had become aware that he had been of interest to the Security Police; he therefore wished "to read his file and all other documents at [their] disposal where [his] name might occur". In addition the second applicant made a similar request in respect of his recently deceased father, in accordance with the latter's wishes.

    In a decision of 11 November 1999, the Security Police accepted the applicant's request in part by responding that his father did not appear in any files or entries in the register and rejected the remainder of his request. It stated:

    "As from 1 April 1999 the treatment of personal data by the Security Police of the kind referred to in your request is governed in the first place by the Police Data Act (1998:622).

    According to Chapter 5, section 1(2), of the Secrecy Act (1980:100), secrecy applies to information relating to undercover activities under section 3 of the Police Data Act or that otherwise falls within the Security Police's remit in preventing or revealing crimes committed against the security of the Realm or in preventing terrorism, if it is not clear that the information may be imparted without jeopardising the purpose of the decision or measures planned or without harm to future activities. The implied starting point is that secrecy applies as the main rule irrespective of whether the information, for example, appears in a file or emanates from a preliminary investigation or undercover activities.

    In the preparatory work for the relevant provision of the Secrecy Act (prop. 1997/98:97, p. 68), it is stated that even information about whether a person is mentioned in a secret intelligence register should be classified in accordance with Chapter 5, section 1, of the Secrecy Act. It is further stated that in view of the nature of undercover activities only in special circumstances can there be a question of disclosing information. If there are no such circumstances, the Government assume in accordance with the preparatory work that even the information that a person is not registered is classified as secret under the Act.

    In the present case the Security Police consider that ... the fact that your father was born in 1920 and has recently passed away satisfies the kind of conditions in which information can be disclosed that a person is not registered.

    In so far as your request concerns yourself, it is rejected for the reasons given in the preparatory work and the relevant provisions of the Secrecy Act."

    According to the applicant, the above reasons given for the rejection of the request made for access to his own records were identical to those given in all other rejection cases.

    18. In their pleadings to the Court, the Government stated that at the time of the Security Police's decision on 11 November 1999 it had not been possible to find the file owing to the fact that the second applicant had not been the subject of a personal record in connection with the report at issue.

    19. On 25 November 1999 the second applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal in Stockholm, requesting authorisation to view his file and all other entries made on him by the Security Police. He relied on certain written evidence to the effect that he had been mentioned in the records of the Security Police, notably on the cover page and page 7 of a secret report, dating back to the third quarter of 1967 and emanating from Section (byrå) A of the Security Police, that had been released by the Karlskrona City Police shortly beforehand. The report was entitled "Presentation on Communist and Nazi activities in Sweden from July to September 1967". Page 7 contained the following statement:

    "On 18-20 September a meeting was held within the DUV [Demokratisk Ungdoms Världsfederation - World Federation of Democratic Youth] in Warsaw. A youngster, probably [identifiable as] Mr Per Rune Nygren from Örebro, participated as a representative for the VUF [Världsungdomsfestivalen - World Youth Festival]."

    The second applicant requested, in particular, access to quarterly reports for the years 1969-1998 and information regarding the authorities to which those reports had been communicated. He stressed that since he had never been convicted, charged or notified of any suspicion of crime and had never taken part in any illegal, subversive or terrorist activity, refusing him full access to the files could not be justified. The wishes of the Security Police to maintain secrecy about their work should have been balanced against his interest in clarifying the extent of the violation that he had suffered, not only through their efforts to collect information about him but also through their disclosure of such information.

    20. In accordance with standard procedure, the appeal was brought to the attention of the Security Police, who then decided, on 20 December 1999, to release the same two pages of the 1967 report referred to above, while maintaining their refusal regarding the remainder of the second applicant's initial request. The reasons given were largely the same as in the first decision, with the following addition:

    "In the Security Police archives there are a number of documents which contain information both about different subject matter and individuals. The fact that such documents exist in the Security Police's archives does not mean that all information in the documents is registered and therefore searchable. Information which is not registered can only be retrieved if details have been submitted about the document in which the information is contained. Since you provided us with such details it was possible for us to find the document that you solicited in your request."

    After receipt of the above decision, the second applicant had a telephone conversation with Ms Therese Mattsson, Officer of the Security Police (who had signed the decision of 27 April 1998). According to the applicant, she explained that, when dealing with requests such as his, only documents that were searchable by computer would be verified, which was the reason why the original application had been rejected in its entirety and access had been granted to the two pages of the 1967 report.

    21. In his appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal, the applicant pointed out that from the above telephone conversation it emerged, firstly, that since 1969 several hundred thousand personal files in the Security Police's register had been destroyed. Secondly, information about persons whose files had been erased could still be found in the Security Police's archives but could not be searched under names or personal identity numbers. Thirdly, the so-called destruction lists, comprising several hundred thousand names, was all that remained of the erased files. The second applicant complained that the Security Police had failed to search those lists (assuming that the files no longer existed).

    On 14 February 2000 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the appeal in its entirety giving essentially the same reasons as the Security Police, with the following further considerations:

    "In connection with the introduction of [section 3 of the Police Data Act] the Government stated that even the information that a person is not registered by the Security Police is such that it should be possible to keep it secret under the said provision (prop. 1997/98:97, p. 68). According to the Government Bill, the reason is the following. A person who is engaged in criminal activity may have a strong interest in knowing whether the police have information about him or her. In such a case it could be highly prejudicial to the investigation for the person concerned to be informed whether or not he or she is of interest to the police. It is therefore important for a decision on a request for information from the register not to have to give information on whether the person appears in the register or not. The nature of secret intelligence is such that there can only be disclosure of information in special cases.

    The Administrative Court of Appeal finds that it is not clear that information, beyond that which emerges from the disclosed documents, about whether [the second applicant] has been the subject of any Secret Police activity falling under Chapter 5, section 1(2), of the Secrecy Act, can be disclosed without jeopardising the purpose of measures taken or anticipated or without harming future operations."

    22. On 25 July 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court refused to grant the second applicant leave to appeal.

    C. The third applicant, Mr Staffan Ehnebom

    23. The third applicant, Mr Staffan Ehnebom, has been a member of the KPML(r) (Kommunistiska Partiet Marxist-Leninisterna - Marxist-Leninist (revolutionaries) Party, established in 1970) since 1978. He is an engineer and since 1976 has been employed by the Ericsson Group.

    24. On 10 April 1999, after the absolute secrecy requirement applying to information held in the records of the Security Police had been lifted on 1 April 1999, the third applicant submitted a request to the Security Police to see all files that might exist on him. In a decision dated 17 November 1999 the Security Police granted him access to thirty pages, two of which could only be read on the Security Police's premises and could not be copied by technical means. Copies of the twenty-eight remaining pages were sent to his home. Twenty-five of these consisted of the decision by the Parliamentary Ombudsperson concerning the above-mentioned matter and the three remaining pages were copies of press articles, two dealing with the applicant and a third, not mentioning him, consisting of a notice from the paper Proletären about a forthcoming 1993 KPML(r) party congress. Thus, all of the said twenty-five pages contained publicly available, not classified, material. The two pages which the third applicant was permitted to see on the Security Police's premises consisted of two security checks concerning him dating from 1980. These were copies of forms used by the FMV (the Försvarets Materialverk, an authority responsible for procuring equipment for the Swedish Army, and with whom the Ericsson Group worked) to request a personnel check (now known as a register check) concerning the third applicant. The registered information contained the following text in full:

    "In September 1979 it was revealed that [THE THIRD APPLICANT] was/is a member of the Frölunda cell of the KPML(r) in Gothenburg. At this time he was in contact with leading members of the KPML(r) regarding a party meeting in the Frölunda town square."

    25. The third applicant submitted that the above information about his membership of the KPML(r) was the real reason for the FMV's demand that he be removed from his post, although every authority involved would deny this. He pointed out that the KPML(r) was a registered and lawful political party that took part in elections.

    26. On 24 November 1999 the third applicant appealed against the decision of the Security Police to the Administrative Court of Appeal, maintaining his request to see all the material that the Security Police might have on him. He disputed inter alia that the material released to him revealed that he constituted a security risk. By a judgment of 14 February 2000 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected his request, giving the same type of reasons as in the cases of the first and second applicants above.

    27. On 13 April 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court refused to grant the third applicant leave to appeal.

    D. The fourth applicant, Mr Bengt Frejd

    28. The fourth applicant, Mr Bengt Frejd, has since 1972 been a member of the KPML(r) and since 1974 the Chairman of Proletären FF, a sports club which has about 900 members. He is renowned within sports circles in Sweden and has actively worked with children and young people in sport, both nationally and internationally, to foster international solidarity and facilitate social integration through sport.

    29. On 23 January 1999 the fourth applicant requested access to information about him contained in the Security Police register, which he suspected had been entered because of his political opinions. On 4 February 1999 the Security Police rejected his request under the rules on absolute secrecy.

    30. The fourth applicant renewed his request after the abolition of the rule on 1 April 1999. On 8 February 2000 the Security Police granted the fourth applicant permission to see parts of his file.

    This comprised, firstly, fifty-seven pages of paper cuttings and various information concerning him and other athletes and sports leaders, their participation in conferences, meetings and tournaments, and about sport and the promotion of social integration through sport, particularly involving international exchanges and solidarity in co-operation with the African National Congress ("the ANC") in South Africa. There was information about a much publicised sports project in 1995, where representatives of several sports such as basketball, football, and handball had left Sweden for South Africa with the aim of helping young people in black townships. A number of people from within the Swedish sports movement whom the fourth applicant had met, many of whom were unrelated to political organisations, had been mentioned in his file. These included, for example, a prominent sports leader, Mr Stefan Albrechtson, who had himself been subjected to Security Police surveillance.

    The file further included a number of items dealing with sports organisations and events, such as an appeal (in the file from as late as 1993) from all the sports clubs in Gothenburg demanding lower fees for the use of sports fields, a document with the names of some one hundred people including that of the fourth applicant and in some instances their telephone numbers. A list of the participants at a spring meeting of the Gothenburg Handball League could also be found.

    In addition to the above material the fourth applicant was granted access on 28 February 1999 to two pages from his file, provided that they were read on the Security Police's premises and not reproduced by technical means. The pages contained the following information:

    "1 January 1973. F is a member of the KPML(r) and has been working actively for half a year. He is responsible for propaganda in the Högsbo-Järnbrott group of the KPML(r), 4 March 1975. According to an article in the Göteborgs Tidningen of 4 March 1975, F is the Chairman of Proletären FF, 9 June 1977. According to an article in Stadsdelsnytt/Väster, F is one of the leaders of the youth section of Proletären FF, 6 September 1979. F is No. 19 on the KPML(r) ballot for the municipal elections in the fourth constituency of Gothenburg. Not elected."

    31. On 1 March 2000 the fourth applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal against the decision of the Security Police, requesting to see his file in its entirety and all other records that might have been entered concerning him. He disputed the Security Police's right to store the information that had already been released to him and stressed that none of it justified considering him a security risk.

    On 12 May 2000 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the fourth applicant's appeal, basically on the same grounds as those stated in the judgments pertaining to the first, second and third applicants.

    32. On 29 August 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the fourth applicant leave to appeal.

    E. The fifth applicant, Mr Herman Schmid

    33. The fifth applicant, Mr Herman Schmid, was from 1999 to 2004 a member of the European Parliament, belonging to the GUE/NGL Group and sitting for the Swedish Left Party (Vänsterpartiet).

    34. On 9 December 1997 the fifth applicant filed a request with the Ministry of Defence to have access to the data files and all entries about him that may have been made in the Security Police registers. On 20 January 1998 the Ministry of Defence informed him that the request had been transmitted to the Defence Authority (Försvarsmakten) for decision. On the same date the fifth applicant was informed about another Government decision to remove secrecy regarding certain information contained in an attachment B to a report entitled "The Military Intelligence Service, Part 2" (Den militära underrättelsetjänsten. Del 2). In this research document, which had previously been released to two journalists, it was stated:

    "One document (...) contains the information that among the teachers listed in the Malmö ABF [Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund - Workers' Association of Education] study programme for the autumn of 1968 are sociologists Schmid and Karin Adamek. It was stated that both of them had previously been reported in different contexts."

    On 19 March 1998 the National Police Authority sent a duplicate letter to the fifth applicant and an unknown number of other claimants announcing that their requests for access to registered information had been rejected.

    35. On 29 October 1999 the Security Police took a new decision granting the fifth applicant access to "eight pages from the Security Police archives with the exception of information regarding the Security Police staff and ... internal classifications", on the condition that the documents be consulted on the Security Police's premises and not copied by technical means. As far as all other information was concerned the former rejection of his request remained, with the following standard reasoning:

    "All information about whether or not you are reported in other security cases filed by the Security Police is subject to secrecy according to Chapter 5, section 1(2), of the Secrecy Act. Thus such information cannot be released without jeopardising the purpose of actions taken or planned, or without detriment to future activity."

    On the above-mentioned date the fifth applicant visited the police headquarters in Malmö in order to have access to the eight pages in question. While under surveillance, he read out loud the text on each page and tape-recorded the reading, for later transcription. According to a transcript provided by the applicant, the entries bore various dates between 18 January 1963 and 21 October 1975.

    The above-mentioned entries concerned mostly political matters such as participation in a campaign for nuclear disarmament and general peace movement activities, including public demonstrations and activities related to membership of the Social-Democratic Student Association. According to one entry dated 12 May 1969, the fifth applicant had extreme left-wing leanings and had stated that during demonstrations one should proceed with guerrilla tactics in small groups and if necessary use violence in order to stage the demonstration and achieve its purposes. There were also some notes about job applications he had made for university posts and a report he had given to the Norwegian police with his comments in connection with the murder of a Moroccan citizen, Mr Bouchiki, in Lillehammer on 21 July 1973. Finally, the documents contained entries on the opening of a boarding school for adults (folkhögskola) in 1984 in which the fifth applicant had played a major role.

    The fifth applicant, for his part, challenged the allegation that he had advocated violence, saying that it was totally against his principles and emphasising that since 1960 he had been active in the peace movement in Skåne and was a well-known pacifist who had been imprisoned three times on account of his conscientious objection to military service.

    36. On 29 November 1999 the applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal against the Security Police's refusal to give him access to all the information about him registered in their archives. He disputed their right to store the information to which he had had access. The appeal was dismissed by a judgment of 15 May 2000 on the same grounds as those given to the other applicants in the present case.

    37. On 27 June 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the fifth applicant leave to appeal.

    F. Particulars of the KPML (r) party programme

    38. Clause 1 of the KPML (r) party programme states that the party is a revolutionary workers' party whose goal is the complete transformation of existing society. Clause 4 affirms that the power of the bourgeoisie in society is protected by the State and rests ultimately on its organs of violence, such as the police, armed forces, courts and jails, supplemented to some extent by private security companies. Clause 22 provides that the socialist transformation of society has to take place contrary to the laws and regulations of bourgeois society and that for a transitional period a revolutionary dictatorship of the working class will be established. Clause 23 states that the forms of the socialist revolution are determined by the prevailing concrete conditions but that the bourgeoisie will use any means available to prevent the establishment of real people's power and the revolutionary forces must therefore prepare themselves for an armed struggle. According to Clause 28, socialist democracy does not make any distinction between economic and political power, or between judicial and executive power, but subjects all social functions to the influence of the working people.

    II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

    39. Domestic provisions of relevance to the present case are found in a number of instruments. Certain constitutional provisions regarding freedom of opinion, expression and association found in the Instrument of Government (regeringsformen) provide the starting point. This is also the case with regard to the principle of free access to official documents enshrined in the Freedom of the Press Ordinance (tryckfrihetsförordningen) and the restrictions on that freedom imposed by the Secrecy Act (sekretesslagen, 1980:100). The Security Police's handling of personal information is regulated in the Police Data Act (polisdatalagen, 1998:602, which entered into force on 1 April 1999), the Police Data Ordinance (polisdataförordningen, 1999:81, which also entered into force on 1 April 1999), the Personal Data Act (personuppgiftslagen, 1998:204) and the Personal Data Ordinance (personuppgiftsförordningen, 1998:1191).

    A. Constitutional guarantees

    40. Chapter 2, section 1, subsection 1, of the Instrument of Government ("the Constitution") guarantees the freedom to form opinions, the right to express them and the right to join others in the expression of such opinions. The freedoms and rights referred to in Chapter 2, section 1, subsection 1, may be restricted by law to the extent provided for in sections 13-16. Restrictions may only be imposed to achieve a purpose which is acceptable in a democratic society. A restriction may never exceed what is necessary having regard to its purpose, nor may it be so onerous as to constitute a threat to the free expression of opinion, which is one of the foundations of democracy. No restriction may be imposed solely on grounds of political, religious, cultural or other such opinions (Chapter 2, section 12).

    41. According to Chapter 2, section 13, freedom of expression may be restricted, for instance, "having regard to the security of the Realm". However, the second paragraph of the latter provision states that "[i]n judging what restraints may be imposed by virtue of the preceding paragraph, particular regard shall be had to the importance of the widest possible freedom of expression and freedom of information in political, religious, professional, scientific and cultural matters". The term "security of the Realm" covers both external and internal security.

    42. With regard to freedom of association, fewer limitations are provided for. It follows from Chapter 2, section 14, that it may be restricted "only in respect of organisations whose activities are of a military or quasi-military nature, or which involve the persecution of a population group of a particular race, skin colour or ethnic origin".

    43. Chapter 2, section 3, provides that no entry regarding a citizen in a public register may be based, without his or her consent, exclusively on that person's political opinion. The prohibition is absolute.

    44. Under Chapter 2, section 2, of the Freedom of the Press Ordinance, everyone is entitled to have access to an official document unless, within defined areas, such access is limited by law.

    B. Security intelligence

    45. The Security Police form part of the National Police Board (Rikspolisstyrelsen). The Security Police are engaged in four major fields of activity. Three of them - the upholding of the Constitution, counter-espionage and counter-terrorism - fall under the common heading of security intelligence. The fourth area concerns security protection.

    1. Legal basis for registration

    46. The legal basis for the register kept by the Security Police before 1999 has been described in the Leander v. Sweden judgment of 26 March 1987 (Series A no. 116, pp. 12-13, §§ 19-22). For the period thereafter the matter is governed by the 1999 Police Data Act and Ordinance. The Police Data Act is a lex specialis in relation to the 1998 Personal Data Act. The Security Police's own rules of procedure (arbetsordning), which are not public in their entirety, contain more detailed rules on the registration and use of personal information.

    47. Section 5 of the Police Data Act (under the heading "Processing of sensitive personal data") provides:

    "Personal information may not be processed merely on the ground of what is known about the person's race or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical conviction, membership of a trade union, health or sexual orientation.

    If personal information is processed on another ground, the information may be completed with such particulars as are mentioned in the first sub-section if it is strictly necessary for the purposes of the processing."

    48. Section 32 reads:

    "The Security Police shall keep a register (SÄPO-registret) for the purposes of:

    1. facilitating investigations undertaken in order to prevent and uncover crimes against national security;

    2. facilitating investigations undertaken in order to combat terrorist offences under section 2 of the Act; or

    3. providing a basis for security checks under the Security Protection Act (säkerhetsskyddslagen, 1996:627). The Security Police are responsible (personuppgiftsansvarig) for the processing of personal data in the register."

    49. Section 33 of the Police Data Act reads:

    "The Security Police's register may contain personal information only if:

    1. The person concerned by the information is suspected of having engaged in or of intending to engage in criminal activity that entails a threat to national security or a terrorist offence;

    2. The person concerned has undergone a security check under the Security Protection Act; or

    3. Considering the purpose for which the register is kept, there are other special reasons therefor.

    The register shall indicate the grounds for data entry. The Government may lay down further regulations on the type of data that may be entered (Act 2003:157)."

    The scope of the expression "special reasons" in section 33 (3) of the Police Data Act is commented on in the preparatory work in respect of that legislation (Government Bill 1997/98:97, pp. 153-54 and pp. 177-78), where the following points are made in particular. In order to enable the Security Police to perform the tasks assigned to them by the pertinent legislation, it could in certain cases be deemed necessary to register persons also for reasons other than those laid down in section 33 (1) and (2): for instance information about persons who were connected with other persons registered under section 33 (1) and (2); persons who could be the targets of threats and persons who could be the object of recruitment attempts by foreign intelligence services. In order for the Security Police to be able to prevent and uncover crimes against national security, it was necessary to survey and identify potential threats and recruitment attempts. It should also be possible for the Security Police to identify links between persons who move to Sweden after having participated in oppositional activities in their home countries. Moreover, it should be possible for the Security Police to register information about persons who have been smuggled to Sweden on assignment from foreign non-democratic regimes with the task of collecting information concerning fellow countrymen. There was a need to continuously update information concerning such informers. Also information concerning contacts with foreign missions in Sweden was relevant in this context.

    The Government stated that the fact that an individual's name had been included in the register did not necessarily mean that he or she was suspected of an offence or other incriminating activities. Other than the examples already mentioned above from the preparatory works, the Government gave the following illustrations:

    - he or she is in contact with someone suspected of a crime;

    - he or she is in contact with personnel from a foreign mission;

    - he or she has attracted the attention of a foreign intelligence service or is used by such a service;

    - he or she is engaged in a circle that has attracted the attention of a foreign intelligence service;

    - he or she is used by an organisation whose activities are the subject of an investigation regarding threats to security;

    - he or she is the referee of a foreign citizen seeking a visa;

    - he or she has contacted the Security Police and provided information;

    - he or she is contacted by the Security Police.

    The Government stated that information in respect of the person in question may be needed in order to make a chart of the interests of an entity (State, organisational or individual) constituting a threat to Swedish security, and the extent and development of that threat.

    50. Section 34 of the Police Data Act provides:

    "The Security Police register may only contain:

    - information for identification;

    - information on the grounds for registration; and

    - references to the files where information concerning the registered person can be found."

    51. Under section 3 of the Personal Data Act, the treatment of personal information includes every operation or series of operations carried out with respect to personal information, whether automatic or manual. Examples of such treatment are the gathering, entry, collation, storage, processing, use, release and destruction of personal information. Personal information is defined by the same provision as all kinds of information that relates directly or indirectly to a physical, living person. The Personal Data Act applies to the processing of personal information that is wholly or partially automated. It also applies to all other processing of personal data if the information is or is intended to be part of a structured collection of personal information that can be accessed by means of a search or compilation according to certain criteria (section 5).

    2. Registration and filing

    52. Documents that contain information are collected in files. Depending on its content, a document may, when needed, either be placed in a file on a certain individual, a personal file (personakt), or in a so-called thematic file (sakakt). It may also be added to both kinds of files.

    53. A thematic registration is made, and a thematic file opened, whenever there is a need to collect and compile documents systematically. The documents may concern a matter or a subject that the Security Police has a duty to supervise or cover, or on which the Security Police needs to have access to relevant information for any other reason. A thematic file may be started in order to collect documents that concern the relations between States and organisations. It may also be started in order to collect a certain type of document, for instance a series of reports. It should be observed that thematic registration as such does not mean that names are entered into the Security Police's register, even though names may be found in the documents of a thematic file. Thus, a search for a person who has been mentioned in a thematic file cannot be made unless, for independent reasons, that person has also been registered in a personal file. Moreover, the name of a person who has been registered personally may occur in a thematic file but may still not show up in a search for the name in the latter file if, for instance, the name in the thematic file lacks relevance for the Security Police.

    3. Correction and destruction of registered information

    54. The Data Inspection Board (Datainspektionen) monitors compliance with the Personal Data Act (unlike the Records Board which supervises the Security Police's compliance with the Police Data Act). The Data Inspection Board is empowered to deal with individual complaints and, if it finds that personal information is not processed in accordance with the Personal Data Act, it is required to call attention to that fact and request that the situation be corrected. If the situation remains unchanged, the Board has the power to prohibit, on penalty of a fine (vite), the person responsible for the register from continuing to process the information in any other way than by storing it (section 45 of the Personal Data Act).

    55. The Data Inspection Board may request a county administrative court to order the erasure of personal information that has been processed in an unlawful manner (section 47 of the Act).

    4. Removal of registered information

    56. Registered information in respect of an individual suspected of committing or of being liable to commit criminal activities that threaten national security or a terrorist offence, shall as a rule be removed no later than 10 years after the last entry of information concerning that person was made (the Police Data Act, section 35). The same applies to information that has been included in the register for other special reasons connected with the purpose of the register. The information may be kept for a longer period if justified by particular reasons. More detailed rules concerning the removal of information are to be found in the regulations and decisions issued by the National Archives (Riksarkivet) and in the Security Police's own rules of procedure. All documents removed by the Security Police are transferred to the National Archives.

    C. Access to official documents

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    57. The limitations on access in this particular field before 1 April 1999 have been described in detail in the above-cited Leander judgment (§§ 41-43). With regard to access to information kept by the Security Police, absolute secrecy was thus the principal rule prior to 1 April 1999. The only exceptions made were for the benefit of researchers. From 1 July 1996 it was also possible to allow exemptions (dispens) if the Government held the view that there were extraordinary reasons for an exemption to be made from the main rule of absolute secrecy.

    58. The absolute secrecy of files kept exclusively by the Security Police was abolished by an amendment to Chapter 5, section 1, subsection 2, of the Secrecy Act, made at the same time as the Police Data Act entered into force on 1 April 1999. According to the amended provision, information concerning the Security Police's intelligence activities referred to in section 3 of the Police Data Act, or that otherwise concerns the Security Police's activities for the prevention and investigation of crimes against national security, or to prevent terrorism, was to be kept secret. However, if it was evident that the information could be revealed without detriment to the aim of measures that had already been decided upon or that were anticipated, or without harm to future activities, the information should be disclosed. When submitting the relevant Bill to Parliament, the Government stressed that the nature of the intelligence service was such that information could only be disclosed in special cases. They presumed that in other cases the fact that a person was not registered would also remain secret (Government Bill 1997/98:97, p. 68).

    A fourth subsection was added to section 1 of Chapter 5 on 1 March 2003, under which a person may upon request be informed of whether or not he or she can be found in the Security Police's files as a consequence of registration in accordance with the Personnel Security Check Ordinance that was in force until 1 July 1996 or corresponding older regulations. However, the Government were still of the view that there were in principle no reasons for the Security Police to reveal whether or not there was any information concerning an individual in its files and registers:

    "The Government acknowledge that it may appear unsatisfactory not to be given a clear answer from the Security Police as to whether an individual is registered in its files or not. There are, however, valid reasons for the Security Police not to disclose in certain cases whether a person appears in Security Police records. This point of view was also taken in the preparatory notes to the Police Data Act (Government Bill 1997/98:97 p. 68) where it was stated that a person linked to criminal activities may have a strong interest in knowing whether the police have any information regarding him or her. In such a case, it could be very damaging for an investigation if it was revealed to the person in question either that he or she was of interest to the police or that he or she was not. It is therefore essential that the information whether a person appears [in the files] or not may be kept secret." (Government Bill 2001/02:191, pp. 90-91)

    59. The Security Police apply the Secrecy Act directly. There are thus no internal regulations that deal with the issue of access to official documents since that would be in breach of the Secrecy Act. Under the Secrecy Act Chapter 5, section 1, sub-section 2, there is a presumption of secrecy, meaning that whenever it is uncertain whether the disclosure of information in an official document is harmful or not, such information shall not be disclosed.

    60. A request for access to official documents kept by the Security Police would give rise to a search to ascertain whether or not the person in question appears in the files. If there is no information, the person who has made the request is not informed thereof and the request is rejected. A few exceptions have been made from this practice in cases where the person concerned has died and the request has been made by his or her children (as in the second applicant's case). However, if information is found, the Security Police make an assessment of whether or not all or part of it can be disclosed. It is not indicated whether the disclosed information is all that exists in the files.

    61. The Government stated that it was set practice for the Administrative Court of Appeal to visit the Security Police and take part of its files - if any - in every case that had been brought to it. The three judges examine each document and make an assessment of every document that has not been released to the appellant. If the appellant does not appear in the register and files of the Security Service, the Court obtains part of a computer print-out showing that the appellant does not appear in the documents kept by the Security Service.

    D. Review bodies

    1. The Records Board

    62. The Records Board (registernämden) was established in 1996 and has replaced the National Police Board (described in paragraphs 19 to 34 of the above-mentioned Leander judgment). It is entrusted with the task of determining whether information kept by the Security Police may be disclosed in security checks, to monitor the Security Police's registration and storage of information and the Service's compliance with the Police Data Act, in particular section 5 (see section 1 of the Ordinance prescribing Instructions for the Records Board - förordningen med instruktion för Registernämnden, 1996:730). In order to carry out its supervisory function, the Board is entitled to have access to information held by the Service (section 11). It presents an annual report to the Government on its activities (section 6). The report is made public.

    Under sections 2 and 13 of the Ordinance containing instructions for the Records Board, the Board consists of a maximum of eight members, including a chairperson and a vice-chairperson, all appointed by the Government for a fixed term. The chairperson and the vice-chairperson have to be or to have been permanent judges. The remaining members include parliamentarians. The Records Board's independence is guaranteed by, inter alia, Chapter 11, section 7, of the Constitution, from which it follows that neither Parliament nor the Government nor any other public authority may interfere with the manner in which the Board deals with a particular case.

    2. The Data Inspection Board

    63. Under section 1 of the Ordinance containing Instructions for the Data Inspection Board (1998:1192), this Board's main task is to protect individuals from violations of their personal integrity through the processing of personal data. The Board is competent to receive complaints from individuals. Its independence is guaranteed, inter alia, by Chapter 11, Article 7, of the Constitution.

    64. In order to carry out its monitoring function, the Data Inspection Board is entitled to have access to the personal data that is being processed, to receive relevant additional information and documentation pertaining to the processing of personal data and to the safety measures in respect of the processing and, moreover, to have access to the premises where the processing takes place (the Personal Data Act, section 43).

    The Board's powers in relation to the correction and erasure of registered data are summarised in paragraphs 55 and 56 above.

    65. A personal data representative (personuppgiftsombud) has been appointed within the Security Police with the function of ensuring independently that the personal data controller processes personal data in a lawful and correct manner and in accordance with good practice, and of pointing out any shortcomings. If the representative has reason to suspect that the controller has contravened the provisions on the processing of personal data, and if the situation is not rectified as soon as is practicable after being pointed out, the representative shall notify the Data Inspection Board (section 38 (1) and (2) of the Personal Data Act).

    3. Other review bodies

    66. The Security Police, the Records Board and the Data Inspection Board and their activities come under the supervision of the Parliamentary Ombudspersons and the Chancellor of Justice. Their functions and powers are described in the above-mentioned Leander judgment (pp. 16-18, §§ 36-39).

    67. Unlike the Parliamentary Ombudspersons, the Chancellor of Justice may award compensation in response to a claim from an individual that a public authority has taken a wrongful decision or omitted to take a decision. This power of the Chancellor of Justice is laid down in the Ordinance concerning the Administration of Claims for Damages against the State (förordningen om handläggning av skadeståndsanspråk mot staten, 1995:1301). The Chancellor may examine claims under several provisions of the Tort Liability Act (skadeståndslagen, 1972:207), notably Chapter 3, section 2, pursuant to which the State shall be liable to pay compensation for financial loss caused by a wrongful act or omission in connection with the exercise of public authority. Compensation for non-pecuniary damage may be awarded in connection with the infliction of personal injury or the commission of certain crimes, such as defamation (Chapter 5, section 1, and Chapter 1, section 3).

    A decision by the Chancellor of Justice to reject a claim for damages in full or in part may not be appealed. The individual may, however, institute civil proceedings against the State before a district court, with the possibility of appealing to a higher court. In the alternative, such proceedings may be instituted immediately without any previous decision by the Chancellor. Before the courts, the State is represented by the Chancellor.

    68. Under section 48 of the Personal Data Act, a person responsible for a register shall pay compensation to a data subject for any damage or injury to personal integrity caused by the processing of personal data in breach of the Act.

    THE LAW

    I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

    69. Article 8 of the Convention reads insofar as relevant as follows:

    "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ...

    2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, ... [or] for the prevention of disorder or crime, ..."

    A. Storage of the information that had been released to the applicants

    70. Under Article 8 of the Convention the applicants complained that the storage in the Security Police files of the information that had been released to them constituted unjustified interference with their right to respect for private life.

    1. Applicability of Article 8

    71. The Government questioned whether the information released to the applicants could be said to fall within the scope of the notion of private life for the purposes of Article 8 § 1. They stressed that the information that had been released to the first applicant did not concern her own activities but the activities of other persons, namely those responsible for the letter bombs that had been sent to her and others. The information kept on the other applicants that was subsequently released to them appeared to a large extent to have emanated from open sources, such as observations made in connection with their public activities (the second applicant's participation in a meeting abroad and the fifth applicant's participation in a demonstration in Stockholm). In addition, the main bulk of the information was already in the public domain since it consisted of newspaper articles (the third, fourth and fifth applicants), radio programmes (the fifth applicant) or of decisions by public authorities (decision by the Parliamentary Ombudspersons with regard to the third applicant). None of them had alleged that the released information was false or incorrect.

    72. The Court, having regard to the scope of the notion of "private life" as interpreted in its case-law (see, in particular, Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, § 65 ECHR 2000-II, and Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 43, ECHR 2000-V), finds that the information about the applicants that was stored on the Secret Police register and was released to them clearly constituted data pertaining to their "private life". Indeed, this embraces even those parts of the information that were public since the information had been systematically collected and stored in files held by the authorities. Accordingly, Article 8 § 1 of the Convention is applicable to the impugned storage of the information in question.

    2. Compliance with Article 8

    (a) Whether there was any interference

    73. The Court further considers, and this has not been disputed, that it follows from its established case-law that the storage of the information at issue amounted to interference with the applicants' right to respect for private life as secured by Article 8 § 1 of the Convention (see Leander, cited above, p. 22, § 48; Kopp v. Switzerland, 25 March 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-II, p. 540, § 53; Amann, cited above, §§ 69 and 80; and Rotaru, cited above, § 46).

    (b) Justification for the interference

    (i) Whether the interference was in accordance with the law

    74. The applicants did not deny that the contested storage of information had a legal basis in domestic law. However they maintained that the relevant law lacked the requisite quality flowing from the autonomous meaning of the expression "in accordance with the law". In particular, they submitted that the terms of the relevant national provisions were not formulated with sufficient precision to enable them to foresee - even with the assistance of legal advice - the consequences of their own conduct. The ground of "special reasons" in section 33 (3) of the Police Data Act was excessively broad and could be applied to almost anybody. This had been amply illustrated by the instances of gathering and storage of information that had been released to them.

    75. The Government submitted that not only did the impugned interference have a basis in domestic law but that the law was also sufficiently accessible and foreseeable to meet the quality requirement under the Court's case-law.

    76. The Court reiterates its settled case-law, according to which the expression "in accordance with the law" not only requires the impugned measure to have some basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see, among other authorities, Rotaru, cited above, § 52). The law must be compatible with the rule of law, which means that it must provide a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by paragraph 1 of Article 8. Especially where, as here, a power of the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. Since the implementation in practice of measures of secret surveillance is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned or the public at large, it would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (see Malone v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, pp. 32-33, §§ 67-68, reiterated in Amann, cited above, § 56, and in Rotaru, cited above, § 55).

    77. In this regard the Court notes from the outset that the legal basis in Swedish law of the collection and storage of information on the Secret Police register, and the quality of that law prior to the amendments which entered into force on 1 April 1999, were the subject of the Court's scrutiny in the above-cited Leander judgment (§§ 19-22). It concluded that such measures had a legal basis in the national law and that the law in question was sufficiently accessible and foreseeable to satisfy the quality requirements flowing from the autonomous interpretation of the expression "in accordance with the law" (ibid, §§ 52-57). In the present instance, the parties have centred their pleadings on the situation after 1 April 1999. The Court will therefore not deal of its own motion with the period before that date and will limit its examination to the subsequent period.

    78. In the first place the Court is satisfied that the storage of the information at issue had a legal basis in sections 5, 32 and 33 of the 1998 Police Data Act.

    79. Secondly, as to the question regarding the quality of the law, the Court notes that, as is made clear by the terms of section 33 of the Police Data Act, "[t]he Security Police's register may contain personal information only" (emphasis added) on any of the grounds set out in sub-sections 1, 2 or 3. The Court considers that an issue may arise but only in relation to the apparent broadness of the ground in sub-section 3 of section 33: "Considering the purpose for which the register is kept, there are other special reasons therefor" (see paragraph 49 above). The Government stated that a person may be registered without his or her being incriminated in any way. Here the preparatory work gives some specific and clear examples: in particular, a person who is connected with another person who has been registered, a person who may be the target of a threat and a person who may be the object of recruitment by a foreign intelligence service (ibid.). The Government have also given examples of wider categories, for instance "a person in contact with someone suspected of a crime" (ibid.). It is clear that the Security Service enjoys a certain discretion in assessing who and what information should be registered and also if there are "special reasons" other than those mentioned in section 33 (1) and (2) (a person suspected of a crime threatening national security or a terrorist offence, or undergoing a security check).

    However, the discretion afforded to the Security Service in determining what constitutes "special reasons" under section 33 § 3 is not unfettered. Under the Swedish Constitution, no entry regarding a citizen may be made in a public register, exclusively on the basis of that person's political opinion, without his or her consent. A general prohibition of registration on the basis of political opinion is further set out in section 5 of the Police Data Act. The purpose of the register must be borne in mind where registration is made for "special reasons" under Article 33 § 3. Under section 32 of the Police Data Act, the purpose of storing information on the Secret Police register must be to facilitate investigations undertaken to prevent and uncover crimes against national security or to combat terrorism. Further limitations follow from section 34 governing the manner of recording data in the Secret Police register.

    Against this background, the Court finds that the scope of the discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise was indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.

    80. Accordingly, the interference with the respective applicants' private life was "in accordance with the law", within the meaning of Article 8.

    (ii) Aim and necessity of the interference

    81. The applicants stressed the absence of any concrete actions recorded by the Security Police that substantiated the alleged risk that any of the applicants might be connected with terrorism, espionage or any other relevant crime.

    82. The Government maintained that the interference pursued one or more legitimate aims: the prevention of crime, in so far as the first applicant's own safety was concerned by the bomb threats, and the interests of national security with regard to all the applicants. In each case the interference was moreover "necessary" for the achievement of the legitimate aim or aims pursued.

    83. The Government submitted that they were at a loss to understand the reason why the first applicant should claim at all that the Security Police's registration and filing of information concerning threats against her were not in her best interests but, on the contrary, entailed a violation of her rights under the Convention. The information that had been released to the other four applicants was highly varied in nature. Most of it appeared to have been found in the public domain, such as the media. The Government were unaware of the origins of each and every piece of information and therefore could not comment on that particular aspect. They noted, however, that from today's perspective the information seemed either fairly old or quite harmless and was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, namely the protection of national security.

    84. As to the second applicant, given the Cold War context at the time, it could not be deemed unreasonable for the Security Police to have kept themselves informed about a meeting in 1967 of left-wing sympathizers in Poland in which he may have taken part. He had not been the subject of personal data registration and the information about him had been carefully phrased (with the use of the word "probably").

    85. The third and fourth applicants had since the 1970s been members of the KPML(r), a political party which advocated the use of violence in order to bring about a change in the existing social order. One of the Security Police's duties was to uphold the Constitution, namely, in preventing and uncovering threats against the nation's internal security. It was evident that persons who were members of political parties like the KPML(r) would attract the attention of the Security Police.

    86. The case of the fifth applicant should also be seen against the background of the Cold War and he too seemed to have advocated violence as a means of bringing about changes in society. According to one of the entries in the records released to him, he was said to have stated that violence could be resorted to in order to stage demonstrations and to achieve their goals.

    (iii) Assessment by the Court

    87. The Court accepts that the storage of the information in question pursued legitimate aims, namely the prevention of disorder or crime, in the case of the first applicant, and the protection of national security, in that of the remainder of the applicants.

    88. While the Court recognises that intelligence services may legitimately exist in a democratic society, it reiterates that powers of secret surveillance of citizens are tolerable under the Convention only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions (see Klass and Others v. Germany, judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, p. 21, § 42; and Rotaru, cited above, § 47). Such interference must be supported by relevant and sufficient reasons and must be proportionate to the legitimate aim or aims pursued. In this connection the Court considers that the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the respondent State in protecting its national security and combating terrorism must be balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the respective applicants' right to respect for private life. Here again the Court will limit its examination to the period from 1999 onwards.

    89. In so far as the first applicant is concerned, the Court finds no reason to doubt that the reasons for keeping on record the information relating to bomb threats in 1990 against her and certain other personalities were relevant and sufficient as regards the aim of preventing disorder or crime. The measure was at least in part motivated by the interest in protecting her security; there can be no question of any disproportionate interference with her right to respect for private life thus being entailed. The Court has received no particulars about the precise contents of the documents released to the applicant on 13 December 2002 and will not therefore examine that matter.

    90. However, as to the information released to the second applicant (i.e. his participation in a political meeting in Warsaw in 1967), the Court, bearing in mind the nature and age of the information, does not find that its continued storage is supported by reasons which are relevant and sufficient as regards the protection of national security.

    Similarly, the storage of the information released to the fifth applicant could in most part hardly be deemed to correspond to any actual relevant national security interests for the respondent State. The continued storage of the information to the effect that he, in 1969, had allegedly advocated violent resistance to police control during demonstrations was supported by reasons that, although relevant, could not be deemed sufficient thirty years later.

    Therefore, the Court finds that the continued storage of the information released to the second and fifth applicants entailed a disproportionate interference with their right to respect for private life.

    91. The information released to the third and fourth applicants raises more complex issues in that it related to their membership of the KPML(r), a political party which, the Government stressed, advocated the use of violence and breaches of the law in order to bring about change in the existing social order. In support of their argument, the Government submitted a copy of the KPML(r) party programme, as adopted on 2-4 January 1993, and referred in particular to its Clauses 4, 22, 23 and 28 (see paragraph 38 above).

    The Court observes that the relevant clauses of the KPML(r) party programme rather boldly advocate establishing the domination of one social class over another by disregarding existing laws and regulations. However, the programme contains no statements amounting to an immediate and unequivocal call for the use of violence as a means of achieving political ends. Clause 23, for instance, which contains the most explicit statements on the matter, is more nuanced in this respect and does not propose violence as either a primary or an inevitable means in all circumstances. Nonetheless, it affirms the principle of armed opposition.

    However, the Court reiterates that "the constitution and programme of a political party cannot be taken into account as the sole criterion for determining its objectives and intentions; the contents of the programme must be compared with the actions of the party's leaders and the positions they defend" (see, mutatis mutandis, Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, § 101, ECHR 2003-II; United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 30 January 1998, Reports 1998-I, p. 22, § 46; Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 25 May 1998, Reports 1998-III, p. 1258, § 50; and Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey [GC], no. 23885/94, § 45, ECHR 1999-VIII). This approach, which the Court has adopted in assessing the necessity under Article 11 § 2 of the Convention of the dissolution of a political party, is also pertinent for assessing the necessity in the interests of national security under Article 8 § 2 of collecting and storing information on a secret police register about the leaders and members of a political party.

    In this case, the KPML(r) party programme was the only evidence relied upon by the Government. Beyond that they did not point to any specific circumstance indicating that the impugned programme clauses were reflected in actions or statements by the party's leaders or members and constituted an actual or even potential threat to national security when the information was released in 1999, almost 30 years after the party had come into existence. Therefore, the reasons for the continued storage of the information about the third and forth applicants, although relevant, may not be considered sufficient for the purposes of the necessity test to be applied under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Thus, the continued storage of the information released to the respective applicants in 1999 amounted to a disproportionate interference with their right to respect for private life.

    92. In sum, the Court concludes that the continued storage of the information that had been released was necessary with respect to the first applicant, but not for any of the remaining applicants. Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention with regard to the first applicant, but that there has been a violation of this provision with regard to each of the other applicants.

    B. The refusals to advise the applicants of the full extent to which information was kept about them on the Security Police register

    1. Submissions of the parties

    (i) The applicants

    93. The applicants moreover submitted that the respective refusals to grant full access to all information kept about them on the Security Police register amounted to unjustified interference with their right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention.

    94. In the applicants' view, the interference was not "in accordance with the law" as the relevant national law failed to fulfil the requirements as to quality under the Convention. It had not been foreseeable what kind of information might be stored or what considerations governed the decisions by the Security Police or the courts on each applicant's request for access to information kept on file about them.

    95. Nor was the interference "necessary in a democratic society". The applicants pointed to the absence of any specific information recorded by the Security Police that could substantiate any assumption of a risk that the applicants might be connected with terrorism, espionage or other relevant criminal activities. Moreover, the lack of access to declassified data kept mainly for purely historical or political reasons could not be viewed as strictly necessary.

    In this connection the applicants argued that the relevant law did not offer adequate safeguards against abuse. They stressed that the Records Board, a body established in 1996, had failed to review their files following their request for access. The Board had no power to order the destruction of files or the suppression or rectification of information therein. Nor was it empowered to award compensation. The Data Inspection Board had never carried out a substantial review of the files kept by the Security Police. The Parliamentary Ombudsperson could not grant the applicants access to their files and was not empowered to correct false or irrelevant information therein. The Chancellor of Justice was the Government's lawyer and was therefore not independent.

    (ii) The Government

    96. The Government acknowledged that, at some point in time, the Swedish Security Police had kept some information about the applicants but, referring to their above-mentioned arguments, questioned whether the applicants had shown that there was at least a reasonable likelihood that the Security Police retained personal information about them and that there had consequently been interference with their private life.

    97. However, were the Court to conclude that there was interference with the applicants' rights under Article 8 § 1 in this context, the Government submitted that it was justified under Article 8 § 2; it was "in accordance with the law", pursued a legitimate aim and was "necessary in a democratic society" in order to achieve that aim.

    98. As to the issue of necessity, the Government argued that under Swedish law there were adequate safeguards against abuse:

    (i) The discretion afforded to the Security Police was subject to limitations set out in the more general Personal Data Act, which dealt with the processing of personal information wherever it took place, and the more specific Police Data Act, which in positive terms obliged the Security Police to keep a register, specified its aims and laid down the conditions under which personal information could be included in the register.

    (ii) Both the Constitution and the Police Data Act expressly provided that certain sensitive information could only be registered in exceptional circumstances, that is to say when it was "unavoidably necessary". Under no circumstances could a person be registered by the Security Police simply because of his or her political views or affiliations.

    (iii) The Data Inspection Board was an important safeguard, considering its mandate with respect to the overall treatment of personal information. It was empowered to take various measures to protect personal integrity, such as prohibiting all processing of personal data (other than merely storing it) pending the rectification of illegalities. It could also institute judicial proceedings in order to have registered information erased.

    (iv) The Records Board, another important safeguard, had two functions. It monitored the Security Police's filing and storage of information and the Service's compliance with the Police Data Act. It also determined whether information held by the Security Police could be disclosed in security checks.

    (v) The Parliamentary Ombudspersons supervised the application of laws and other regulations not only by the Security Police themselves but also by the bodies monitoring them (the Data Inspection Board and the Records Board). The Ombudspersons were empowered to carry out inspections and other investigations, to institute criminal proceedings against public officials and report officials for disciplinary action. It was to be recalled that the third applicant's trade union had in fact lodged a complaint with the Parliamentary Ombudspersons, arguing that there had been a breach of the Personnel Security Check Ordinance in connection with the security check carried out with regard to the third applicant, and that the Ombudspersons had voiced some criticism about the manner in which the matter had been handled.

    (vi) The Chancellor of Justice had a role similar to that of the Parliamentary Ombudspersons, was competent to report public servants for disciplinary action, to institute criminal proceedings against them and to award compensation.

    In addition, damages could be claimed under the Tort Liability Act in direct judicial proceedings. The Personal Data Act moreover contained a separate ground for damages that was of relevance in the context of the present case.

    The Government argued that, in view of the absence of any evidence or indication that the system was not functioning as required by domestic law, the framework of safeguards achieved a compromise between the requirements of protecting a democratic society and the rights of the individual which was compatible with the provisions of the Convention.

    2. Assessment by the Court

    99. The Court, bearing in mind its assessment at paragraphs 72 to 73 above, finds it established that the impugned refusal to advise the applicants about the full extent to which information was being kept about them on the Secret Police register amounted to interference with their right to respect for private life.

    100. The refusal had a legal basis in domestic law, namely in Chapter 5, section 1, subsection 2, of the Secrecy Act. As to the quality of the law, the Court refers to its findings at paragraphs 79 to 80 above, as well as paragraphs 57 to 61 above, describing the conditions of a person's access to information about him or her on the Secret Police register. The Court finds no reason to doubt that the interference was "in accordance with the law" within the meaning of Article 8 § 2.

    101. Moreover, the refusal pursued one or more legitimate aims; reference is made to paragraph 87 above.

    102. The Court notes that, according to the Convention case-law, a refusal of full access to a national secret police register is necessary where the State may legitimately fear that the provision of such information may jeopardise the efficacy of a secret surveillance system designed to protect national security and to combat terrorism (see Klass and Others, cited above, § 58, and Leander, cited above, § 66). In this case the national administrative and judicial authorities involved all held that full access would jeopardise the purpose of the system. The Court does not find any ground on which it could arrive at a different conclusion.

    103. Moreover, having regard to the Convention case-law (see Klass and Others, cited above, § 50; Leander, cited above, § 60; David Esbester v. the United Kingdom (dec.) no. 18601/91, 2 April 1993; and Campbell Christie v. the United Kingdom (dec.) no. 21482/93, 27 June 1994) and referring to its findings regarding the quality of the law (see paragraphs 79 and 80 above) and the various guarantees that existed under national law (see paragraphs 52 to 68 above), the Court finds it established that the applicable safeguards met the requirements of Article 8 § 2.

    104. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the respondent State, having regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, was entitled to consider that the interests of national security and the fight against terrorism prevailed over the interests of the applicants in being advised of the full extent to which information was kept about them on the Security Police register.

    Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention under this head.

    II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION

    105. The applicants complained that in so far as the storage of secret information was used as a means of surveillance of political dissidents, as was particularly noticeable with regard to the first and fourth applicants, it entailed a violation of their rights under Article 10 of the Convention. That Article provides insofar as relevant as follows:

    "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...

    2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, [or] for the prevention of disorder or crime, ..."

    They further complained that, for each of them, membership of a political party had been a central factor in the decision to file secret information on them. This state of affairs constituted an unjustified interference with their rights under Article 11, which provides in so far as relevant as follows:

    "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

    2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or ... for the prevention of disorder or crime, ..."

    106. The Government argued that no separate issues arose under either Article 10 or Article 11 in the circumstances of the present case in so far as the first, second, fourth and fifth applicants were concerned. They had not been the subject of personnel security checks. The information on them held by the Security Police was apparently never consulted by third parties. In fact, it seemed only to have been released to the applicants themselves following their own requests for access. Furthermore, their suspicions that the Security Police were holding information on them - suspicions that were confirmed when information was indeed released to them - appeared not to have had any impact on their opportunities to exercise their rights under either Article 10 or Article 11. They had at all times been free to hold and express their political or other opinions. It was not supported by the facts of the present case that their opportunities to enjoy freedom of association had in any way been impaired. Therefore the Government maintained that there had been no interference with their rights under Articles 10 and 11 and requested the Court to declare their complaints under these provisions inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.

    107. The Court, for its part, considers that the applicants' complaints under Articles 10 and 11, as submitted, relate essentially to the adverse effects on their political freedoms caused by the storage of information on them in the Secret Police register. However, the applicants have not adduced specific information enabling it to assess how such registration in the concrete circumstances could have hindered the exercise of their rights under Articles 10 and 11. Nevertheless, the Court considers that the storage of personal data related to political opinion, affiliations and activities that is deemed unjustified for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 ipso facto constitutes an unjustified interference with the rights protected by Articles 10 and 11. Having regard to its findings above under Article 8 of the Convention with regard to the storage of information, the Court finds that there has been no violation of these provisions with regard to the first applicant, but that there have been violations of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention with regard to the other applicants.

    III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION

    108. The applicants further complained that no effective remedy existed under Swedish law with respect to the above violations, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:

    "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."

    A. Submissions of the parties

    1. The applicants

    109. Apart from arguing that the relevant Swedish law on data registration was vague and that the safeguards against improper data entry were inadequate, the applicants submitted, in particular, that Swedish law did not provide for a judicial remedy enabling aggrieved parties to have the files destroyed.

    110. The applicants further alleged that the standardised reasoning the national courts gave when rejecting their request for full access to their respective files had been arbitrary and even stigmatising.

    The first applicant claimed that the Administrative Court of Appeal did not look into the Security Service's files on her before adopting its judgment.

    111. The applicants maintained that during its 30 years' existence the Data Inspection Board had never performed a substantial review of the files of the Security Police. While the Register Board had been a success, it had not been involved in any of the instances at issue under the Convention. The Parliamentary Ombudsperson was not empowered to decide on whether the applicants should be granted a right of access to their files or to correct irrelevant or false information on them. The Chancellor of Justice was not independent of the executive.

    2. The Government

    112. The Government disputed that the applicants had an arguable claim for the purposes of Article 13 and contended that this provision was therefore inapplicable. In any event the requirements of this provision had been complied with.

    113. In so far as the applicants could be deemed to have arguable claims when it came to the correction and erasure of information held by the Security Service, the Government referred to the available remedies. The applicants could have complained - but had failed to do so - to the Data Inspection Board in order to seek appropriate measures.

    114. The Government moreover disputed the first applicant's contention that the administrative courts had failed to look into the Security Police's files. It was evident from the case file of the Administrative Court of Appeal that the court on 3 February 2000 had visited the premises of the Security Service in order to obtain some of the documents.

    115. In so far as the applicants had also complained of a lack of opportunity to seek compensation for any grievances resulting from the storage of information on them by the Security Service, they had had the opportunity to (1) lodge complaints with the Chancellor of Justice, (2) institute judicial proceedings under the Tort Liability Act, or (3) claim - also within the framework of judicial proceedings - damages under the Personal Data Act. None of the applicants appeared to have made use of any of those remedies.

    B. Assessment by the Court

    116. The Court sees no reason to doubt that the applicants' complaints under Article 8 of the Convention about the storage of information and refusal to advise them of the full extent to which information on them was being kept could, in accordance with its consistent case-law (see, for example, Rotaru, cited above, § 67), be regarded as "arguable" grievances attracting the application of Article 13. They were therefore entitled to an effective domestic remedy within the meaning of this provision.

    117. Article 13 guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. It therefore requires the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the "competent national authority" both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their obligation under this provision. The remedy must be "effective" in practice as well as in law (ibid. § 67).

    The "authority" referred to in Article 13 may not necessarily in all instances be a judicial authority in the strict sense. Nevertheless, the powers and procedural guarantees an authority possesses are relevant in determining whether the remedy is effective. Furthermore, where secret surveillance is concerned, objective supervisory machinery may be sufficient as long as the measures remain secret. It is only once the measures have been divulged that legal remedies must become available to the individual (ibid. § 69).

    118. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the Parliamentary Ombudsman and Chancellor of Justice have the competence to receive individual complaints and have a duty to investigate them in order to ensure that the relevant laws have been properly applied. By tradition, their opinions command great respect in Swedish society and are usually followed. However, in the above-cited Leander judgment (§ 82), the Court found that the main weakness in the control afforded by these officials is that, apart from their competence to institute criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings, they lack the power to render a legally binding decision. In addition, they exercise general supervision and do not have specific responsibility for inquiries into secret surveillance or into the entry and storage of information on the Secret Police register. As it transpires from the aforementioned judgment, the Court found neither remedy, when considered on its own, to be effective within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention (§ 84).

    119. In the meantime, a number of steps have been taken to improve the remedies, notably authorising the Chancellor of Justice to pay compensation, with the possibility of judicial appeal against the dismissal of a compensation claim, and the establishment of the Records Board, replacing the former National Police Board. The Government further referred to the Data Inspection Board.

    Moreover, it should be noted that, with the abolition of the absolute secrecy rule under former Chapter 5, section 1 (2) of the Secrecy Act (when it is deemed evident that information could be revealed without harming the purposes of the register), a decision by the Security Police whether to advise a person of information kept about him or her on its register may form the subject of an appeal to the County Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. The former will in practice carry out visits to see the Secret Police register and appraise for itself the contents of files before determining an appeal against a refusal by the Security Police to provide such advice. For the reasons set out below, it is not necessary here to resolve the disagreement between the first applicant and the Government as to the scope of the Administrative Court of Appeal's review in her case.

    In the circumstances, the Court finds no cause for criticising the similarities in the reasoning of the Administrative Court of Appeal in the applicants' cases.

    120. However, the Court notes that the Records Board, the body specifically empowered to monitor on a day-to-day basis the Secret Police's entry and storage of information and compliance with the Police Data Act, had no competence to order the destruction of files or the erasure or rectification of information kept in the files.

    It appears that wider powers in this respect were vested in the Data Inspection Board, which could examine complaints made by individuals. Where it found that data was being processed unlawfully, it could order the processor, on pain of a fine, to stop processing the information other than for storage. The Board was not itself empowered to order the erasure of unlawfully stored information, but could make an application for such a measure to the County Administrative Court. However, no information has been furnished to shed light on the effectiveness of the Data Inspection Board in practice. It has therefore not been shown that this remedy was effective.

    121. What is more, in so far as the applicants complained about the compatibility with Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the storage on the register of the information that had been released to them, they had no direct access to any legal remedy as regards the erasure of the information in question. In the view of the Court, these shortcomings are not consistent with the requirements of effectiveness in Article 13 (see Rotaru, cited above, § 71, and Klass and Others, cited above, § 71) and are not offset by any possibilities for the applicants to seek compensation (see paragraphs 67 to 68 above).

    122. In the light of the above, the Court does not find that the applicable remedies, whether considered on their own or in the aggregate, could satisfy the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention.

    Accordingly, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of this provision.

    IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

    123. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

    "If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."

    A. Damage

    124. The applicants each sought 400,000 Swedish kronor ("SEK"), (approximately 42,970 euros - "EUR") exclusive of value-added tax ("VAT"), in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, arguing that they should be awarded the same level of compensation as had been offered to Mr Leander following the revelations as to what information had been kept about him on the Secret Police register and subsequent to the delivery of the Court's judgment in his case.

    125. The Government stressed that the offer to Mr Leander had been made on an ex gratia basis under a special agreement reached on 25 November 1997 between him and them. In their view, the grant of compensation to Mr Leander could not serve as a model for any award to be made in this case. The Government submitted that the applicants had not substantiated their claim and had not shown any causal link between the alleged violation of the Convention and any non-pecuniary damage. In any event, the injury which may have been inflicted on the applicants was not of such a serious nature as to justify a pecuniary award in this case. In the Government's view the finding of a violation would in itself constitute adequate just satisfaction.

    126. The Court agrees with the Government that the settlement they had reached with Mr Leander could not serve as a model for an award in the present case. However, the Court considers that each of the applicants must have suffered anxiety and distress as a result of the violation or violations of the Convention found in his or her case that cannot be compensated solely by the Court's findings. Accordingly, having regard to the nature of the violations and the particular circumstances pertaining to each applicant, the Court awards under this head EUR 3,000 to the first applicant, EUR 7,000 each to the second and fifth applicants and EUR 5,000 each to the third and fourth applicants.

    B. Costs and expenses

    127. The applicants first sought the reimbursement of their legal costs and expenses, in an amount totalling SEK 289,000 (approximately EUR 31,000), in respect of their lawyer's work on the case (115 hours, 35 minutes, at SEK 2,500 per hour).

    Secondly, the applicants' lawyer sought certain sums in reimbursement of the cost of his work in connection with a "first session" with the third applicant and a number of other persons.

    128. The Government maintained that costs and expenses relating to other cases were not relevant and should not be taken into account in any award to be made in this case. As to the amount claimed with respect to the present case, the Government did not question the number of hours indicated but considered the hourly rate charged to be excessive. SEK 1,286 (inclusive of VAT) was the hourly rate currently applied under the Swedish legal aid system. In view of the special character of the case, the Government could accept a higher rate, not exceeding SEK 1,800. Accordingly, should the Court find a violation, they would be prepared to pay a total of SEK 208,000 in respect of legal costs (approximately EUR 22,000).

    129. The Court will consider the above claims in the light of the criteria laid down in its case-law, namely whether the costs and expenses were actually and necessarily incurred in order to prevent or obtain redress for the matter found to constitute a violation of the Convention and were reasonable as to quantum.

    Accordingly, the Court dismisses the applicants' second costs claim. As to the first claim, the Court is not convinced that the hourly rate and the number of hours were justified. Deciding on an equitable basis, it awards the applicants, jointly, EUR 20,000 under this head.

    C. Default interest

    130. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

    FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

    1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of the second, third, fourth and fifth applicants, but not of the first applicant;

    2. Holds that there has been a violation of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention in respect of the second, third, fourth and fifth applicants, but not of the first applicant;

    3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in respect of each applicant;

    4. Holds

    (a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:

    (i) in respect of non-pecuniary damage EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) to the first applicant; EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros) each to the second and fifth applicants, and EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) each to the third and fourth applicants;

    (ii) EUR 20,000 (twenty thousand euros) to the applicants jointly in respect of costs and expenses;

    (iii) any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;

    (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

    5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.

    Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 June 2006, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

    S. Dollé J.-P. Costa
    Registrar President

    SEGERSTEDT-WIBERG AND OTHERS v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT

    SEGERSTEDT-WIBERG AND OTHERS v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT

    <a href="http://www.jp.dk/dokumentation/artikel:aid=4218494/">Klik her for at læse del 1</a>

    http://www.jp.dk/dokumentation/artikel:aid=4218494/

    PET-arkiver

     

     

    Overvågede danskere vil slettes fra PET-arkiver

     
    Af MORTEN PIHL og SANNE GRAM
    Under Den Kolde Krig overvågede og indsamlede Politiets Efterretnings-tjeneste oplysninger om adskillige danskeres færden. To tidligere politikere vil have dem fjernet.
     
    To venstreorienterede politikere kræver at få slettet oplysninger om dem i arkiverne hos Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET). De var under Den Kolde Krig i PETs søgelys og står fortsat i PETs arkiver. 

    Kravet fremsættes med henvisning til en svensk sag, hvor Menneskerettighedsdomstolen i Strasbourg fastslår, at den svenske efterretningstjeneste Säpo ikke måtte opbevare op til 40 år gamle oplysninger om fire svenskere.

    »Jeg vil have slettet alle oplysninger, og jeg er parat til at gå hele vejen til domstolen i Strasbourg, hvis det skal være,« siger tidligere medlem af Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti, Hanne Reintoft, som efter flere afslag nu har fået adgang til visse dokumenter om sig selv.

    Ifølge tidligere medlem af SF, Pia Dam, er der urigtige oplysninger om hende i PET-arkiverne.

    »Der står, at jeg skulle have haft min gang hos Land og Folk, men jeg har aldrig været der. Hvis jeg erfarer, at jeg også er ulovligt registreret alene på grund af mit politiske virke, vil jeg have det slettet,« siger hun.

    I den svenske sag fastslår Menneskerettighedsdomstolen, at Sverige krænkede fire borgeres privatliv ved at opbevare gamle oplysninger af en karakter, der ikke var nødvendige for efterretningstjenestens aktuelle arbejde.

    Advokat Niels Fisch-Thomsen, formand for Wamberg-udvalget, der fører kontrol med PETs registreringer og sletning af oplysninger, ønsker ikke at udtale sig på grund af sin tavshedspligt.

    http://www.jp.dk/indland/artikel:aid=4219264/